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**LECTURES ON  
“CITIZEN AND WORLD POLITICS”**

The intensity of our contacts with the world – as private persons, citizens – contacts pursued on our own, without the intermediary of the state and escaping the control of great politics, is increasing.

In front of our eyes as ordinary citizens, a great phenomenon of a private person entering the world stage is taking place. Thomas Friedman associated this phenomenon with the term globalization 3.0, the flattening of the world by information technology. Perhaps this is indeed the most powerful manifestation of globalization. But the entry of an individual as an actor into the international arena by no means displaces countries from their traditional role, does not democratize international politics by itself. The individual creates her/his own international world, a parallel world. This world obviously affects the traditional dimension of international relations – relations between states, between states and international institutions, international corporations, social and non-governmental organizations, etc. The impact is slow, not very noticeable, but, it seems, potentially deep. The human individual is not only a citizen who needs the state to act in the outside world on his/her behalf and protect his/her interests against external threats. The human individual is a set of overlapping identities and relationships. He/she is a consumer, producer and member of various communities. He/she is someone who is sensitive to his personal sovereignty and wants more and more often to freely decide about his/her connections, loyalty and obligations.

This emerging role of the individual in international politics is the most important factor in transforming the nature of international relations and their traditional paradigms. It accentuates the tension between the state and the individual – visible in all aspects of social and political life. Perhaps the tension between the individual and the state is the most important process transforming the existing international system and its paradigms.

The protest and revolutionary movements are increasingly spontaneous and anonymous, formed as networks of accidental people, without leadership and organization, and grow in strength facing powerful state machineries. "Facebook" democratic revolutions have swept from the surface seemingly inviolable regimes. The global civic movement on climate change put tangible pressure on political leaders and governments. The spontaneously organized action of the anonymous crowds was able to stop the process of ratification and implementation of international agreements, with the notorious ACTA agreement among others. The

dangers associated with the individual's access to technology are also evident. Doing evil has become easier. Cybercrime can turn into cyberterrorism and even private cyberwar. A human being may even possess weapons of mass destruction.

The fundamental question is to what extent the human being is able to help or replace countries in solving strategic global problems, including those related to climate change, poverty and hunger, fair access to basic goods and raw materials. While we can imagine the negative effects of the state losing its monopoly on the ability to use force and coercion, and losing control over individual's behaviour, we still cannot imagine how the increasing role of the individual can be used for the most constructive purposes: solving global problems.

The empowerment of the individual is linked to the impact of digital technologies – allowing the individual to access freely information, express his/her views and build international connections, create networks and mobilize action. As a backfire some states have tried to limit these freedoms, block connectivity by building national firewalls, prevent operation of some international services, and censor expression. They want to continue their old habits of controlling the individual, at least to survey his/her behaviour and to manipulate it. The digital technologies provided some new possibilities for that.

The global emancipation of the individual also affects the tension that increasingly characterizes the relationship between individual and collective rights. In the long run, this individual empowerment may have a much greater impact on the structure of international relations than the currently observed and emotionally commented political emancipation of developing countries, the diffusion of international power due to the rise of China or India, and the relative decline of the West. The dispersion of power in the modern world is increasingly starting to resemble the formula that reflects the essence of the Internet system: *"Everyone is connected but no one is in charge"*.

The empowerment of the individual creates a new platform for global civic movements. And global challenges like climate change help to build the global civic identity. The idea of global citizenship has been advocated by years. Can it become an organizing force without proper frameworks of a world state?

Some pundits believe that the world politics today stand at a crossroad: either the world returns to the times of national egoisms or it follows the philosophy of "one world". It is obvious that the one world concept can become a reality only if accompanied by appropriate civic mobilization. How this mobilization can be achieved and channelled is of key importance.

The empowerment of the individual changes the way which we perceive the axioms of international politics, its moral dimension, the understanding of justice, and the models of governance of world affairs.

## SESSION I:

### AXIOMS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The history of international relations and the history of diplomacy suggest a profusion of insights regarding states' behaviour on the international arena and the nature of their policies. However, these patterns are not eternal and have evolved with time. **Today's model of international relations emerged some 350 years ago and is sometimes called "Westphalian"**. It has undergone transformations since the Treaties of Westphalia but its main features (states as the primary actors of international relations, their interests as the engines of action, and the principle of sovereign equality) remain the same.

The theoretical views on international relations are often divided into the camp of realists and the camp of idealists. The realists emphasize the factor of interests and power, idealists put emphasis on progress and values, institutions and law.

In political practice, including in the present era, even the most idealistic politician may develop realistic reflexes in practical activity, at least in the praxeological, if not the moral dimension. Politics is still governed by a special version of the principle of Grisham-Copernicus, and it is impossible to treat everything that is received as a good coin. States deceive, manipulate, and even lie to each other, which spoils politics and can heal any politician from idealism at least in the sphere of methods.

The tag of an idealist can be assigned even to leaders of the most powerful countries. Gorbachev with the idea of a common European home or Obama proposing a total denuclearization of the world – earned the description of an idealist. With time, however, they had to learn the arcana of the school of realism. **Perhaps, indeed, idealism is the privilege of powerful leaders.**

The world is not slowing down in its transformation and the rules of international politics must change. Therefore, none of the truths and none of the axioms can be treated as timeless. So what would be the truths that might be helpful to a citizen in deciphering and interpreting the behaviour of states in international politics today? After all, a citizen to be effective as a global actor should understand how the political environment works.

First, **survival is the primary motivation of states in politics**. The preservation of statehood of one's own nation is the highest motivation for every politician. Nothing has changed fundamentally in international politics in this respect since the Peace of Westphalia. For a politician, the imperative of survival of a state (nation) is more important in practice than international law or morality. The state is able to violate its own international obligations, even general legal norms, if its existence is under threat.

In many international treaties and conventions, the states reserved the right to review or suspend their application in the event of threat to their vital security interests. They do so even if the agreements do not explicitly contain such clauses. In 2007, Russia unilaterally suspended the CFE Treaty on conventional weapons, stating that it no longer met its security needs. The principle "clausula rebus sic stantibus" established in the customary law provides an easy excuse in this regard. It is enough to properly

interpret the change in general circumstances affecting the viability of the treaty provisions.

**The survival of the state (nation) is more important than the political survival of its leader.** The European lesson in the state-building process says that once a nation obtains statehood, it is rather unwilling to relinquish it. Of course, there are parts of the elite in some countries for which the existence of their own state is not an absolute historical priority. Political debates in Austria after the end of World War I, in Cyprus in the sixties, in Moldova in the nineties of the last century or in Kosovo at the beginning of this millennium could create such an impression.

The strength of the state instinct depends on many factors: cultural and linguistic binds, ethnicity, historical identity, political legacy, social energy, quality of leadership. The most important conclusion from the European history is, however, that the survival of the state, especially of a small or medium size, depends to a large extent on historical luck, but requires conscious effort. As Machiavelli taught: fortune is an arbiter of half our actions, but fortune must be constantly helped.

In the twentieth century, several European countries were put to an existential test. Debates continue to this day, would a better solution for Czechoslovakia be armed resistance to the German invasion? Does the struggle for state existence have to be at all costs? President Benes used to say that the survival of a nation is more important than the survival of a state.

Even in Poland, visions of alternative history appeared based on the hypothetical fulfilment of German demands in 1939.

Thus survival is the highest good. The leader in the face of a dilemma to choose between the observance of international law and the survival of the state, has basically no major misgivings. Is this a purely abstract observation today? Still, thirty UN member states do not recognize Israel, and there are also politicians in those states who are denying it the right to exist at all. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea perceives the policy of some states in terms of a threat to its very existence. This factor must be taken into consideration, not to justify, but to understand the policy of states in some special circumstances.

The individual turns to the protection of the state when his/her security (physical, economic, cultural) is under threat. But in rich societies (where the value of life has increased dramatically also because of demography) his/her personal survival is no less important than the survival of the state.

Another axiom: **leaders put the state's own interest in the foreground, and treat its power as the crowning measure of the ability to act.** Interests and power change the world and explain the workings of international politics. The paradigm of interest started dominating politics with the advent of capitalism in the 16th century and the Westphalian model of international relations is based on it. Interest became "national" with the era of shaping nation-states in the 19th century. Interest is at least morally neutral. In today's world, the need to introduce a moral compass into international politics is growing. Interest is increasingly subject to moral evaluation. Any leader should be cautioned that when speaking to the national audience he/she should accentuate the national interest and assure that he/she wants to be its guardian, but when appearing in international forums he/she must emphasize the need to strengthen common values and norms in a globalized world.

Globalization has emphasized the postulate of taking into account common interests of the international environment. Explicit national egoism and ignoring the interests of partners conflict with the requirements of political correctness in the era of globalization. **The globalized world requires showing empathy, compassion and readiness to help.** International development aid has become a moral imperative and a political norm. Altruism, in order not to encounter internal resistance, must, however, be shown in such a way that it does not conflict with the primacy of the interest of its own state. The imperative to take account of the wider interests of the international community has become an unquestionable norm. Jacques Attali tried to transfer the concept of altermodernism to politics by identifying it with altruistic modernity. Jeremy Rifkin announced the advent of the age of empathy.

People are genetically programmed, as even Fukuyama has invoked, into altruism. They think in terms of reciprocal altruism – when they help others, hoping that someone will help them if they find themselves in need. Countries do not have such a genetic code, but have learned to think altruistically in the context of basing their policy on a paradigm of interests. The concepts of rational altruism and interested altruism were designed to reconcile the imperative of altruism with the primacy of the national interest. They explain that it is in our interest that other societies should not live in poverty (they could import our consumer goods thus contributing to the growth of our economy), do not suffer from diseases (especially those causing global epidemics), and be well educated (so that they can participate in the network economy and assimilate our Western values).

Altruism towards future generations is the most developed form of international altruism. The growing commitment and cooperation of states to protect the environment and prevent negative climate change is a manifestation of this.

A practical challenge for a leader is, therefore, to show the ability to define national interests in the long run, and reconcile the needs of the moment (e.g. the interests of the coal industry) with the need to take into account the distant future factor (clean air for the next generation).

Another real and indisputable truth of realists proclaims that **the world of international politics is hierarchical.** States are formally equal, but "more equal" actually (politically). Power determines the place in the hierarchy. Asymmetry of power leads to domination, and balance of power weakens hierarchy. The definition of power is evolving. Its classic interpretation (based on the military potential, economic strength, population, etc.) still has decisive meaning, but the role of the "soft" or "smart" power factor, as Joseph Nye announced, is increasing. Soft power is the ability to set an international policy agenda, serve as an example, and the ability to win sympathy.

Each leader listening to the partners' voices must be mindful not only of what is being said, but who is saying it. He/she must take into account not only what he/she says, but also to whom. He/she will instinctively avoid entering into a dispute with those whom he/she perceives as high in the hierarchy. It is easier for him/her to criticize the human rights situation in Myanmar than in China. It is easier for him/her to publicly assess the state of democracy in the DPRK than in Russia.

**The progress of our civilization is measured by the ability to protect the interests of the weaker.** International law serves to limit the power of the powerful, their possibility of imposing their interests on others. International institutions mitigate

power differences between states. Has the warning of Thucydides forever disappeared, however, that "the strong do as much as they can; the weak suffer as much as they must"? The institutionalization of the international environment serves the interests of weak countries. They may still be threatened by a dictate of the more powerful, but it is much easier to resist it today. The Hobbesian vision of international politics may be revived in times of some severe crisis, when the temptation to show others their place in the rank increases, but the hierarchy today in the form of any "pecking order" is difficult to enforce even by the most powerful.

Certainly, what has not lost its relevance is Thucydides' trap: how to react to the emergence of a growing competitor who threatens to take the position currently occupied by the dominant power. Is the conflict between the dominator and the aspirant always inevitable? Nowadays, US-China relations have been interpreted as a test of the truth of the Thucydides trap.

The technological revolution taking place today undermines the foundations of the hierarchical world and the institutions established in it to guarantee order. **Non-state actors are growing in strength.** The world is entering the era of networking. Reforming international institutions without taking into account the increase in the network factor will not bring desired fruit. The problem in the failure of the UN is not how many members the Security Council counts and which are its members. But networking is in itself spontaneous and unpredictable. So leaders have to think about how to connect hierarchies with networking.

A step from the Thucydides trap leads to the next axiom: the international environment is a competitive environment. Countries compete with each other (for military advantage, influence, prestige, commercial deals and investment contracts, influx of tourists, hosting sporting or exhibition events, international offices, and even for the level of citizens' well-being or their future happiness). In times of global transparency, the success of a state's own policy is measured against the achievements of the partners. Societies turn against governments, often comparing their poverty with the well-being of others. It is not without reason that the imagination of voters in many countries can be effectively aroused by the promises to catch up and overtake the level of development of neighbours and partners.

The time of globalization, however, imposes a new force for cooperation in the name of the common interest. This broadens the horizons of the benefits of cooperation, in the past understood only as a way to maximize national benefits. The competition has been organically inscribed today in the imperative of cooperation. Politicians argue that the era of diplomacy as a zero-sum game is now over. The most supportive argument in the debates has become the "win-win" formula (commented sarcastically in some capitals that if a big power proposes the "win-win" formula, it means it wants to win twice).

The search for balance is a reaction to disproportions in the distribution of power, and in particular to its concentration. Too much dependence on one partner is unhealthy. It leads to dependence, even vassalization. A sensible leader is looking for ways to weaken unilateral dependence, in particular by practicing multi-vectorism.

**States are rational** (and are guided by interests, as mentioned earlier, but also by an assessment of the possibilities and limitations arising from the international system) - this is the main truth of realists. However, leaders, like men, are rational only by approximation, even if every leader wants to be guided only by common sense. Their

capacity for cognitive errors is innate. The history is filled with examples of leaders who have gone astray in their judgements.

Leaders are like other people exposed to emotions – their own and social. Fear is the most rudimentary. Does fear remain the invisible engine of small countries? Are especially the presence of very powerful states in the neighbourhood and unpleasant historical experiences in relations with them factors of sedimentary fear, which manifests itself even when there is nothing to be afraid of? Because another axiom states that **threat perception is more important when making decisions than the threat itself.**

**Honour impedes the rationality of thinking.** It has been driving European politics since ancient times for centuries. It went down into the background in the era of the paradigm of interest. But it is still present. It is not just the privilege of large and rich countries. Those do not often want to show that they feel offended, especially by smaller partners. And even more so by states that are denied their honourability (states once called rogue). There are also at least a few medium-sized and even small countries, which even nowadays put the factor of honour above common sense.

Inaction, reactivity, rent-seeking is a feature of self-satisfied countries that consider their main foreign policy goals to be met. Maybe this attitude very often heralds internal stasis and decline of power. Some countries have recognized membership of the European Union as reaching the end of their path in their foreign policy.

It has been assumed that **greed is the engine of aggressive countries.** The problem becomes really acute when external expansion is considered the only way to maintain power. Extensive imperialism is a fairly well described phenomenon – 19th century Russia had to grow territorially to remain superpower.

And **the only salvation of disoriented countries is ideology.** No fuss if ideology is a cynical veil of true intentions. The worst happens when you start to believe in ideology. Ideology strengthens inertia and deprives of the ability to forecast. It is significant that countries that still declare faithfulness to Marxist-Leninist ideology in internal policy today have ceased to refer to proletarian internationalism, the doctrine of peaceful coexistence or other elements of the ideological relay of Marxism-Leninism in foreign policy.

Ian Morris wrote that the true engines of history are fear, greed and sloth. They drive the behaviour of people who do not have awareness of long-term or real effects of their choices. Can a responsible leader today free himself from the algorithm of individual and social emotions, or is he/she able to control them?

Another axiom: **the rules of international coexistence require states that protect their application ("rules need an enforcer"),** i.e. an international order without its guardian is ineffective. The Holy Alliance states of the nineteenth century aspired to be such classic enforcers. Such a decreed collective sheriff was to be the UN Security Council after World War II, but the lack of consensus among its permanent members very easily paralyses it.

The absence of a guardian anarchizes the environment. The cascade increase in the number of participants in international politics is also conducive to anarchization. One of the political leaders in the early nineties had a very simple recipe for stabilizing the international situation after the collapse of the Cold War system. The world would

have to be divided into boxes and a sheriff was to be assigned to each box, who would be responsible to the UN for order in its area of responsibility. Any similar concept would, however, lead to the sanctioning of the idea of spheres of influence, which medium and small countries in particular are extremely allergic to. From areas of responsibility it is only a step to the areas of influence. Today's era was often associated with the slogan of Pax Americana, and the instability was explained with the weakening of the US ability to guarantee universal peace.

The new networked world will not generate a similar enforcer. Is the only way to ensure compliance with the rules created by it – the cutting off the infringer from the network? Only at a time when cutting off will be possible and it will pose serious cost to the infringer, it will be willing to follow the rules.

Another old truth, still much geopolitical, says that **power knows no vacuum**. The rivalry of countries does not leave free space; there exist no man's land in world politics. Vacuum raises the temptation to fill it. The expansive state is pushing itself to the point where it encounters the resistance of the international environment, i.e. other states. It retreats under the effect of resistance. But then, as in a pendulum, it may try again. The problem of vacuum was a real challenge for Europe after the collapse of the USSR. It took some time for Western Europe to realize it.

**Each international institution lives longer than the conditions which justified its establishment.** Each institution, even in such a situation, can justify its *raison d'être* by the potentially catastrophic consequences of its dissolution. It is easier to create an institution than to dissolve it. It is easier to build an institution that replicates existing tasks than to reform the existing one. An old reflex on the part of states has been to see in organizations by default international tools for solving emerging. The reflex is rarely preceded by a reflection whether the old organization is functionally able to cope with the new task. Bureaucratic inertia of international institutions is one of the major blockades in addressing new international policy challenges. All international organizations suffer from weak civic legitimacy.

**International law, politically binding rules and international institutions protect "the weak"**. But big powers will always try to use these institutions to legitimize their unilateral priorities and positions. Ignoring the will of big powers in the activities of international organizations may lead to their marginalization. Big powers will always find a way to express the frustration at the institution's work (by clamping on the budgets, ignoring their decisions, etc.). In turn, international institutions dominated by a big power, especially one growing out of potential over other countries, lose their credibility and are perceived as the transmission belt of a larger power. All institutions of the former communist bloc suffered from this ailment (Warsaw Pact, Comecon). Today this syndrome is visible in the activities of Collective Security Treaty Organization or the Eurasian Union. Asymmetry of potentials was also a serious challenge for some Western institutions (Organization of American States, for example).

Creating a formula for balancing interests and influences is the key to the relevance and credibility of every international institution.

**The stronger the links between states, the less likely a conflict between them.** This principle, and in a double incarnation, was promoted by the well-known journalist Thomas Friedman. Its first version was the McDonald's principle, according to which the states in which the McDonald's network operates do not wage war with each



other. But this referred to the time when McDonald's was an attribute of free world countries. In Russia, McDonald's presence did not have any impact on its policy towards some neighbours.

In the revised form, the theory of the preventive role of close connections was supposed to be reflected in the so called Dell's theorem, according to which states that are part of the global supply chain of an international corporation will not fight with each other. But theoretically they can, because in a globalized world, and especially in a world of hybrid wars, conflict may not interrupt supplies, and there will always be someone who fills the gap if needed.

Strengthening connections as an effective method of preventing destructive animosities is treated by many as the philosophical foundation of the European project from which the European Union grew.

**Nothing unites a nation and consolidates support for the authorities like an external threat and an external enemy.** If the real enemy is missing, then there is nothing else left but to create it. Domestic impact of conflicts makes it difficult to settle them. Threatened by the lack of internal support, the elite may hope that the conflict will arouse the people's solidarity with the government. Therefore, the analysis of the partner's foreign policy, always should start with a deep review of his internal situation.

**Common values reflect common interests.** This thesis found the most expressive expression in the theory of democratic peace: democratic states do not resolve conflicts between each other by force. Even if the proponents of the theory saw its precursor in Emmanuel Kant, it began to take wind in its sails only after the end of the Cold War. It was believed that its soundness during the Cold War was mainly due to the fact that the United States, as the leader of the democracy (free world) camp, did not allow its allies to fight wars with each other. Certainly, democratic control in rich, pacifist societies today alleviates the militant instincts of politicians. But as the American campaign in Iraq has shown, it does not eliminate the emotional blindness of the elite. In any case, the theory of democratic peace works well within the European Union. There, conflict resolution *manu militari* does not come to mind both in the society and the elite.

It is believed that the mistake of Western policy in the 1990s was to oppose values to interests (Western policy towards China). Absolutization of values leads to doctrine detached from the realities, blindly following interests - to cynicism and demoralization of politics.

**The margin for resolving problems by force is shrinking.** The most aptly the paradox of helpless force was once formulated by Madeleine Albright: "Why do we need these wonderful armed forces if we can't use them!" Less and less political problems can be solved by coercion, even legalized (see military operation in Afghanistan), and just as important: social consent for the use of force is decreasing, even in a just cause (see internal resistance in the US to the engagement in Libya or Syria). The argument of strength is becoming more and more irrelevant, especially in political discussions held in Western countries. However, this does not mean that resolving problems, especially local ones, does not cease to tempt to resort to force. The massive proliferation of medium and small weapons, and more recently a drone revolution in the art of war, make the use of military force unprecedentedly cheap and asymmetrically severe.

Globally, **the risk of uncontrolled escalation of even accidental military action remains high.** All optimistic scenarios of world peace (and past experience of crises, e.g. the Cuban one) are based on the assumption of rationality of the decision-making process in states possessing nuclear weapons. But no one can guarantee that an atomic button somewhere cannot be controlled by an irrational person. **Today's post-war era, being the most peaceful in the history of civilization, has at the same time become the most sensitive to deliberate or unconscious errors in political calculations, especially of nuclear countries.**

As Harari wrote: "Even if war is catastrophic for everyone, no god or law of nature protects us from human stupidity."

**Time sanctions fait accompli.** This is one of the most cynical truths of politics. We are dealing today with the effects of such thinking, also in the immediate vicinity of the European Union.

Solving international problems is becoming more and more time consuming. Trade liberalization, climate regulation, and migration management escape simple answers. There is an objective circumstance in this: the problems of the modern world are becoming more and more complicated, and taking into account the diverse interests of an increasing number of participants in international politics makes finding a common and effective denominator a Herculean task. But there are aspects less understood, and thus even more demobilizing, for example, the so-called frozen conflicts. Impotence in resolving sometimes even small, local conflicts can be frustrating. Admittedly, in some of them the interests of larger countries are quite strongly involved, but the meaning of this impotence looks debilitating and leads to a conclusion that the creation of *fait accompli* pays off.

**Procrastination (once the privilege of the strong) became the weapon of the weak.** Unable to counteract the logic of regulations imposed by larger states, they can only slow them down. They sign agreements, even ratify treaties, and then do everything not to have to implement uncomfortable provisions. The implementation of agreements within the Commonwealth of Independent States gives a rich incentive for similar reflections.

Procrastination has become one of the most serious diseases of modern international coexistence. Every leader should be prepared that nothing can change quickly in the world today. The average ratification of even the most innocent European Union international agreement takes Member States over two years. Therefore, the Union is the most consistent spokesperson for provisional application clauses in its agreements with partners.

**The provisional application clause working in *aeternum* has become *signum temporis* of our time.**

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**One of the most consequential developments in international politics in recent decades has been the rise of sub-state (non-state) and supra-state actors. This challenges the traditional paradigms of international relations, their mechanisms and axioms. The Westphalian model experiences an increasing pain to absorb the change. It has failed so far, in particular, to find an appropriate formula to inscribe the voice and the activism of an individual (a citizen) in the settlement of**

**the global challenges and problems like climate change, environment protection, depletion of resources that directly affect the lives of citizens and are global in nature.**

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This list of old and new truths that are driving international behaviour could of course be continued. But, as stated, they are subject to evolution, reinterpretation and change.

The new religion of dystopians – dataism, described by Yuval Noah Harari, assumes that the "big data" revolution will create effective algorithms that predict the behaviour of individuals, societies, countries. Everything is a matter of the ability to obtain and process the necessary information. **Politicians whose raison d'être is to read social moods, and to control them by appropriate social engineering and political measures, will become superfluous.** Institutions controlling data and their processing will be able to create social emotions themselves. The state will be able to effectively control its citizens.

Freedom will consist irrevocably only in understanding the objective necessity dictated by "big data".

Harari predicts that the "big data" era will create new challenges in global politics. It will overwhelm the existing civilization, make irrelevant existing cultural, religious and national divisions. In their place new divisions will appear: transnational, supra-civilizational, resulting from unequal access to biotechnology and infotechnology benefits. **The current structure of international cooperation seems completely unprepared for these qualitatively new challenges.**

In the short term, a very tangible challenge is the use of technology to manipulate the political choices of other countries, including those about their foreign policy. The "foreign factor" in the British pro-Brexit campaign is quite well documented.

Algorithms processing "big data" are being built to analyse social processes in individual countries. Many ministries of foreign affairs commission studies to explore the possibilities of using "big data" in optimizing foreign policy.

Optimists (like Parag Khanna) admittedly believe that the advent of "Pax Technologica" in world politics will ensure harmony and peaceful coexistence, putting an end to traditionally conceived, competitive and conflicting international politics. It should be remembered, however, that in the foreseeable future man will continue to control technology. Technology will remain only an instrument. Its important role is beyond doubt. Already today one can imagine the rivalry of states (and corporations) on the technological field with clear political ramifications. Aren't the following statements appealing to the imagination: "who controls big data controls the future", "who has control over 5G, has power"? Ensuring Internet freedom and creating regulations on artificial intelligence will remain crucial for the future of the world.

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The international environment is a highly complex system. Responding to emerging objective challenges is usually of a temporary nature. Principles are principles, rules are rules, but in general perception the development of the international situation is governed by derogations, variations, fluctuations. That is why so few politicians and diplomats are interested in theories of international relations. As Yogi Berra said: in theory there is no difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is.

**A great source of unpredictability are the unforeseen consequences of our own actions.** The international environment can be compared to a complex, dynamic adaptive system. In such systems, a small, insignificant, insignificant impulse can lead to gigantic, unpredictable changes, based on the multiplying effect.

Robert Merton reminded many decades ago that we were used to explaining the unforeseen consequences of our actions by our ignorance. However, our knowledge will always be limited. And maybe it's a waste of time and energy to fill the gaps in our knowledge to take responsible decisions. There will always be barriers. Can the upcoming "big data" era definitely remove them?

A constant and perhaps indelible even in the era of "big data" is the factor of unpredictability of human behaviour, its propensity to err even if one can accumulate full and complete knowledge necessary to make a decision.

Human error, conscious or unconscious, resulting from rational premises or being the result of madness, is the biggest factor of the unpredictability of politics.

A politician as a reason for his own inaction will always be willing to point out insufficient policy implementation capabilities. Indeed, sometimes even if the cause-and-effect relationship is correctly diagnosed, one may simply lack the strength and means to produce the effect. However, it seems that the main brake on international politics today is the fear of the unpredictable consequences of leaders' own decisions.

What can heal leaders from this fear? Will they get confidence and knowledge about the direction of society's expectations from the use of big data algorithms? Will it remove fear from the decision-making process? Algorithms should not be wrong. The algorithms do not have a hidden agenda. Algorithms are not driven by emotions, prejudices, and ego.

However, this is not an attractive vision of the future of the world.

**And what appears to be the only obvious alternative? Perhaps only the disinterested, collective wisdom of the citizens.** Probably, following the example of some countries, where the development of solutions to difficult, emotionally eruptive issues was given to randomly selected citizens reflecting the image of society (Ireland, Belgium, France), it is time to trust the wisdom of randomly selected citizens of international community countries that reflect the world. It is always a matter of finding the most equitable solutions in a situation where views are divided.

The nineties introduced the fashion of establishing various panels of statesmen and eminent personalities. Each international organization, when struggling to produce ideas for its reforming, used to establish a special panel. The problem with the credibility of these panels' reports was that their composition was mostly made up of former politicians who, although outstanding, did not themselves show courage or the ability to implement the proposals, which they then as wise men suggested to their successors.

## **SESSION II: EMOTIONS, INTERESTS AND VALUES**

What influences international policy more strongly: **objective interests of states (however we define them) or perhaps the collective emotions of nations (or emotional states of their leaders)**? The conventional wisdom says: human beings are emotional but states are rational. The Westphalian model is built on the centrality of states (and thus the rationality of motives of actors). But the states are run by people and they can be influenced by emotions.

Rational interests or political emotions? This is an old question that has been answered differently over the years. And indeed, international politics has consequently stretched itself on its paradigmatic course between the two gravity poles – the pole of emotions and the pole of interests. There was always tension between them.

Habits of opposing passion to reason are still strong. Although they seem to be becoming less and less fit for our post-modern times. **Thucydides found the causes of wars in fear, interests and pride.** It would seem that these are fundamentally different sources. As it turns out later, all three can be reduced to emotions. Even interests. But the road to such a conclusion was long.

The dispute between realists and idealists in assessing the motives for the conduct of states concerned not so much whether, but **how irrationality manifests itself in international politics.** The realistic current in the science of international relations focused on the study of fear as an engine of state policy, its impact on rational reasoning (incidentally pride was reduced to might as a form of prestige). On the basis of a rationalist reflex, passions were pressed by the realists into a straightjacket of interests. **Actors of international politics were assumed to be rational.** Another current – the idealistic school tried to design desirable constructions of reason and mind, which were to stop the world from revealing emotions, especially negative ones.

**Most scholars of international relations were for many years displaying a consistent disregard for the importance of emotions.** Also because of the special nimbus surrounding international politics. For centuries, international politics was seen as a playground of the elites. It was made by the "insiders": members of royal courts, camarillas, secret councils. The court style of practicing politics reduced it to the level of dispassionate intrigue, at best to be treated as a duel of intellect and cleverness, a political game of chess. States and governments were to act rationally, suppressing emotions. Emotions were seen as a disorganizing channel of irrational influx from the external and already strongly disorganized world in its natural state.

**International politics was to be the art of controlling emotions.** The Westphalian Peace is considered a model example of harnessing emotions by negotiating international agreements. In that case it was about taming religious emotions. The Westphalian Treaties, considered as the beginning of the era of international relations based on the principle of the nation-state, did not eliminate, however, emotions from

politics. **They only replaced religious or dynastic emotions with national emotions.**

It has been widely accepted that, unlike people, institutions, especially the state, remain emotionally neutral and are not emotional. By logical projection people who make decisions on behalf of the state are considered as immune to the influence of emotions, guided only by common sense and reason. However, not only in authoritarian countries, where institutions are identified with a person (monarch, dictator), but also in the most democratic regimes, **the most important decisions may be made under the influence of emotions, both collective and individual. Collective emotions would seem to be unavoidable, but individual emotions in a democracy? Yes, because even today it turns out that the most important decisions in a democratic system can be decisions taken all alone, on your own, sole and lasting responsibility. They can sometimes deal with such dramatic issues as starting war operations. In such situations, as in the case of Tony Blair, when he had to decide on military action against Saddam Hussein, the truth is that "for prime ministers it is a moment of loneliness. They can't really trust their ministers or advisers. They are facing a decision that they must make on their own."** Solitude relates also about how to conduct wars. As Margaret Thatcher warned: **wars cannot be waged by committee. The key decisions in foreign policy are made personally. And wherever a person decides, emotions may come to the surface.**

Therefore, historically, emotions have always been evident. **In the era of nation-states it was accepted to associate emotions not so much with inter-state relations, because they were supposed to be rationalized, but with a collective rebellion, a popular or national uprising.** Therefore, it was believed that emotions were mainly manifested by the eruptions of revolutions and revolutionary wars. However, even from a distant perspective, it is difficult to balance the real role of emotions in political calculations. Can it be argued, for example, if the American independence war was dominated by emotions alone? Were Napoleonic marches just motivated by a revolutionary mission? Was the suppression of the 1848 European Spring of Peoples merely an emotional reflection on the part of the participants of the then concert of powers?

One thing is not in doubt: nation-states often need an ideological binder, and there is no ideology without emotions. Nationalism, which the nation-states awakened for themselves, was able to make politics hostage to national passions. The First World War showed how a dull military planning algorithm to respond to the mutual movements of European policy actors could work well if it was oiled by a nationalist amok.

**In the period from the Bolshevik revolution to the fall of the Berlin Wall, national passions were in many places replaced by pure ideologies (communism, fascism, but also the liberal ideology of freedom) as political drivers. Today, ideologies, it seems, have given way to emotions associated with the process of shaping the identity of people, societies and nations. Emotions seem to be driving politics again.**

## **Ancient times – the epoch of rage**

None of the emotions fascinated philosophers, sages and researchers as much as anger, rage. For all time, **Plato** introduced into political discourse the concept of *thymos* - a component of the human soul, without which we would be barely intelligent machines. **Thymos was responsible for pride, shame, need for recognition and anger.** *Thymos* was a full partner of reason and affectations. Nothing like *thymos* explained the Greek world of war.

**Aristotle** associated anger with an emerging impulse for **revenge** for the harm done to us or our loved ones. Seneca saw in **anger a reflex of violence, fuelled by the most inhuman blinded desire for punishment and suffering for others even at the cost of his own loss.** Anger is therefore seen from ancient times as one of the most negative states of personality. First of all, because it is associated with aggression and violence. Marcus Aurelius warned that "the effects of anger are much more serious than its causes."

Today psychologists relativize anger. They also see in it a positive charge. Anger helps to correct the nature of the relationship. It can strengthen the bond with another close person whose harm caused our anger. It can also stabilize our own moral compass in the perception of other people's behaviour towards ourselves. Anger can motivate a person to act. In the social dimension, **collective anger is a catalyst for promoting justice.** In the opinion of modern psychologists, anger very rarely provokes physical aggression and violence. Anger serves to regulate relationships, not to destroy them.

Anger is primarily associated with impulsive, explosive, but short-lived behaviour. Meanwhile, it can also have more durable forms. It can grow and smoulder for years. As a rule, it disappears when the original situation has been corrected to provide the sense of moral satisfaction.

Anger, of course, may apply not only to human communities (masses!), but also to individual leaders. Anger can have a quite rational impact, helping engage reason. It is sometimes seen as an attempt to maintain order and reason, when that order and rationality are undermined. Anger then plays the most rational role.

Traditional perception of anger emphasizes its blinding influence. Anger is supposed to limit our perception, narrow optics, disrupt cognitive functions and selectively interpret stimuli. It turns out, however, that it can also have a quite positive role. Anger can motivate, help to keep focus on a strategic goal.

There are conflicting opinions over the usefulness of anger in negotiations, especially international ones. Of course, where the parties to the negotiations are not quite equal, anger can serve to intimidate and incapacitate the other, weaker party. It is an attribute of strength. Well-staged anger can convince the other side in the tenacity of our position. Politicians are always showing anger, especially in public, more than sadness and guilt, although it can sometimes be seen as a sign of instability. Everything, however, depends on whether or not the surge of anger is justified.

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Peter Sloterdijk recalls the primary role of the presence of rage in politics. **Europe began with anger. Indeed, the West began with anger.** Before that, it was the

Hellenistic divine anger that chose the time, place and human person when the divine anger was supposed to influence the fate of the world. It was the Homeric pure anger which treated people instrumentally, objectively, passively, absolving them morally from the consequences of their own actions. Anger was "the force of action in its quintessential form."

**The world of ancient Greek wars was a world of heroic rage.** The wars between Greek cities were wars for "just" order, proper order of subordination and dependence. Often they were not intended to annihilate the opponents completely, strip them of their property, enslave the population, but to show them simply their place in the ranks. Despite Thucydides' sincere efforts to give the Peloponnesian war in the fifth century BC a deeper strategic sense, from today's perspective, it can only be summed up by the question: "What exactly was it being fought about? For what?" Greece became the arena of the "quarrelsome competition of the internal swarm" which was full of emotions. And just like after the Battle of Mantina, the parties often claimed they had won, but none of them got more than they had before the battle. The end of compulsive wars was brought to an end only by fulfilling the prophecy of Isokrates from the beginning of the 4th century BC that "the only way to consolidate the fragmented Greek world is to take a national crusade under one leader against Persia."

The "joyful bellicism", the cult of heroism, and the "inseparable pair" of the concepts of war and happiness have flowed down to our times with the Hellenistic tradition. But the Greek civilization proceeded to "secularize" affects, fostering a transition from a situation in which emotions control the behaviour of people, to a state in which people have emotions at their disposal, although they do not always control them. **Thus came the "domestication" of anger.** Rage survived, but in the form of bravery. The perception of affectations became more subtle. **It was more often associated with the Platonic "thymos", "the focal point of the proud Self" rather than the divine fury.**

Thymos historically appeared halfway between Homer and the Stoics. As a result, passions obtained the right of citizenship in a state ruled by reason. Although Aristotle appreciated its value as a driving force of justice, anger emerged shadowed by honour, pride and dignity, and disappeared from the list of charisms. Rebellious emotions were ennobled.

### **The Medieval Tyranny of Honour**

In medieval Europe, the Old Testament divine anger and the New Testament divine mercy merged; the fusion of Christianity (love and martyrdom) and Germanic cult of bellicosity (ancient rage) produced a new paradigm. **Rage became an element of royal majesty, the privilege of the kings.** In the feudal social hierarchy, the lower the position on the social ladder, the stronger was the imperative of containment of anger.

**International politics in the medieval times has become a narrative of competition for a place in the ranking of honour.** Europe has evolved into a theatre of wars for confirmation of feudal sovereignty, skirmishes for tributary rights, contests for feudal sovereignty. The English war of barons in the early Middle Ages



was a colourful illustration of this. Heroic deeds in wars became a natural pass for titles and possessions. The cause of a war could have been an ordinary insult to majesty; the right to a title became a bargaining element in peace treaties. When Otto I the Great subjugated Byzantine-dependent territory in the Apennine Peninsula in 967, he himself offered to return it immediately in exchange for recognition of his equal standing with the Byzantine emperor.

The reason for a war could have been the right to use a title. The claims of the English kings to the French throne became the rationale for aggressive expeditionary policy for over a hundred years. It is very interesting to note how the issue of titles influenced the Polish policy in the past centuries, especially in relations with Russia and Sweden. In the case of relations with Russia, the issue of titles was more than just an honorary one, for it was connected with the problem of claims to territories inhabited by Eastern Slavs. When, at the end of the 15th century, Ivan III demanded that Lithuania recognize the title of "*gosudar vseya Rusi*", the underpinning of the request was all too clear. And when in 1576 Russia demanded that the Polish Commonwealth should recognize the title of Tsar assumed by Ivan IV, also then the subtext was clear and even more territorially specific (recognition of Russia's incorporation of the Smolensk and Polotsk lands). In the treaty of 1582 in Jam Zapolski, the title dispute was resolved by a compromise: in the Polish text of the treaty Russia was ruled by "the great gosudar", and in the Russian version by "the tsar and grand duke of Smolensk". Poland definitely recognized the title when prince Władysław was elected tsar in 1610. Władysław gave up the title of tsar only in 1634, but Poland had no more problem thereafter with the tsarist title of Russian rulers.

The titular dispute with Sweden did not have such a geopolitical dimension, although it eviscerated Poland. The Polish Vasa kings displayed their extraordinary attachment to the title of Swedish kings. They valued it higher than the royal title in Poland. From the *realpolitik* point of view, it was a dispute with fatal consequences for Poland. From 1592 to 1660, it fuelled the Polish-Swedish conflicts that exhausted Poland. A small consolation was that Jan Kazimierz forced the Swedes to recognize his right to a lifelong use of the title of the King of Sweden (as if only to sweeten Poland's loss of Livonia). The Oliwa Peace in this sense gave a good testimony to the common sense of the Swedes. Satisfying someone's vanity at the price of settlement that gave territorial gains testified to sobriety that the Polish Vasas lacked.

The fetishization of honour was not just a European feature. In China, the absolutization of the act of homage testified to an equally strong dominance of the factor of honour in politics. It is enough to recall Macartney's missions at the end of the 18th century, when it took several weeks to negotiate whether the English envoy must and how to submit the act of kowtow to the Emperor (a compromise solution turned out to be kneeling on one knee).

The cult of honour seems to continue to this day in diplomacy. Awarding titles and orders to foreign citizens, including leaders of foreign countries, is part of international diplomacy. Not to mention the fact that representatives of foreign states in the rank of ambassador must be addressed as excellencies, and British ambassadors in more significant capitals receive noble titles with the ambassadorial appointment.

The religious (Christian) doctrine of control over emotions, which governed the moral code of human conduct throughout the European Middle Ages, made thymotic

reflexes sinful, morally penalized. Not only pride and anger, however, became signposts to the hellish abyss. **All passions became morally suspicious.**

Enlightenment gave rise to a healthy, middle-class reflex of resistance to this assumption. It questioned the doctrine of waiting for justice and retribution till the afterlife and the final judgement. But at the same time, as Sloterdijk reminds, **enlightenment elevated revenge to the role of an "epoch-making" factor.** It led to a cult of excessive revenge, the most strongly manifested in the French Revolution. The vision of class revenge fuelled later on the communist movement.

### **Capitalism and the Coming of the Paradigm of Interests**

Albert Hirschman masterfully showed how, for the needs of the emerging capitalism, the European societies totally reassessed the impact of passions on human actions.

Christianity gave the passions the mark of sin. And it taught to fight the temptation to sin. Passions were to be curbed. Saint Augustine condemned the desire for money and possession as one of the three sins leading to the fall of man (lust for power and sexual desire completed the triad). By the coming of Enlightenment it was already considered quite possible and justified, however, to use one passion to counteract another (Spinoza later gave it a solid philosophical foundation). It was concluded that the pursuit of fame (power) could have healing social effects. Thus the knightly cult of honour and fame spread, despite the fact that the original Christian interpretation rejected it as a seedbed of vanity and sin. In the era of renaissance, the cult of heroism reached its apogee to be quickly disregarded or ridiculed, like by Cervantes' brilliant pen.

**A revolution in the assessment of passion is associated with Machiavelli and Hobbes.** It resulted from the postulate of accepting the man "as he really is". And in holding back passions, one should no longer rely solely on religious codes and moral instructions. **The state was to control the passions.** Suppressing them on your own would be a task beyond your strength. Therefore, it could only be about taming, harnessing and channelling them. Thus, the state was to become an element of civilizing behaviour. This is how **the theory of the transformation of sinful affectations into noble actions emerged.** Ferocity was meant to contribute to defence, avarice – to commerce, vanity and ambition – to good politics, and as a result these passions could enrich society and the state with strength, wealth and political wisdom. Personal vices were therefore to be transformed into public benefits through a collective effort. This transformation has thus become the secret of civilizational development – **human weaknesses can be transformed into social exploits.** The era of emotion engineering has begun. Engineering concepts based on this were designed by some outstanding minds of the European Enlightenment.

**Interests appeared in these considerations as a construct serving to repress and harness emotions.** In the writings of Machiavelli, they were synonymous with *raison d'état*. Thus, they started influencing state policies. They went beyond their narrow, material or economic understanding. And according to the maxim "interests do not lie", a representative of the proud princely-episcopal Breton-Alsatian family Henri Rohan stated that **just as princes order their people around, interest orders princes around.** The smooth transition from passions to interests was illustrated by

the appearance in the philosophical literature of the 18th century of concepts such as "interested affection" and "passion of interest." Interest has also become more common. Hence, it was often accompanied by the adjective 'public' or 'social', something which passions were never able to experience.

**With the development of capitalism, and after the industrial revolution in particular, the paradigm of interest has dominated politics, the economy and the world.** It freed civilization from masochistic lamenting over the imperfections of human nature and gave moral relief not only to business but also to politics. Sometimes to the point of **killing moral instincts.**

The paradigm of interest came just in time for international politics. The greatest era of territorial expansion of superpowers in history was underway. And at the beginning of the 19th century, when colonization-free areas ran out, expansion had to turn into imperial competition for control over the most strategic areas. **Territorial hunger, ruthless conquest and domination could only be absolved by a morally neutral concept of interest.** This imperialist rivalry took the form of a game of interests.

The international policy quickly recognized the ambivalent, sometimes destructive effects of the primacy of the paradigm of interests, because in contrast to the field of trade or broadly understood economic activity, where the concept of interest is the essence of action, **interests in politics were often too contradictory.** The conflict of interests was clearly destructive to the international environment. The only way to neutralize the negative effects was to weigh the interests, try to reconcile them. This was the etymology of the concept of **"balance of interests"**, which quickly entered political discourse.

Hirschman recalled that **the paradigm of interests gave the world a new psychopolitical quality: predictability and stability. And by directing public interest towards enrichment through trade and business, it contributed to the progress of human civilization. Therefore, interest became a paradigm of progress. In the international dimension, the economic interest was intended to reduce the likelihood of wars, bring nations closer and overcome prejudices between them. Because nothing brings together like trade and mutual benefits.**

**Interest became a soaring monument to the triumph of common sense over emotions in politics.**

### **Emotions Today – the Thymotic Revolution**

One of the collaterals of rage has been revenge. Revenge, of course, has always existed in politics, including international politics. Revenge was inscribed for millennia in the negotiating position of the winners of the war. Through the image of revenge, anger gained its future-oriented spin. There is a thesis that all angry societies are future oriented societies. And revenge offers the biggest support for determination in pursuing change. The political events seen in this context make us conclude that **"all history is a history of rage." The problem is that anger, as a motor for designing the future, treats the future as the reconstruction of the past. Sometimes this can drive politics into a dead end.**

The thymothic core of politics is referred to at times in justifying the legitimacy of the Hegelian desire for recognition. Accordingly, the lack of recognition could cause legitimate anger. This is a practical problem of modern politics. It is believed that treating Iran and the DPRK as political outcasts from the international community only strengthened their uncompromising and confrontational tone. President GW Bush was accused of making "his axis of evil" become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The nightmarish tragedies of the 20th century are interpreted as a failure of the concept of civilizing the thymothic energy. Bolshevism, in particular, is seen as an attempt to condense and channel anger in the form of a political project to rebuild society and the world. From today's perspective, this attempt appears as a macabre experiment to politically exploit mass discontent. The communist movements were quite strongly lined with the desire for revenge and compensation. They did not civilize anger, but allowed it to pour out in the form of hatred.

Sloterdijk believes that thymos nowadays receives its second chance under the code name of sublimity. The thymotic emotions are channelled to satisfy the need for recognition. Today, man is already able to satisfy all existential needs, except for one – the most ephemeral and lofty – the need for recognition. The need for recognition arises from "revised thymology," reflecting **megalothymia**: a human claim to pride and grandeur. Developing Fukuyama's myth of the end of history, Sloterdijk announces "eternal thymothic anxiety," replacing the era of physical wars with an era of metaphorical wars. The demand for a fair recognition of all by all is in principle impossible to fulfil, even if it can be included in the formal guarantees of law and egalitarian social codes. As Sloterdijk notes, people in conditions of widespread freedom will never stop chasing specific forms of recognition, excelling themselves in prestige, prosperity, sexual attractiveness and intellectual superiority. The result of this race is the accumulation of anger in the weaker, excluded and handicapped. Society becomes obsessed with constant competition for success in life. Despite finding new ways to meet the need for recognition, **frustration is a permanent feature of society**. In this way, "modernity has invented a loser."

Sloterdijk predicts at the same time that "the first half of the 21st century will be shaped by enormous conflicts, induced by angry and offended civilizations. It is remarkable that at the beginning of the present decade political labels appeared referring to the bare concept of anger: the "*indignados*" movements in particular.

**For now, however, that the post-Cold War world is a world of diffusion of anger.** There is nowhere a centre of anger condensation or any vision of its concentration. "Indignation no longer has any idea capable of embracing the whole world." Today's world is a world of dispersing everything. There are many reasons for diffusion of anger. Above all, institutions that could embezzle universalistic horizons of anger have not developed. There is also no ideology of anger that would be enfranchised. Paradoxically, the most universal vision of alter globalists is an anti-universal and anti-future vision. There is also a lack of social platforms of universal anger - social class, group, and tribe. The universal aestheticization of life also causes that the discharge of anger comes quickly and virtually. A half-day riot with a car put on fire and window breaking is sufficient for the need to satisfy anger to be effective.

In international politics, emerging countries are not looking for an opportunity to discharge their anger. It is written about China that they want to use the existing

international structures to their maximum advantage, and not change or overturn them. The concept of *peaceful rise* had a thesis of the renunciation of revenge on the list of axioms.

Resentments in African politics associated with colonial trauma are manifested only in the verbal layer. There is no attitude of anger in the daily policy of African countries towards the West. The situation is more complicated in the Islamic world. Stocks of hostile sentiments towards the West, especially towards the USA, are big, but used instrumentally in domestic politics. In foreign policy, anger syndrome basically only characterizes the policy of countries like Iran. In Europe one could probably find two countries with foreign policy driven by anger: Russia and Serbia. Certainly it is not anger in its extreme form, but more sophisticated. One can meet the view that both countries differ in objective interests and azimuths of politics, but what connects them (next to religious, pan-Slavic and historical sentiments) is the emotional state in politics.

And what about international terrorism as an emanation of anger in international politics? According to Sloterdijk, international terrorism at the beginning of the 21st century is posthistory. He denies it the right to historical sense. It appeared and was received with an oversized response because it responded to the West's need for an enemy, a role vacated by the communist East. Terrorism under the banner of Islam has become a substitute for the enemy. Islamism in this assessment is not able to replace communism as a "global resistance movement".

The 21st century is to be ruled by universal multi-egoism. Anger, therefore, according to Sloterdijk, gives way under the pressure of misanthropy, which in a specific form of amorphous negativity must already be called mesocosm or misisia: animosity to the world and the very human existence. It brings anger to a zero point and pushes it into the embrace of apathy. Anger, however, exists and, according to Sloterdijk's theses, is the main force in the ecosystem of passions. But it has died, however, as the nucleus of the revenge mindset.

**Resetting anger, neutralizing collective anger, which, despite Sloterdijk's suggestion, is hard to believe, would be good news for the world and international politics.**

### **The Geopolitics of Emotions Today**

Which emotions are determining today the direction of the modern world? No longer anger, because as we have concluded above, it can only function today in a peripheral, diffused form.

Dominique Moisi says: **fear, hope and humiliation**. Because **all three touch upon the problem of trust**, and trust is the substance that decisively determines our emotional relationship with the world. Fear is the lack of confidence. Hope – its expression. Humiliation - its violation. Confidence determines the attitude towards the future, its challenges, and thus the attitude towards others. We need all these emotions for healthy and efficient functioning. International policy should promote their balance. **The balance of emotions is decisive for the health of the world.**

The empowerment of an individual as an actor of international policy is a crucial factor in the growing importance of the emotional balance of the world.

The logic of reasoning proposed by Moisi is as follows: **the world has been charged with emotions by globalization**. Without emotions, one cannot grasp the complexity of the world in which we live. Globalization has primarily caused uncertainty and insecurity. Above all – an identity shock. Globalization raises the question of the identity of individuals, societies and entire nations. And identity affects the sense of trust and confidence. **The free flow of goods, people and ideas leads to a free flow of emotions. Positive and negative ones.**

Emotions became the gravedigger of geopolitics.

The three basic emotions: fear, hope, humiliation are always present simultaneously, but in different proportions depending on the place (continent, region) and time.

Perhaps we do not fully grasp **the emotions of the Orient, but it is difficult to disagree with Moisi's thesis that they are emotions associated with hope.**

He associates the emotional state of **humiliation with the world of Islam**. However, humiliation is everywhere. It can mobilize. But it can also incapacitate. The Japanese or later the Korean economic successes are explained by a deep motivation that arose from the humiliation of Japan by America, and Korea by Japan. Even today, Chinese progress is mobilizing the Japanese. The defence against humiliation by the Chinese is reportedly the main motive of the Japanese anti-stagnation grove. So humiliation can strengthen competition instincts. But it can also turn into resignation or a desire for revenge.

Perhaps **humiliation remains the most underrated emotion in politics**. It is easier for people to endure suffering and deprivation than a lasting sense of humiliation.

There is even a **diplomacy of pity**. Diplomacy of pity is about using guilt for political purposes that another country may feel because of harm done to the country in question. This is how Moisi characterizes the sense of Israel's policy towards Germany (Germany is always more inclined to support Israel than to support the Arabs). Similarly, Arabs play on the guilt of former colonial powers (British or French).

Moisi also claims that emotions are cyclical. The length of the cycles depends on culture, political events, economic processes, events in the world. Recursion can be quite irregular.

Of particular importance, however, in today's world of emotions seems to be fear. It mainly concerns the West. **The West is a society of fear**. Moisi is not alone in this diagnosis. The West as a society of fear is an apt, though superficial, term. Anxiety has long been inscribed in the mentality of European societies. Also in recent history. Geopolitical fear accompanied Western Europe throughout the Cold War. It is, however, completely incomparable to the nature of today's fear. It was a real fear resulting from the number and destructive power of weapons and armed forces, war doctrines and the sharpness of political confrontation. Any major Cold War crisis, Berlin, Korean, or Cuban, could have developed into a nuclear war or Soviet invasion. This geostrategic fear of Western Europe was concrete and tangible. The foreign policy of Western Europe in the Cold War period was clearly marked by this fear.

This fear made Western Europe dependent on America, and produced quite a characteristic "American neurosis" in European politics.

Today, European fear is more than just political fear, deeper than social fear. One could say - it is a deeply civilization fear. Zygmunt Bauman wrote that **today's social fear in the West has the character of derivative fear**. It is the anxiety resulting from exposure to danger, unspecified in the sources of the sense of insecurity, perceiving the world as full of dangers, which can collapse at any time, from everywhere, without warning. This is a world of threats against which there are no reliable guarantees. Whether we call a threat a terrorist attack, a failure at a nuclear power plant or a climate disaster - does not matter. The Western European societies have adopted the vision of helplessness to potential danger, and have incorporated it into their mental code. In this way, this **derivative fear has become a self-driving mechanism**. And the Western societies have entered a state of deepening resignation. In particular, they do not believe in the sense of elevating guarantees against threats. They are subject to the spectre of danger despite the lack of the slightest contact with its real dimension. It is not surprising then that Germany is abandoning nuclear energy even though they have never experienced a major accident themselves, and their territory is surrounded by countries that have active nuclear policy (France).

It cannot be excluded that fear in Western consciousness may also arise from neurosis resulting from the loss of a sense of centrality in the development of the world. **Marginalization of the West would in itself be a source of fear**. From this perspective, fear has become an indicator of the crisis of the West. The West is afraid because it has lost control of the future.

As mentioned, fear is an emotional response to the perception (real or exaggerated) of impending danger. It leads to a defensive reflex that reflects the identity and "crunchiness" of a person, culture, civilization. One could say after Bauman that it is the key to analyzing the human person and society: "Tell me what you are afraid of and I will tell you who you are". However, fear can have positive sides: it protects against self-confidence, can be a source of hope. This is the great challenge of the European project. The point is to use the fear of the future, compounded by the current financial crisis or the climate change, to generate the hope necessary to develop the mechanisms of a common Europe.

At the same time, Zygmunt Bauman saw the connection between fear and the demise of a democratic ideal. Fear reduces the qualitative gap between democratic and undemocratic regimes because "fear pushes countries to violate their own moral principles based on strict compliance with the rule of law."

There is a lot of truth to the statement that **nothing increases fear as ignorance**. Xenophobia as a fear of Otherness also arises from ignorance. Bauman claims that knowledge is the answer and the key to emotional control, and thus overcoming negative emotions. It is impossible to disagree with the thesis that peace and reconciliation is only possible between people who know and understand each other.

Many scholars say that globalization highlights the problem of identity, its definition and evolution. Bauman already saw this as a stage of people's obsession with their identity. The obsession only increases the importance of emotions in the world, and emotions are an additional element that complicates the view of the world. The world in quality and quantity is becoming more and more complex. It is impossible to

comprehend it. It can either be simplified (religions and their simple truths) or structured emotionally. For this reason, it becomes imperative to understand the emotions of other cultures. Emotional borders have become at least as important as territorial borders.

This new civilizational European fear is manifested in its own way in international politics. There are, of course, deep layers of old, conventional fear in politics. On them is built the geopolitical thinking of Russia or China, not to mention small countries, sensitive to threats from stronger neighbours.

If you look for signs of derivative fear in the foreign policy of European countries, it is the lack of readiness for pre-emptive action in their policies, lack of attempt to embrace systemic solutions that would be ahead of time, and lack of readiness for risk. This policy is an expression of resignation from the inevitability of cataclysms, deterministic waiting for real problems (with the implicit hope that most problems will not occur, will be solved by themselves or through the efforts of others). Critics of the common EU policy accuse it of reactivity: the European Union usually reacts, not pre-empt, and reacts slowly and in a predictable way: by introducing sanctions or granting aid. It can be said that this is what pragmatism looks like under the influence of the derivative fear.

### **The Promise of Empathy**

There is no doubt that the most desirable emotional formula for the harmony of international relations and the implementation of great ideals associated with their remodelling would be a composition of positive emotions based on empathy. Will empathy be a source of emotions for the future?

Jeremy Rifkin claims that **empathy is the essence of the progress of civilization**. People are genetically encoded for empathy. Which does not mean, however, that they are also not genetically inclined to "aggression, materialism, utilitarianism and selfishness." Like violence, aggression, as we wrote in previous chapters - empathy has its genetic foundation. Mirror neurons are responsible for it. You can develop it. For, the same neurons are activated in the process of learning foreign languages. Learning foreign languages thickens the mirror neuron system.

According to Rifkin, **we are currently observing the largest surge of empathy in all of human history**. Admittedly, this growth is limited mainly to the prosperous strata of the societies of the most developed countries, as well as the middle class in developing countries. **The catalyst for empathy was the accumulation of economic wealth**, which enabled the society to achieve a level of security that gave people the chance to move from "survival" strategies through a period of dominance of materialistic values (enrichment, consumption) to a period in which the most important for people became "the quality of life". **Prosperity has brought people a safe margin of trust and confidence**, both in relation to other people, societies and the environment as such. Globalization at the same time deepened the divisions and stratification of societies measured according to the current philosophy of life (survival – enrichment - quality of life).

Empathy exists in every culture and at every stage of civilized development. In the societies of the "culture of survival" it was limited to a narrow circle – people above all connected by blood ties, tribal membership, belonging to a common caste or social



layer. The development of economic opportunities and religious awareness allowed empathy to cross the boundaries of affinity and to be extended to anonymous crowds of strangers, however, connected by religious (intra-Christian, Islamic or Judaic) affiliation. The ideological factor expanded the limits of supra-religious empathy to the territorially designated circles of national communities. Beyond these borders, however, there was the empathic "no man's land."

Today's knowledge-based societies, stimulated by individualistic attitudes, show an unprecedented level of empathy. For, if one feels safe within the limits of one's own freedom, he/she naturally shows more understanding and trust in others. Strangers no longer are perceived as a threat.

In poor (or primitive) societies, survival is a priority. There, the most important thing is economic and physical security. Life is organized in hierarchical-command structures: family life is governed by patrimonial principles, social life is characterized by the supreme role of the state. Individuals outside the family, clan or nation are treated at least as a potential threat.

The transition from pre-industrial societies to "quality of life" societies is sometimes violent and fast (see China today). In particular, a breakthrough is taking place from the materialism of industrial societies towards the intangible values of a "knowledge-based" society. The illusion that the material well-being gives a sense of freedom evaporates. Something more is being sought.

The march of empathy through the history of human civilization was highly irregular, although linear. The thesis about the historical zenith of empathy in today's societies provokes the question of how to explain that the empathy of post-industrial societies is accompanied by other social phenomena within them, which are by no means associated with good emotions. Post-industrial societies are often described as atomized societies with disappearing social bonds. Marriage is becoming increasingly fragile. The "patchwork family" formula is becoming more and more wide-spread. The western world is apparently entering the "post-family" era. In several at least Western European capitals, singles constitute a significant (even more 50 per cent) percentage of households.

Individualism, indifference, egoism describe today social relations in the West. Impressive numbers of "friends" on social media, numbers of followers on twitter, etc. are important, but above all statistical. The role of these numbers is mainly to impress others.

Empathy, however, increased, without a doubt. So far excluded and discriminated groups: women, LGBT people, people with disabilities, dissenters regain their rightful place in the society. The level of negative feelings towards other nations is falling.

The trend is very clear: decrease in negative feelings. The alien ceases to be a threat. Even the one quite different in customs, beliefs and views.

Empathic awareness cements social bonds, builds good will, intensifies contacts, allows you to enjoy communing with the world. It translates into the way of assessing international relations. It is harder for politicians to propagate negative emotions. Even if they erupt, it is for a short time.

## **The empowerment of the individual contributes to the promotion of positive emotions in international politics.**

Is the increase in empathy significant enough to revise the entire view on the history of civilization and its political and international dimension so far? Is it possible to start writing human history anew by assessing events through the prism of the hierarchy of values built around the empathy paradigm? Instead of continuing to comprehend history as a narrative of power and wealth, including, in particular, the narrative of pathological aspects of power (war, conquests), instead of continuing to comprehend history, history would be rather about what Hegel once called "empty pages of history" (periods of social happiness, harmony, peace).

There are historians who believe that at the dawn of its history, humanity lived the happiest of "empty histories." Rifkin reminds that by 93 percent in its historical time as a species, people lived harmoniously and without conflicts in tribal groups (numbering from 30 to 150 people) as hunter-gatherers. Aggression and violence were limited to keeping hunting grounds under control when foreign tribes travelled through them, as well as to *male selection*. Even after switching to settled agricultural mode in the Neolithic age, people lived relatively peacefully. This is to be confirmed by the lack of fortification remains, weapons and traces of violence. This idyllic era was not disturbed until around 4400 BC by the arrival of warlike nomads from the East. It was the Kurgans who reportedly disturbed the earlier European idyll. Domestication and animal husbandry closed it irreversibly. Property appeared. And where ownership is at stake, there is competition and violence. It must be remembered, however, that at an early stage of humanity people were united by a common challenge: nature and threats to the existence it carried (predatory animals, food scarcity).

The "blank pages of history" show that changing the paradigms of history is not a simple matter. The dramatic transitions of history are and will remain the building blocks of national identity. They cannot be erased and reinterpreted. Of course, morally correct questions can be asked: should collective memory be marked by wars, suffering, crises, acts of brutality and violence? Should it be rather determined by acts of solidarity, support, generosity and altruism? But these will be demagogic questions. Because tragic and dramatic events will always remain anchors of collective memory. This is their nature. Also today.

Another question: can the march of empathy revise views on elementary political and legal concepts such as freedom, independence and sovereignty? According to Rifkin, freedom was the dominant concept of the Age of Reason. Freedom was then understood as autonomy towards the will of others, a state of independence from the will of others. Freedom was the title to dispose of your own work and its fruit, the title to ownership. Sovereignty of choice has become the essence of democracy. The right to pursue one's own interests started driving the economic system. Empathy makes freedom a means of optimizing one's personal potential and entering emotional relationships with others. Similarly in the group dimension. The national dimension of this phenomenon means that sovereignty is fulfilled in entering international relations, which is difficult to argue with. Even a few decades ago, it was suggested that true sovereignty is associated with the ability to satisfy needs independently, with self-sufficiency and even autarchy. Today, such views can only provoke laughter. **Freedom is realized by becoming entangled in a network of dependencies!**

Empathy also changes our sense of justice. It promotes the concept of reconciliation. It makes revenge unacceptable. In recent years, international relations have been a testimony to new practices that convince us of the strength of the need for reconciliation filled with empathy. After the Second World War, Europe entered a historically unprecedented path of reconciliation between nations. France and Germany, Germany and Poland, Poland and Ukraine – these are the best-known examples. Reconciliation has become a political term. In a dozen or so recent years, this practice has gone internationally. Truth and reconciliation commissions were established in South Africa, Ireland, Argentina and Timor-Leste. Reconciliation has even become an instrument of re-socialization. The term *restorative justice* has been introduced in the education policy of penitentiary establishments in at least several countries. Its essence is to stimulate the empathic awareness of the perpetrator of the crime.

Another dimension in the impact of empathy: it changed the strategic role of information. Information is no longer a privileged good whose possession gives an advantage. The principle that "information gives power" no longer exists. Empathy makes "sharing information" the source of power. This is another impact of the Internet. Sometimes, of course, to the limits of exaggeration. The *WikiLeaks* scandal has by no means shown that secret diplomatic information would serve to immorally plot against other states, to play cynically and to compromise power before society. What it proved was the truth that there are areas of information and evaluation in the policy of states, which, even in the name of protecting the interests of individual citizens, must remain outside public knowledge. The requirement of transparency in foreign policy is a legitimate requirement, but it has its limits. It should be added that the scandal with the anti-Islam video of 2012 made clear how easy distribution of information can destabilize political processes. But there are also very encouraging examples - just mention the phenomenon of *Linux*, the distribution of free software in the name of mutual benefits.

The era of mass communication, especially television, has created the phenomenon of para-social relationships. Millions or even billions of people sit in front of TV sets watching the same event (funeral of Princess Diana, wedding of Prince William or Princess of Sweden). The Internet revolution has transformed para-social relationships into *peer-peer* relationships. Relations have flattened, acquired an open, cooperative and truly subjective character. "The world has truly become a stage, and everyone – an actor." Para-social relationships generate para-political behaviour (activities). The best example - the "anonymous" movement against ACTA.

The most important for our considerations is the fact that the Internet revolution has consolidated global consciousness. The Internet "pushes the young generation towards cosmopolitanism and universal empathic sensitivity." The dark side of this process is the spread of narcissistic attitudes, Internet voyeurism. Just as the concept of a "social" network is inherent in the era of the Internet, so its mirror-like negative reflection of the Internet is the phenomenon of virtual parallel societies. They operate in silos without the slightest intention of talking to opponents. The Internet gave the individual the rostrum for free speech, but it also provided the cover-up for hate speech. It enabled free and democratic choice, but at the same time exposed it to delusions and anti-liberal manipulations.

**Without the Internet, the “world of human individuals” would never have arisen. It turned the Internet into a medium for co-creating the world by the individual. Anyway, more than cheap transport and visa-free travel. It was the Internet that brought the human individual to the stage of world politics. The world has been a theatre for a long time, but in the twentieth century, most people were barely spectators, sat in the audience, today the audience enters the stage.**

Empathy is also to stand behind growing cosmopolitanism. Urban, ethnically and culturally diversified environments build a "culture of hospitality," and cosmopolitanism has ceased to be the ideology of the elite. It grows from below, on the basis of social contacts in a multicultural environment. It becomes "organic cosmopolitanism".

How the social and personality ramifications of empathy have manifested themselves in politics, especially international politics, is obviously a topic of direct interest to us. The unquestionable effect is the growing sense of solidarity in international politics, development assistance treated as an elementary reflex, not the requirement of political correctness, a natural reflex of assistance in situations of natural disasters and other often affecting distant nations. Empathy for humanitarian intervention stands behind international human rights mechanisms and justice institutions. But its effects can be more strategic: empathy in international relations can manifest itself in the fact that they will have an increasingly "participatory" character. Expanding international organizations, multiplying international agreements can take on systemic importance in this light. Empathy can change the paradigm of international politics as such - participation in conversation about world affairs will become an end in itself. It will not be about profit, power, and influence. It will be about affirming the act of belonging to a wider community - regional, value community, and global community.

However, today, in everyday contacts, thanks to empathic education, we do not want to own, but want to have access. We do not want to trade ownership, we want to open the "participation" and "belonging" formulas. Perhaps this is a recipe for a way of understanding international relations and the expanding spheres of public goods: **instead of trading resources and protecting our part of public goods, it is better to protect universal, fair but balanced access to them (to waters, raw materials, technologies, etc.).** And in this way empathy-fed non-hierarchical and cooperative world will become a real model of the future.

The power of empathy and the attractiveness of a networked world are so tempting that they can seduce us without end. So it's time for some sobering comments. It seems that the increase in empathy is not the only symptom of the emotional transformation of modern man and society. Empathy, and its unquestioned growth in the Western societies, is part of a wider phenomenon. Perhaps it should be described more as entropy of emotions. Emotions are becoming more and more diffused. Their amplitude decreases. The lack of strongly negative emotions is accompanied by a decrease in the intensity of positive emotions. Entropy of emotions means that we tolerate the otherness of the environment, but we are becoming the centre of positive feelings more and more ourselves. This must not weaken the pronunciation of the conclusion that empathy manifested as tolerance is already a giant advance in our relationships with others. It is the key to a fundamental reconstruction of the tribal paradigm in international relations. There is so much of it enough to start destroying

the order based on the duality of standards regulating relations between states on the one hand, and within countries on the other, which is taking place before our very eyes.

Politics is increasingly being linked to the process of generating and accumulating positive emotions. Every long-term political strategy today is focused on building the capital of social trust. It is of key importance to developing countries. And, as we already know from references to Moisi's arguments, modern emotions touch upon in the first place the problem of trust. Effective policy must generate hope. If it can't do it, it will turn society away from politics.

This also applies to international politics. **A policy that appeals to fear or anger cannot generate trust. The world, especially in such a run as today, must be managed by a load of positive emotions.** This does not mean, however, that today we do not have personalities with an old emotional structure among politicians shaping the international climate. We know that we need to take into account their emotional characteristics. The role of emotional profiling in international politics is growing. Making an emotional portrait of an interlocutor is a permanent element of preparation for negotiations and international talks.

In general, emotions in politics never show themselves directly. They go a long way by shaping the identity of the political class and leaders. Therefore, the concept of existential code, generational identity, and national mentality is more suitable for analysing the political course of a state.

**All in all, the surge of social emotions is evident. The State has increasing problems in controlling and shaping the emotions of the citizen, in particular concerning the outside world. The citizen used to be told by the State whom to hate, whom to fear, whom to like. With decreasing impact nowadays. The emotional sovereignty of the citizen puts additional stress on the existing model of international relations. They are still based on a morally neutral and emotionally sterile concept of interests. The rise of positive emotions, in particular empathy, makes the traditional model unwieldy in transferring the new positive energy created by citizens into common benefit.**

### **The Primacy of Values**

**Like before the advent of the Enlightenment and the emergence of capitalism, we are witnessing now another period of paradigm shift. Just as passions were once replaced by interests, today interests are being supplanted by values.**

The impulsive reaction to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 can be interpreted as one of many proofs of this phenomenon. Many recognized economists and politicians then talked about the moral bankruptcy of the existing model of capitalism. Stock market bubbles gave rise to attack the degeneration associated with the so-called casino capitalism. Capitalism, understood as a dispassionate pursuit of interests, the clashing and harmonization of interests through competition and market mechanisms, has lost its attractiveness. The crisis eventually discredited the belief that greed is good, which after all was the foundation for the paradigmatic transformation of passions into interests.

We already know that interests differ from passions mainly in form. What are the interests? Nothing other than desires, worries and fears on which we build our views and positions. By understanding interests, it is easier for us to reconcile our desires with those of others.

The introduction of the interest category as the chief paradigm of international relations had practical justification. Negotiations on the level of interests allowed faster reconciliation of parties to the dispute than conversation on the basis of rights or hierarchy. And harmonizing interests through negotiation was the best way to build relationships and trust.

**The problem with values is that, like interests, they grow out of subjective needs. However, they are more stable. But also less plastic. It's hard to bend them. As a rule, they are not negotiable. Therefore, it is impossible to negotiate on the basis of values if the parties adhere to their different canons.**

Today, the moral conclusion resonating quite convincingly is that social and civilizational development based on the pursuit of interests (individual or group ones) has reached its limits. The progress must be about following the values that are the essence of our civilization and the premise for self-realization of people and societies. The concept of interests and pursuit of interest is to fall to the shadows. This also applies to international politics.

**In modern international politics, the concept of values as a motive for the action of states appeared at the turn of the last century.** The rise of values was associated with the development of international law. The First World War brought moral reflection, which forced us to look for the foundations of peace in recognizing the rights of minorities, self-determination of nations, and propagating the idea of justice as a way of settling disputes. Woodrow Wilson personified the idealism of international politics based on values to the fullest. The world approached, at least in terms of political discourse, to a point where the overthrow of the Westphalian model of international policy based on interests was really close.

An even greater influx of idealism, centred on the idea of peace as the supreme value, occurred at the end of World War II. However, it was quickly drowned out by geopolitical calculations.

The realists prevailed.

The values became an important argument for the West in the era of confrontation with communism. Freedom became the supreme of them. The ideological war was a dispute about values. Since the late 1970s, the values factor has made its way through international politics through the concept of human rights. **It would seem that with the fall of communism in Europe, a universal community of values based on the Western understanding of democracy, social justice and market economy should come about soon.**

However, the Chinese challenge emerged. Initially, despite the shock of the tragedy on Tiananmen Square, attempts were made in the West to conduct a policy towards China set by the compass of values. The victory over Soviet communism was treated as its historical validity and effectiveness. Rotten compromises, which the West sometimes had to make to the USSR, giving up values for interests, acquired

retrospectively bad connotation. Realpolitik was referred to as transactional diplomacy and was disparaged.

The West, and the United States first of all, adopted a strategically expectant attitude towards communist China in the early 1990s. It was assumed that the temptation to seek a compromise between the values factor and the real interests factor would have to be rejected. The West should rather stick to its principles, and the consistency in its policies would eventually ensure the final goal of connecting China with the West through a bridge of values. Therefore, it was necessary to support the development of the market economy in China, promote trade contacts, support the inclusion of China in international networks (WTO), and democratic reforms would come by themselves. The gap in the sphere of values would inevitably be filled. It turned out, however, that the desired internal changes in China did not occur. Capitalism grew in China, but communism in politics and ideology held fast. Waiting had no effect. Instead of wasting time, it became necessary to come up with a formula for combining interests with values in the Western policy towards China.

At the same time, the West skilfully avoided entering into disputes about the coexistence of values, and especially in disputes over the superiority of the so-called Western values over Asian values.

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In the postmodern world, people are inclined to perceive the effectiveness of state policy, including international policy, more and more through the prism of their own well-being and satisfaction than national well-being and the degree of state satisfaction (prestige in the world, etc.). Sociologists say that in developed countries, above a certain level of material security of existence, **the human individual begins to value the realization of its values and symbolic interests more than the multiplication of material goods and the realization of physical interests.** This applies in particular to how we perceive relationships with the outside world. We do not look at the world only through the prism of our own economic interests. It turns out that such a basic interest as the prospect of a good workplace would seem to give way to the interest of protecting a community's identity (but a community wider than family).

**Globalization causes political and psychological stress, which cannot be relieved by the paradigm of interests. People care primarily about identity.**

And identity is shaped by values.

In post-industrial societies, the fear of globalization, as it has come to light, has resulted in recent years not so much from people's fear of losing employment, lowering the level of prosperity, but about preserving the cultural identity of the community bursting under the pressure of the influx of immigrants intensified by globalization. Concepts such as (European) integration and free trade (trade in North and South America) which are key to international politics are assessed by public opinion in developed countries not so much from the perspective of the economic interest of the individual as their effects on the cultural identity of societies. Interestingly, for the psychological comfort of the citizen, the most important is establishing certainty as to the effectiveness of the state's activity in the field of identity protection.

What values determine the attitude towards globalization? The empirically confirmed answer is simple: nationalism, statism, and elitism prevent us from accepting the changes brought about by globalization. Internationalism meant as support for wider and more intense international cooperation is conducive to openness to globalization. But even internationalists do not want to entrust international bodies, institutions and fora too much. Therefore, international institutions washing out states' ability to preserve their own political and cultural identity are treated as a threat.

**It is significant that while the paradigm of interests still sells well when politically justifying the course of foreign policy, it is only when used for the consumption domestically, for its own citizens. The same foreign policy course in the international forum must be justified using other paradigms, above all the paradigm of values.**

It is not surprising that the strategic speeches of foreign ministers of many countries made in the national parliaments begin with attempts to define *raison d'état*, national goals, and national interests. The same ministers refer to values when speaking in the global fora about the same things.

In the international fora, interests simply "sell" worse. Interest is inherent in particularism. Even a cluster of "common interest" and "mutual interest" appears less frequently in political discourse on the international fora than yesterday.

**The European Union is described as an agent of values in international politics. In the last decade, with intensified discussions about the identity of the European Union as a global actor, the concept of building this identity around the idea of values, in particular normative and ideological values, have gained many supporters.** The idea of identity understood in this way began to be associated with the European Union as a new type of political power: not based on the idea of pursuing national interests, but on their transcendence. The Union was to become a normative power that would seek to introduce norms, values and principles into international policy. Therefore, the Union was to be a new type of political entity.

This concept cleverly harmonizes the role of the European Union with the traditional role of the Member States, decouples the mutual roles as it were: the Member States are therefore in principle to continue the classic policy driven by national interests, and the European Union is to fill the political space with the promotion of values based on what all members share. Such harmonization of roles would also strengthen the Union itself as a community of values.

Customarily, in expert analyses, the catalogue of values that **the Union would patronize internationally includes: the rule of law, democracy and human rights, market economy, social solidarity, care for the environment and sustainable development, tolerance and cultural diversity.**

**The problem is, of course, that all these values are universal values.** Adopting them as regional and European ones does not serve their universalization. It undermines the argument for their universality. Proponents of the so-called Asian collectivist values immediately gain strong support for their point about the need to respect regional values and about the lack of a universal model of democracy or human rights.



For it is not true that Chinese or other Asian politicians and theorists limit their attitude to criticizing the so-called Western values, offering nothing in return. Zbigniew Brzezinski in one of his books cited a sample of an alternative canon of (Chinese) values. The concept of harmony is its foundation and crown. It is complemented by values such as justice, mutual benefit and joint development.

Whatever the case, even if the concept of normative power is ahead of its time, it seems to have a future. Today, countries are still struggling to provide basic material conditions for their citizens. They must therefore be guided by their interests related to jobs and well-being. Political lobbying for economic interests is the main task of most diplomatic services of world countries. Sometimes the pressure is so great that values are compromised. In the global competition, especially for arms contracts, what counts is effectiveness, and sometimes less – the principles.

More than once, international corruption scandals break out. Representatives of companies that come from countries that set the tone in the fight against corruption, companies that would never allow themselves the slightest departure from the transparency standards in the domestic market, apply bribery practices to representatives of other countries, where corruption is normal, but more reprehensible (see, for example, the scandal associated with representatives of Alstom organizing a huge bribe for a Zambian government official in 2002). This is, however, the collateral damage of pressure to take care of the economic interests.

It is obvious that as long as universal values do not apply in a fairly large area of the world, where democracy, the rule of law and the market economy are lacking, interests must coexist with values. **Values, according to Arthur Schlesinger, including moral values, are not an alternative to interests, but an instrument of "exposure and control of the national interest." An attempt to absolutize values leads to fanaticism, absolutism and intolerance.** Thanks to the concept of interests, we realize that other nations may have different values, traditions, customs, rights and obligations. Many years ago, Richard Niebuhr warned against the assumption that reason always resolves the conflict between values and interests.

But how will it be when the world reaches a common denominator of values? It doesn't have to be any different. This is what those who describe the torments of the negotiations over the long-term financial perspectives of the European Union claim for their key argument. Ad hoc, short-term interests dominate over a long-term strategic view usually associated with values. This is a true picture, though perhaps misleading. Future-oriented questions remain: can the values factor in international politics operate within countries that share the same values? Will the dispute between states not be resolved by power, not cleverness, political efficiency, but by fundamental values: truth, goodness, justice, peace?

**Yet, the emergence of the common canon of values in world politics would only increase the role of the moral factor and limit the cynicism imposed by the rule of the paradigm of interests. The coming of the citizen into the world politics focuses politics on common global challenges like climate change, preservation of the environment, migration, and fight against global pandemics. This only strengthens the factor of values.**

## SESSION III:

### MORALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The citizen has an immanent moral compass. If you ask ordinary people, they say that the world should generally be a fair, good, decent world, based on sound moral canons.

**However, does talking about morality in international relations make any sense? Why is the field of international relations so often associated with the absence of moral judgements?**

Scepticism is quite justified. First of all, because moral norms and judgments are attributed to people, and the basic dimension of international relations is created by institutional entities: states, international organizations. **The state watches over the realization of interests: security, sovereignty, well-being of the nation, but these interests in themselves, in the view of representatives of realistic schools of international politics, do not contain any moral connotation. In other words, for example, goods such as state security and the well-being of a nation are not subject to moral evaluation. Ergo, no government needs moral legitimacy to pursue these goals.**

And in the process of implementing related tasks, the state is not under pressure to read into the moral compasses of its citizens.

These theses of the realistic school are, however, increasingly criticized. Not only "moralists" question the idea of the non-applicability of moral judgments against the actions of the state. Critics of the realistic approach argue that the interests and rights of the state cannot be separated from the interests and rights of the society from which their legitimacy originates, which in turn must be subject to moral judgment.

**The difficulty in the ethical assessment of politics also results from the fact that the ethics of international politics, in order to be effective, would have to be based on universalistic or universally professed values.** But till today each nation sets moral values for itself and without any universalistic motives. They are seen as a constitutive part of national identity.

In every country the domestic law stems from a socially acceptable moral code. It reflects the catalogue of values of the majority of society. A minority, even if it believes in other moral judgments for religious or ideological reasons, respects and applies the applicable legal expression of the prevailing moral system. For example, different moral judgments can guide people in relation to the issue of protecting life as reflected in views on abortion, euthanasia, or death penalty. Within the state, the socially dominating moral doctrine, however, determines the generally applicable shape of legal solutions on these issues.

**In relations between states, legal solutions are not always determined by dominant moral judgments.** This even applies to relations within a group of

Western states that adhere to the universalistic philosophy of moral order. That is why EU countries may campaign for the abolition of the death penalty, treat its use as a sign of moral handicap, resort to arguments soaked in moral judgments, but they cannot impose legal solutions on other countries, including those belonging to the common Western family, such as USA or Japan.

As Stanley Hoffmann pointed out, any moral doctrine openly or secretly aspires to be a universalistic doctrine. **Propagating it as the only legitimate one may, however, become an expression of imperial arrogance or be seen as an attempt to impose foreign political influence under the guise of moralizing.** That's the whole problem with the so-called policy of values in current international relations.

The key issue for the credibility of values-based policies is, **does the progress of globalization bring us closer to the universalization of the moral code?** Cosmopolitans would certainly answer in the affirmative. The thing is not so much that globalization generates enough strong cultural convergence to strengthen the common moral denominator. If cultural diversity in individual countries does not weaken moral coherence, and empirical evidence shows that it does not, then the moral coherence of different cultures (religions, etc.) should increase. Ultimately, on fundamental issues, such as the condemnation of violence, all religions and cultures are in agreement. **Virtually no one at the UN forum is trying today to justify differences in political positions with different ethical codes. The differences concern not so much the essence of the code as the interpretation of specific issues (understanding of the principle of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, family model, status of women, rights of persons with different sexual orientation, abortion, euthanasia, etc.).**

Another factor complicating moral judgments is their sensitivity to historical evolution. Territorial conquests, which were once considered legitimate spoils of war, even if the victorious powers did not have any ethnic, historical or dynastic rights to the lands they took away, they will not find moral approval today. Similarly, resettlement or even the so-called population exchange, once quite a normal phenomenon in peace treaties, nowadays usually raises serious moral doubts.

**International relations also reflect the natural human weakness to succumb to moral relativism.** Governments tend to be more rigorous in assessing phenomena and events occurring in other countries compared to similar phenomena that take place in their own countries. They also assess the policy of hostile governments more harshly than the behaviour of friendly countries. This is known as a double standards policy.

In other words, even if the actions of states in the international arena can and should be subject to moral assessment, it will always be an assessment from a local, national or community perspective, and also an assessment subject to historical reinterpretation. As noted by George Kennan: **there are no clearly codified standards of morality in international relations** and this should not come as a surprise. Still, there are documents that indirectly could or should fulfil this role, such as the Briand-Kellogg Pact or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To date, however, there is no universally recognized moral code of conduct for states on the international stage. Only legal norms and standards remain a real reference in assessing the conduct of states. This is a natural course of things, because

international law is postulative and imperative. The norms of international law reflect the desired ideal of behaviour. And this ideal may reflect ethical standards, but it is not identical with them.

International relations were always governed by international law norms, not moral norms. At best, international policy would be morally neutral. However, the problem is deeper, at least in terms of image: politics, and international policy in particular, bears the common stigma of amorality. It is believed that international politics is full of lies, deception of public opinion and cynicism. The leaders of countries authorize illegal operations, steal the secrets of other states, plot hostile actions, and even deliberately unleash conflicts or wars, bringing suffering to civilians. In a milder form, this stigma is connected with the accusation of ignoring the interests of ordinary people, particularism and hypocrisy. These common views can be relativised, but only to some extent. Without removing this stigma, trust in international institutions and international politics cannot be won today.

This stigma is also the background for the dichotomization of policy components, their division into values and interests. The values are intended to be moral, and the interests – sometimes just the opposite. But the division is misleading. Basing politics on values was not always synonymous with morality. Similarly, realistic concepts of policies subordinated to interests do not question their moral dimension.

**The paradigm of interests pushed the moral factor in the international relations into a utilitarian understanding of morality where maximizing gains and minimizing losses is moral in itself. Whereas domestic policies more and more reflected the Kantian categorical imperative. The gap made international politics increasingly tribal. The global citizen will find it increasingly inconsistent and schizophrenic.**

So where is the unquestioned place for a moral factor? The common view is that morality in politics is not about goals, but about methods of achieving them. This is not entirely true. Goals can (and should) be subject to moral evaluation. International politics today operates with a complex concept of goals. They include material goals (economic contracts, political agreements, etc.), but they also include more ephemeral goals related to the shaping of an international environment conducive to one's own policy (*milieu goals*). The latter, in the increasingly common opinion, must be based on some concept of good or evil.

As mentioned, even realists do not question the *raison d'être* of morality. But they consider the moral factor to be secondary. Desirable but unreal. In an extreme form, in Machiavelli's or Weber's views, the moral factor was considered either useless in politics in general or impossible to apply (in view of the anarchic system) in international politics. Today, in a milder form, the moral factor is taken into account by realists as a postulate of moderation in politics or the choice of a lesser evil.

Treating morality as a non-cumulative value is a common stereotype. In fact, in the doctrinal layer, moral codes have consolidated over the centuries. S. Hoffmann distinguished three stages they went through. The first impulse for the development of moral sensitivity was the Christian concept of just war. It was based on the belief that evil in the world is an inevitable phenomenon, but it is a Christian duty in politics to limit, stop and combat evil. This is how the complicated code of warfare that the Christian community of nations gave the world was born. Another impulse came from

the liberal concept of natural rights. It split into two streams: natural rights and utilitarian ones, but both generated a future-oriented vision of moral order in politics. The third impulse is related to the Marxist (and its post- and neo-Marxist continuations) vision of a classless and stateless society.

Notwithstanding the doctrinal evolution, almost naked eye can see that over the centuries morality pierced its way in international relations. This was evident, for example, in the development of international law (e.g. principles of warfare). Above all, morality broke its way in the form of codes and patterns of good behaviour.

**Sometimes foreign policy took on expressive moral clothes.** This was always the case when, in a revolutionary euphoria, the state challenged the prevailing doctrines of international politics. The fundamental reconstruction of international politics in Europe was postulated by the French Revolution and France tried to change it under republican slogans. However, it quickly became inconsistent and turned in its own denial. The Bolsheviks challenged the system of international relations with even stronger moral slogans and equally quickly showed the hypocrisy of their own policies.

**Successive layers of moral imperatives were reflected in international legal and politically binding norms.** After all, the United Nations Charter was the first universalistic and systemic reflection of these imperatives. It contained the idea of ethical goals guiding the cooperation of states.

The aims of this cooperation were described as serving to save future generations from the scourge of war, to restore faith in fundamental human rights and equality of nations, to maintain justice and respect obligations under international law, and to promote social progress and improve living conditions in greater freedom. In the layer of methods and mechanisms of cooperation, the Charter focused on the issues of preventing armed conflict. This could not be enough to create a moral pattern of state behaviour.

The boldest attempt to develop the idea of the principles of inter-state cooperation was the work that resulted in the "Declaration of the principles of international law regarding friendly relations and cooperation between states" adopted on October 24, 1970 at the 25th session of the UN General Assembly. The declaration formulated seven general principles: the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, the obligation to cooperate, equality and national self-determination, sovereign equality of states and the fulfilment in good faith of the obligations assumed by them. On the European plane, these principles were developed and enriched in the Final Act of the CSCE, adopted in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. Three additional principles were added then to the UN's seven principles: inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, and respect for human rights and fundamental values. This was a result of political bargaining. The then East demanded that the principle of inviolability of borders be added to the list. The West wanted the inclusion of the principle of respect for human rights (and the possibility of a peaceful change of borders, but within the principle of sovereign equality). For several years after the adoption of the Act, Polish diplomacy unsuccessfully sought to give them a legal and constitutional dimension. Like the UN declaration, they remained only a politically binding document.

The rules adopted in the seventies of last century carry a visible stigma of East-West competition. In the post-Cold War era, no attempt was made to rewrite them. The United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted on September 8, 2000 introduced several general values into the moral canon: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for the environment, and shared responsibility. However, they were not developed in the form of moral norms for the conduct of states. However, new standards have emerged and gained quite a solid description. These include, first and foremost, the principle of responsibility to protect and the principle of sustainable development.

In Europe, new ideas were brought in by some documents adopted after the Paris Charter of 1990, in particular the Code of Conduct adopted by the Budapest Summit in December 1994 in the field of political and military aspects of security and the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security.

**Both in the global and regional dimensions there is still no clear code of political and moral conduct of states.**

**The postulate to develop such a moral code is getting stronger. The moral dimension of world religions is not enough to deal with the imperative of cooperation in the age of globalization.** Indeed, most religions agree that global altruism, helping others is something worthy. The problem with the political credibility of religion is that religions proclaiming love of neighbour are also accused of sowing hatred (conflicts between Christians and Muslims, persecution of Christians in the world). On the other hand, secular humanism has no religious underpinning. Morality must be rethought. And the sense of moral reform is to be awakening altruism and solidarity. **Is such a moral reform of international relations possible at all?**

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The doctrinal separation of law and morality in international relations had consequences that we will face for years to come.

**Perhaps it would be excessive to say that international relations have become as a result an organized dimension of tribalism, but the fact remains that as a result of this process it became habitual to assess the behaviour of the state by double standards: one was applied to the relationship between the state and its own citizens, and another was used to assess its relations with other countries and foreign citizens.**

Moreover, the very existence of the institution of state has forced us to draw a thick line between relations within states and relations with other states. Therefore, international relations reflected a deeper and deeper dichotomy between the way one treated "its own guys" and the way one treated the "aliens". Everything within the borders of one's own state was subject to a moral code characteristic of the relationship between "us". Relations with the outside world developed according to a code based on the "aliens" paradigm. **The scissors of this dualism, where relations with strangers were to be perceived in other categories than relations among "its own", sometimes opened up very much.** The concept of the nation-state has become the catalyst. The nation-state was the concept of a political creation based on national identity, the concept of a community of "our own guys".

One moral code regulated relations within the national (state) community, while another was the basis for the moral assessment of actions towards other societies (nations). Thus, the sphere of international relations has become a kind of kingdom of double morality.

It would be a misunderstanding to attribute moral nihilism to states in international relations. Especially today. The prevailing trend in the behaviour of states is the search for convincing moral justification for politics. Even international villains have wanted and want moral peace. Nazi Germany used the slogan to repair the moral harm of the Versailles Treaty to unleash World War II. The Soviet Union, participating in the partition of Poland in 1939, justified its actions by the need to take indigenous peoples into protection.

Often, then, recalling moral arguments in foreign policy was cynical.

Today, cynicism can rarely be attributed to the motives of state behaviour. Although various conspiracy theories (even treating the attack on the World Trade Centre as a provocation of special services) do not cease to refer to old habits. Without much conviction, however. Cynicism works by the wayside, but one can certainly still say that the sphere of international relations is marked by a high level of moral relativism.

While the moral factor has always indicated an important role in building social order within the state, it was poorly visible in relations with the outside world. The thing is not only that relations with the outside world were inter-institutional, i.e. inter-state. Where institutions dominate, there is rarely a human factor. There is also no element of moral sanction in relations with "strangers". One cannot induce a "foreign" individual to the desired pattern of behaviour if the "foreigner" is separated by the protective wall of another state, its legal and social order. Among "us" moral sanctions through an element of pressure, social approval or exclusion (ostracism) have a chance of enforceability, even if they are not always and everywhere supported by the legal order (and justice). Towards "**strangers**", **moral sanctions have little impact**. In practice, the assumption that objectively morality is universal and unchanging will not help us in practice.

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The universal nature of ethical norms was emphasized by the concept of natural rights. Their immutable character – by the concept of their divine origin. These concepts came to the fore with the age of Enlightenment.

However, the concept of ethics based on natural rights quickly began to be associated with utilitarianism. Good was associated with satisfying your own needs, and evil was everything that was associated with suffering. **The dead end of utilitarianism in ethics has become the thesis attributed to Mill that only civilized societies are entitled to freedom**. It refused elementary political rights to colonized societies. It could justify both slavery and apartheid.

**In international practice, one can trace utilitarian ethics in the sources of the absolutization of the notion of interests in the international policy of states**. The universal mantra of foreign ministers of states that the goal of diplomacy is to fight for the interests of the country, nowadays also reduces foreign policy to maximizing

benefits and minimizing threats. Just like in the teachings of J. S. Mill, where human ethics results from the principle of maximizing pleasure and minimizing suffering.

Utilitarian ethics is still an inspiration to various behavioural theories of international relations. It gives moral absolution to the carrot and stick policy. Critics of the common foreign policy of the European Union note a specific fixation of this policy on two instruments: sanctions (economic, trade, visa, etc.) and aid measures (as a rule – grants and macro-financial assistance). They see this as an excessive belief in the effectiveness of policies that refer to measurable benefits and losses.

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**The moral aspect of international relations began to manifest itself in international practice since the time when it was necessary to ease the tribal tension and a selected group of "strangers" began to be treated as "almost us", and in any case closer than other "strangers".** In this sense, relations between, for example, Greek city-states already had a different moral dimension than relations between them and Persia.

However, this moral factor has always been marked by the sign of conventionality. Actions were subject to different moral judgments depending on whether they concerned states connected by a common convention of procedure (legal regime, customs) or states excluded from the community forged by the convention. It can be assumed that the idea was that morality was made dependent on guarantees of reciprocity.

A good example can be found in the rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war in armed conflicts (inter-tribal or later international). For millennia, prisoners were simply killed or captured. Without major moral dilemmas. There was no difference between combatants and civilians. In the European Middle Ages, a fundamental difference already existed between Christian prisoners, especially those born well (they could count on the possibility of being released for a ransom), and infidels (whether Muslims in the Holy Land during the Crusades, or pagans, like in Prussia). The handling of prisoners of war began to be included in civilized norms only around the Thirty Years' War.

An attempt to codify these principles was made at the Brussels Conference of 1874, although the declaration adopted at that time never entered into force. Thanks to the Hague Conference, the process could be continued and effective provisions were included in the Third Geneva Convention (of 1929, with a revision in 1949). Despite the fact that the Geneva Convention stipulated not to make any difference in the treatment of prisoners of States that are or not party to it, in practice it made a difference. During World War II, Germany referred to the USSR not ratifying the Geneva Convention to justify de facto extermination policy (sending to concentration camps, etc.) towards Soviet prisoners – over 3 million, i.e. over 50%, of Soviet POWs died in captivity. The USSR put itself also in the black pages in the treatment of prisoners. It committed a genocidal murder of Polish officers; and prisoners of the Axis countries were forced by the Soviets to slave labour for years after the war (out of 3.5 million prisoners, over a million died).



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Of course, utilitarianism grows out of biology. Reducing international relations to the relations between dehumanized entities (states) at the same time blurs the traces of biological factors in the behaviour of states. After all, **Fukuyama compared contemporary international relations to the formula of justice in tribal societies. In both cases, the acts of mutual assistance happen inside competing groups (countries) and there is no top third party guaranteeing compliance with the rules, enforcing their application.**

If international relations are so close to inter-tribal politics, then the biological basis of politics should be quite strong in international politics. This assumption would be very handy. It would have an absolutary value. It would explain the misconduct in international politics by genetic considerations. Evil would arise from areas beyond our conscious control.

Fukuyama lists at least a few biological factors relevant to politics in general. However, not all of them are relevant to international politics.

**Among the biological factors that seem to affect most strongly the way international politics works are “kin selection” and “reciprocal altruism”.**

Another of the biological propensities of man – towards creating and observing the rules of conduct – is also strongly felt in international relations. According to Fukuyama, the human instinct for compliance is often based more on emotion than reason.

The same goes for a natural disposition to violence attributed to human beings. It would help explain the entire scourge of war as a phenomenon in international relations. It can even be assumed that the more rules and institutions limited the violence in social relations within countries, the easier they channelled and legitimized violence against other countries (nations, societies). The institution of the state itself was established and developed in order to monopolize coercion and eliminate destructive violence within society, and optimize the ability to counter violence from "foreigners".

Violence is undoubtedly the most significant reflection of evil in international relations. Fukuyama refers to research confirming the direct molecular relationship between genes and aggression in men. He argues that it is because of the disposition towards violence provoking rivalry that people have learned to organize themselves and cooperate. Evil was turning into good. This created a kind of balance (and even a symbiotic system), which was the driving force of social development. Fukuyama even claims that "societies that are not exposed to competition and aggression are stagnating and unable to act innovatively."

Good in international relations is not only related to satisfying one's material interests. Fukuyama has long emphasized that the biological driver of human behaviour is not only the satisfaction of material needs, but also the need for recognition. In international relations it reveals itself with greater force than in the internal dimension. Within societies, we accept hierarchies, while the international environment is doctrinally non-hierarchical. Fukuyama emphasizes that it is the need

for recognition that has often caused conflicts to extend far beyond the point of economic justification.

The need for recognition is so great that it is attributed in modern times to the strive for independence. According to Fukuyama, thymotic emotions related to the need for recognition meant that, among others, Ukraine and Slovakia, although economically they could do better as part of larger countries (USSR and Czechoslovakia respectively), wanted to see "their flag and seat in the UN" at all costs. Apart from the fact that with Ukraine just the argument of the flag and membership of the UN did not work very well for Fukuyama (because Ukraine sat in the UN from the very beginning of the organization, even when Ukraine was not independent), it is the simplification of state-forming processes, which raises serious objections. Fukuyama trivializes the problem.

Statehood aspirations have as a rule deeper roots. They grow often out of the sense of national oppression or humiliation (religious, cultural). Also, the statehood aspirations of the Ukrainians were not purely related to pride and vanity. Likewise, the position of Irish Unionists regarding the links between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom is not due to the lack of need for recognition. Even if countries sometimes gained independence by accident and without explicit will (see former Soviet Central Asian republics), they like independence and do not want to renounce it, even though some of them cannot be economically self-sufficient. This led to the creation of a whole powerful group of independent but inefficient states.

An interesting observation of Fukuyama is that while in ancient times the need for recognition was manifested in the pursuit of subordination (of rulers, states), nowadays it is most strongly visible in egalitarian and non-discriminatory slogans, also in international relations.

## **SESSION IV:**

### **EVIL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Biologism explains that evil in international relations has deep roots. It grows out of our genetics. Perhaps even because of this, it is impossible to eradicate it from international politics. **Evil can be limited, neutralized, restrained, but it cannot be completely ruled out.**

**Over the centuries, relativization of evil has become a bad feature of international politics. International policy was largely about explaining the inevitability of evil and the need to live with it.**

One way of relieving moral reproaches is their social diffusion. **In the international dimension, its manifestation was the creation of specific communities of conscience.** One might even be tempted to say that the drive of states towards coalitions or alliances did not have only political and military underpinning. It often had indirect moral effects. In a group, it is much easier to justify actions of dubious ethical quality.

**Belonging to a group, identification with a group is a relief for conscience.** Compliance with the rules governing the behaviour of the group, participating in joint actions weakens the sharpness of questions about the ethical nature of one's behaviour.

It is hard not to resist the temptation to say that in international relations the lower the moral legitimacy of an action, the greater the tendency to inscribe it in a collective framework. The partition of Poland in the 18th century was done by a group of three empires. There was simply no strategic agreement for Poland to be absorbed by a single power (Russia). But acting in a group was also a form of moral absolutism in this situation. Annexation by a single state would be easier to condemn and contest by the international community.

**Evil is commonly defined as a conscious behaviour that causes damage, harm, humiliation, and leads to abuse, dehumanization and even death of innocent people. It is also evil to use power and position to encourage or allow others to do so on our behalf.** This is undoubtedly an anthropocentric definition and cannot exhaust the symptoms of evil in international relations. But it reflects quite well the citizen's instinctive approach to morality in politics.

Psychologists point out that a binary logic lies in human nature: dividing people into good and bad, separating one from the other by a categorical, impassable wall. Either you are on one side or the other.

Such a division makes it easier to call evil by name also in international politics (Hitler, Pol Pot, Bokassa, Saddam Hussein, but also those tried in international tribunals like Milosevic or Taylor). In turn, **the evil named by name is a psychological mechanism of purifying "good" people (that is the vast majority of international society) from responsibility for evil occurring in the world.**

Another feature of human nature is the tendency toward self-centeredness. It seems to us, not only at an immature age, that we are the centre of the world, we are unique, we stand above the rest. This kind of egocentric tendency is more common in societies that cultivate the independence of the individual, i.e. in Western societies, especially the European ones. Societies based on a more collectivist spirit (Asia, Africa, Middle East) are less inclined to do so. Egocentrism in a collectivized form, especially national, and not necessarily in extreme forms like nationalism or chauvinism, translates into a sense of moral superiority.

**The tendency towards self-centeredness compounded by centuries of tribal logic of international relations evokes in us a natural reflex to attribute not only the leaders of states but entire nations a disposition to do evil.** Whole countries and nations can become the embodiment of evil in politics.

"Evil state" as an epithet in international politics in modern times entered the political lexicon in the late seventies. President Reagan gave the Soviet Union the stigma of the "Evil Empire" (the invasion of Afghanistan and martial law in Poland was a political context, and the movie "Star Wars" was a helpful association).

George W. Bush became the continuator of Reagan's imagery. In January 2002, he put on the world map the "Axis of Evil" consisting of Iran, Iraq and North Korea (also known as the "Axis of Hatred"). John Bolton added Libya, Syria and Cuba to this

axis. "Axes of terror" and "axes of belligerence" followed suit. The comparison has caught the imagination of many experts and politicians.

The leaders of Iran, in turn, invented diabolic epithets. Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979 referred to the United States as "Great Satan". He interchangeably cursed America and the West as "Iblis," the Islamic devil of devils. And Israel began to be called "Little Satan".

Such parallels have deep psychological and cultural roots. We always position strangers towards Satan. Some believe that there is even a certain amount of perversion in this tendency. Condemning Satan's excesses can go hand in hand with marvelling at them. ("We are afraid of evil, but we are fascinated by it."). We create myths about devilish scheming and begin to believe in them to mobilize counteracting forces. **Sometimes, unfortunately, we do even greater evil in the name of fighting evil.** The Inquisition still remains a model example of evil done in the name of fighting evil.

Of course, assigning the role of evil seedlings to specific nations or states is strictly political, propaganda-oriented and instrumental. It is about creating a bad image that would justify appropriate action against a hostile state. As human beings, we are not good or bad by nature. We have predispositions, but we can change our nature: in the right or wrong direction. Psychologists like Philip Zimbardo argue that there is no situational evil without the existence of a system that makes evil conducive to empowerment and dominance. In turn, there is no system without the power elite, which is able to make decisions with far-reaching consequences for other people. This applies to all hierarchical structures: the state, enforcement services, churches, and business.

When the power elite wants to confront an enemy state, it turns to propaganda experts to design a hate program. Its essence is always the "image of the enemy". **Evil in relations between countries always begins with propaganda and the "image of the enemy"**. Words and pictures are enough for this. They are based on stereotypes, dehumanized perception of the picture of otherness as worthless, demonic, ruthless, which is a threat to our own values and interests. It does not require much effort to make even rational and calm people be guided by negative emotions, and turn peaceful minds to the power of warlike and destructive emotions. In extreme form it leads to genocide, mass extermination (Holocaust!).

**In this way, we come to the essence of difficulties in eradicating evil in international relations: too often it was needed for the consolidation of power within the state. Emotions unleashed by the "image of the enemy" were able to turn off morality sensors even for the most orderly societies. Everyone can do evil.** As Zimbardo states: "No man and no state are incapable of doing evil." Effective emotional engineering has been able to appropriately shape the bad emotions of ordinary members of society, not just political leaders or military commanders. After all, international relations of the 20th century were international relations of the "age of mass murders". **It was the 20th century that weakened our faith in the possibility of accumulating ethical knowledge, shook our conviction to strengthen the moral factor in politics.**

Zimbardo provokes reflection with the thesis that little differs modern people from barbarian tribes. And calculates: more than 50 million people died in the 20th century carried out upon the orders of the authorities by the hands of soldiers or civilians.

Psychologists, when explaining the causes of these barbarities, insist that **people are moral beings. However, they can switch their moral gear to a neutral position.** The easiest way to do this is to give others a "dehumanized" outlook, a patch of "inferior". It has been proven that nothing is more conducive to anti-social behaviour (and doing evil) than anonymity. When people are not afraid of identification, they feel unpunished. The state as an anonymous social construction gives a full sense of anonymity. It is an excellent "mask" under which aggression can be conducted. **That is why foreign policy made it easy to turn off moral brakes. Not just those of the leaders. Moreover, leaders have always been able to enjoy the feeling of anonymity offered by acting on behalf of the state.**

Even minimal areas of anarchy and disorganization of the international system can spoil the overall ethical order. This should be understood as the application of the *broken windows theory* in the context of international relations. These broken windows have now become weak, bankrupt and "rogue" countries (or, as it is said today: *outliers*). There is no need to justify the thesis that the existence of weak and failed states spoils the standards in the entire international system.

Zimbardo proved that a person's character can be changed in a few days. In a short time a calm and consistent man can be made an aggressive and ruthless beast. Even such a trivial thing as a uniform can fundamentally change a person's personality. The speed of ethical transformation also applies to societies and countries. **Demoralization of society can proceed at a galloping pace. The policy of "evil" in the behaviour of states on the international stage does not have to hatch for years.** Our faith in the preventive and educational role of institutions and international law must take this into account.

**There is no social order without rules. However, many of the rules are seen as just a cover for the domination of one over the other. This also applies to international order! The weaker the credibility of these principles, the faster they lose their regulatory power against evil. Evil in international relations is making its way faster the more institutions and norms are perceived as imposed and dominant.**

## **Violence and War**

The power of the state is associated with the ability to induce desired behaviour from other international partners. As a rule, actions that change the policy of other states by means of persuasion, or a good example, are not subject to moral criticism. Even bribery is not always condemned. After all, international politics is seen as a continuous transaction. Something for something, favour for a favour, support for support. Even clientelism, blind affiliation, and *bandwagoning* can often be interpreted positively as building a capital of sympathy that can be discounted at the time of need.

Thus, perception of politics in transactional categories does not always arouse negative moral emotions. One can buy support in international elections also today (with the promise of investment, grants and assistance), one can buy a vote in elections for a post on an international forum, one can even buy political support. Everything is a matter of form and style. In principle, the buyer is never condemned, and the bribed, usually, only when the price is disproportionate to the moral doubts that the desired action carries.

The fundamental problem with moral judgment arises when we are dealing with coercion. The state is forced to act against its own will under clear pressure. Regardless of the real effects of acting against yourself (your own interests), the sense of dignity suffers, the attribute of sovereignty and independence is violated. Consequently, evil is happening.

The use of power in order to force another country to act against its will was historically associated with increasing moral reproaches. To the extent that coercion had to be legalized, even *ex post*. Coercion was often justified by higher moral reasons. Just look at the Bayeux tapestry to realize how important for William the Conqueror and his heirs was the moral justification for the invasion of England. However, coercion was justified primarily by legal instruments. In fact, every peace treaty is a moral dispensation of the victor's actions.

But there is no order without coercion. Giving states full freedom of conduct would be a recipe for total anarchization of the international environment. **The development of international law is, to a large extent, a history of legalizing coercion. Coercion is, as it is often said, a legalized form of violence.**

**Violence is undoubtedly the essence of evil in international relations.** It is associated with wars, assaults, interventions, destruction and suffering of people. War is seen as the highest stage of evil in international relations. Not only because of the extent of the damage it inflicts, but also because of the scale of the moral desolation it causes indirectly. Nothing corrupts societies like wars.

What is the reason for violence in international relations? Why do people go to war? In the name of what are they willing to risk their lives and the happiness of others? There is a powerful moral rebuke in these eternal questions. And the war was once such a natural and primary state of affairs that peace was simply defined as the absence of war. Peace was defined only as the antithesis of war (by analogy: health is the antithesis of illness, life is the antithesis of death).

**The international war has the same primary sources as any violence in social relations, in this case it is violence directed against a foreign state, a nation.** In the analysis of sources of violence, it would be appropriate to start with the most primordial, and therefore biological, factors. And the simplest answer to the question about the causes of war would be: because that's human nature. Genetic disposition to violence, however, could easily explain violence, but only at the early stages of civilization.

The biological determinants of violence have been tried to be transferred even to the level of societies and nations. Therefore, some nations would have a tendency to mercurial behaviour encoded in their blood, others would rather be pacifist. Nobody, however, takes these stereotypes seriously today.

Another biological explanation attributed the instincts to resort to violence to the human passion of "greed", as a way of satisfying the need of possession. The simplest expression of the passion of possession in the case of nations was the desire to expand territorial possessions. **Rivalry for territories, territorial expansion has been an important factor in conflicts and violence in international relations throughout the millennia.** The legacy of this is still existing territorial and border disputes.

The age of the "instinct to possess" seems to be coming to an end, however. Power is not derived from possession, nor does it serve to meet the need to own things. The policy objectives today focus rather on creating conditions for the free satisfaction of common needs through appropriate regulation of international relations. The desire for possession today can therefore explain violence not in all cases.

**Other theories explain violence and war as driven by "the need for domination."**

The realistic school (since Thucydides and Machiavelli) assumes, as we know, that the international environment is inherently anarchic and the only way to satisfy interests is *power politics*. The clash for domination must have led to violence. The stake at it was not so much material gains (territories, population, resources, etc.) as the hierarchy of power. Such an inevitable collision was, among others the conflict between Prussia and Austria for hegemony in the Germanic area. A classic example of competition for dominance was the global competition of the US and USSR during the Cold War. There is no shortage of voices that even today global politics is a power politics.

Increasingly, striving for advantage over others is a political dead end. Nowadays, it is not enough to think about power over others. One needs to think about the power of achieving goals together with others. Networks and connections become the source of power, and power itself becomes a game with a positive sum. The war ceased to be (as "realists" would like) the ultimate measure of the power of states.

It is a separate issue: what power is today. And whether doing evil justifies its pursuit. Is the ability to win wars today key in assessing the power of the state? The determinants of power have changed over the centuries. Once the sources of strength were colonies and gold (Spain in the sixteenth century), then: trade and finance (the Netherlands in the seventeenth century), population and army (France in the eighteenth century), industry and fleet (England in the nineteenth century). Today, power is estimated primarily by comparing GDP. Even so, measured economic power does not give a pass to influence the shape of political processes in the world.

Joseph Nye tried to prove that other dimensions of power really matter. Power is based today on politics of persuasion ("*country with the best story that wins*"). **The departure from the fetish of domination towards power based on the attractiveness of the political message reduces the temptation to resort to practices related to violence, coercion, pressure, and therefore morally reprehensible.**

**This is facilitated by the natural process of diffusion of power.** Joseph Nye is right when he writes that for old, stagnant powers, including the US, today the greater threat may be not so much the strengthening of China, India or Brazil, but the general diffusion of power, to which non-state actors contribute, as well as "contemporary barbarians" or *outliers*.

The realists, though, while rejecting today atavistic motives and biology in international relations, see a long way to Nye's postulated concept of noble competition for attractiveness. **Contemporary realistic school assumes that violence originates not from the nature of man but from the structure of international politics.** The structure is still anarchic, and in the environment of anarchy, the zero-sum game philosophy dominates. So, sometimes one has to resort to war in the fight for survival. Anarchy is created not so much by states operating under the old classic rules of *power politics* but mainly by failed and weak states, as well as non-state actors such as international terrorism sometimes acting consciously for the destabilization of the environment. The terrorist strike of September 11, 2001 is treated as a new stage in the structural dimension of evil in international relations, but also as a transition to the privatization of wars or rather the reprivatization of wars. In the mid-nineteenth century there was an irrevocable doctrinal "nationalization" of wars. The ability to wage war was associated with the concept of sovereignty. The act of war became the sole prerogative of the sovereign.

Polemology gave birth to a wealth of theories and descriptions explaining the causes of war. Thanks to Georg Simmel, a strong sociological stream of research into the sources of conflicts and wars developed. In turn, thanks to Sigmund Freud, there were many convincing explanations for the roots of conflicts on psychological grounds. Marx gave rise to the study of economic and social sources of tension and dispute. In our modern times, the cultural trend in the interpretation of wars became quite popular.

**For centuries, war was considered a natural and inevitable phenomenon.** Over time, however, the moral factor in its conduct began to emerge. We owe the notion of a just war (*bellum iustum*) to the Romans. *Bellum iustum* in modern international relations of the Westphalian order was transferred in *ius ad bellum* as an attribute which every state has in resolving international disputes. However, **if one looks for the logic of progress in the history of international relations, it is undoubtedly determined by the tendency of delegitimizing the use of force as a means of resolving disputes.** The last hundred years have been a period of accelerated progress towards elimination of violence from international relations, and, above all, its delegitimization.

Of course, there are plenty of Proudhon's and Sorel's followers who will want to see the war as the revitalizing factor or the development catalyst of societies and the world as such. There is no shortage of followers of Lenin's views on just wars, and even of Carl Schmidt's theories on morally neutral wars, but these are views operating on the margins of political and intellectual discourse. **War is a recognized evil, although sometimes being a necessary evil.** Sometimes the war was undertaken in the name of noble moral goals. At the same time, war remains a phenomenon considered permanent and inevitable. Perhaps the day will come, announced once with the help of technological logic of development by the eminent Pole Jan Gottlieb Bloch, that **the war will become technically impossible and unprofitable, but even the most ardent pacifists are not placing that day in the foreseeable future.**

When accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, **President Obama admitted that war could never be eradicated. That there will be situations in which states, acting alone or in an alliance, will be forced to consider the use of force "not only necessary but also morally justified."**



The nature of wars evolves. There is even a generational chronology of modern wars. The first generation was to be marked by the arrangement of lines and columns (after the French Revolution). The second generation: by massive firepower (World War I). The third generation: by manoeuvring and tanks (World War II). At present, however, **the "fourth generation" wars are wars with no front and no battlefield.** They are focused not so much on controlling and maintaining the territory as on depriving the opponent of the political will and social cohesion. And the fifth generation wars are lurking behind - "invisible" wars, fought in cyberspace and with the use of drones, robots, computers, etc... Sometimes called hybrid wars. Wars being so different that they are already non-wars.

"War no longer exists". Such a *dictum* in the mouth of a philosopher or pacifist politician is not surprising. Another story if it is spoken by a general, an outstanding military commander who run impressive military operations. General Rupert Smith concedes that armed confrontation, conflict and armed clash are still real phenomena. However, **the war that we have known for millennia and centuries, war as a battle in a real battlefield using people and equipment, war as a dispute settlement event in international affairs, such war will never be seen again.** Before our eyes, one of the fundamental paradigms of international politics has changed. The inter-state and industrial war was replaced by the war "between the people". A war without a defined battlefield, without organized armies (on both sides), a war in which everything is a battlefield, and all participants are combatants, a war in which military action must be constantly tuned to the political purpose it is to serve, a war in which the traditionally conceived purpose of the armed force: the destruction of objects and incapacitation (annihilation) of the opponent ceases to have political sense, a war in which a civilian ceases to differ from a soldier, also under international law, in which civilians fight with weapons, and soldiers perform tasks of humanitarian organizations and security services. The wars of the new paradigm serve policies towards societies rather than towards states, they are fought under the watchful eye of the media, they are wars broadcast live. They tend to stretch forever. The main concern of the commander is not so much a military victory at all costs as minimizing his own sacrifices. The fight is constantly bringing new application to old weapon systems. Non-state actors are parties to the conflict.

Even if we recognize that today's wars are non-wars, even if we have to find a new term for them, **violent actions will be part of our political reality.** Certainly, conflicts with the participation of states/groups of states, as well as non-state entities, in a very traditional sense, where the stake is to take over the territory or make planned damage (e.g. on military or other installations) will continue to break out. There will be "hybrid wars" and "wars between peoples". The ability to generate credible military threat, to provide armed protection and to fight will remain important. But less and less used.

An important problem is that **international law does not keep pace with the changes in the nature of war.** There was even a thesis that the entire *acquis* of the law of armed conflict, developed over the last three hundred years, collapses in a collision with new realities. With the blurring of the border between war and peace, the blurring of differences between war and law enforcement, some of the existing paradigms are beginning to be questioned, e.g. the issue of targeting and killing terrorist group leaders. In times of peace and as part of law enforcement operations, they would be treated as homicides, in times of war they are treated as the lawful

killing of an enemy without legal consequences. Stabilization operations are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from war. The reason for regulatory demands has recently been the mass use of drones in military-police operations (Afghanistan, Pakistan). New technologies sometimes even encourage hidden acts of violence that escape existing legal regulations.

**In the international dimension – might as a deterrent and means of military intimidation will be a factor of stability in the foreseeable future, whether we like it or not.** Military strength will remain a factor of order, even if today it may have trouble demonstrating usefulness.

At the beginning of the nineties, **the theory of democratic peace** became quite popular. According to it, democratic states are generally not willing to start wars with each other. The triumph of the democratic system on a global scale would give hope for a lasting world peace. Of course, critics of the theory quickly showed that in addition to democracy within states, the democratization of relations between states is also important for the stability of the international system. Moreover since the mid-nineties the progress of democracy in the world has slowed down. Many dictatorships could hold on tight. It will therefore remain a long time for the final verification of the theory of democratic peace.

Another hope for the eradication of wars comes from psychological theories. **Psychologists say that although a tendency towards violence is a feature of human nature, there is also a tendency towards empathy, cooperation and self-control.** The vector of civilization progress consists in limiting violence. Steven Pinker showed how the development of state institutions contributed to this, as well as technical inventions such as print and the Internet. Therefore, humanity strives to control violence from a civilization's needs.

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And as long as there is a need for violence, there will be a need to justify it. **The stability of the international order will largely depend on how individual cases of violence are credibly legitimized.** Fundamental disputes over the legitimacy of the military action against Iraq in 2003, or earlier in 1998 against Serbia (in connection with Kosovo) did not serve the coherence of international order.

The cornerstones of each political order are, in Fukuyama's parlance, self-interest and legitimacy. Also in the international dimension, states must be convinced that functioning within a given political order brings them concrete benefits, and at least protects them against harm, including that resulting from the act of violence. Legitimization provides a sense of just behaviour. As mentioned above, the idea of legitimacy has been at the heart of peace treaties since the dawn of time. **Acquiring goods (territory, people, property, and money) was justified and right if it was legitimized by the principle of just wars and cemented by a peace treaty.**

The need for legitimacy also applies to violence itself. Apparently, just as violence is allegedly genetically conditioned in us, likewise people have a natural tendency to control and channel it.

Legitimization was always carried out at high social levels: tribe, nation. The "alien" factor helped in this process. It helped to give violence a heroic dimension if violence

was used against strangers and those arriving with hostile intentions. This led to the glorification of heroism of acts of violence, of war combatants and victims of violence. The entire social hierarchy at some stages of civilizational development was based on the roles and achievements at war (European feudal states). Warriors up till now are treated with respect and honour as opposed to criminals and terrorists. The Hobbesian war of "every man against everyone" was actually the war of every group against each other, writes Fukuyama.

For Fukuyama the logic of the development of human civilization pushes violence to the margins. Relations between human groups go from a violent competition for dominance, based on the formula of zero-sum game, to focus on satisfying the needs of people to prosper and live in dignity through cooperation and exchange. Globalization, whose essence is the free movement of information, capital and goods across geographical boundaries, is seen as the culmination of this logical process of the triumph of a mutually beneficial cooperative model of peaceful competition.

This logic is suggestive, and yet we still cannot free ourselves from the fatalism of violence. Violence is still widespread. Why?

**The contemporary model of international relations paradigm is characterized by the dusk of a monopoly on the use of armed force.** The modern nation-state has guaranteed itself, on the ruins of the feudal system, the exclusive right to possess and dispose of an armed force, especially in external relations. This monopoly faltered under the influence of ethnic conflicts (especially in Europe and Africa). And the catalyst has become the ease of trade in weapons, especially small-calibre ones. There are more than one billion light and small-calibre weapons in the world, the vast majority in private and unrecorded hands. These weapons are circulating illegally. They are not covered by the state monopoly on the possession of weapons. They are behind everyday violence.

The increase in violence is today lamented upon by many prominent philosophers, sociologists and historians, even if statistics say otherwise. This increase in violence has both a social and a political dimension. Hobsbawm saw the cause of the increase in violence among others in the revival of "neo-Blankism." Referring to the already forgotten pages of history, he understood by this phenomenon **the organized aspirations of small, elite-type, often self-styled social groups aimed at overthrowing regimes and achieving the goal of national separatism through military action.** It began to grow in the late sixties. Initially, neo-Blankism was limited to Western Europe (IRA, RAF, ETA). In Latin America, it poured out into guerrilla movements. In the 90s it adopted an ethnic and confessional form (Al Fatah, Hamas, Hezbollah, Tamil Tigers, Kurds, etc.). Then it found embodiment in Islamic terrorism (Al-Qaida). Mass popular support is irrelevant to neo-Blankists. Neither territorial entrenchment matters. **With globalization processes, political violence took on an increasingly supra-regional dimension.**

However terrorism and irredentism seen from a strategic perspective are not the mainstream of changes in the world of the last dozen or so years. Many observers today say, from a perspective of two decades, that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were not a turning point in the history of the world, as it was thought when commenting on their significance at the time. They made us aware of the destructive power of international terrorism. They have undoubtedly released American unilateral

energy. But only for a moment. However, the world and the organization of international politics have not changed. In this sense, they have not become a flywheel event. **From today's perspective, the key process for the world is the growth of China's power that has taken place in recent years.**

Zygmunt Bauman, in turn, claimed that violence will last as long as coercion exists. And coercion, also internationally, is a form of legalized violence. Bauman's forecasts were pessimistic. They purport that the past century can go down in history as the century of violence used by nation-states against their own citizens. This will probably be followed by another age full of violence: this time caused by the progressive incapacitation of nation-states by the free flow of global forces. He described a new type of war – the wars of the era of globalization. The purpose of these wars are not territorial gains. It is not about control over the territory of a foreign country. The aim is rather to force the conquered state to submit, to open its territory to globalization forces. These are to be wars first of all to open all possible doors for the free movement of capital. These wars are a policy of free global trade, by other means. The point is, however, that globalization does not need war for its expansion. It seems to work better at breaking the door with peaceful means.

Similarly, overinterpreting emotions made us treat the outbreak of ethnic wars of the early nineties as a testimony to the tendency of increasing violence in international relations. Small nations, according to this interpretation, without being able to resort to legalized coercion, entered the path of violence and mostly with good results, i.e. breaking into independence.

The issue of the bubble, inflated suddenly with statistics of internal conflicts in the early nineties, is not disputed. The background to these conflicts was still clear when they were in an acute phase. They were the result of the so-called defreezing effect. These conflicts did not come all of a sudden. Their escalation resulted from the fact that for years they were artificially suppressed. This did not mean, however, that we entered a new age of violence. Today we know with a greater degree of certainty that this was a temporary regression in the history of international relations, which in no way broadly disturbed the long-term tendency which is **delegitimization of violence and its eradication from the practice of international relations**. These wars were more of a belated past than a herald of the future.

Globalization neuroses are manifested in the fact that we want to see in everything heralds of new, most often mega historical trends. Just as the fall of communism prompted the thesis of the irreversibly coming triumph of democracy, so when the democracy march slowed down and authoritarian regimes resisted international pressure, the attractiveness of the Western model of democracy was quickly seen as exhausted. It was enough, however, for the Arab nations to take to the streets in protest against stagnation and dictatorships, and we have already declared the inexhaustible strength of common values and democratic aspirations.

It was similar with ethnic wars. They were inevitable in a situation of unstable international order. But this does not mean that they are the essence of the transitions produced by globalization.

**Today's wars are wars of poverty.** Of the more than thirty countries (their number has fallen by almost half since the beginning of the nineties) currently experiencing civil wars and internal conflicts, the majority of them are poor. Poverty and violence

come together in a vicious circle. It is getting harder and harder to break free from it. Conflicts drag on or turn into a phase of criminal violence. Over 1.5 billion people are affected by cycles of political and criminal violence. They carry more and more serious effects on development and a burden on the international community.

**Violence is an attribute of underdevelopment.** The new phenomenon of the beginning of the 21st century is the penetration of the phenomenon of violence into a group of middle-income countries. Already 40 percent of wars and conflicts also affect countries below the middle-income group (MIFF). These weak middle-income countries are the bane of donors. Although they need little support for stable functioning, they have huge areas of poverty (sometimes caused by the deliberate abandonment of help by central authorities) and thus a huge space for the escalation of violence.

**All in all, non-violence has therefore become an attribute of civilizational progress, and the practice of international relations confirms this. Violence, even legalized, has become irrevocably a shameful and reluctantly used form of international action.**

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**What is undoubtedly a new phenomenon is sublimation and virtualization of violence. Violence has reached cyberspace. The IT revolution is changing power relations and the very concept of power in international relations. In this sense, it is perhaps the most important technological factor in changing the paradigms of international relations since the introduction of weapons of mass destruction to military arsenals.**

The axiom that information is power is no longer valid. **The Internet has democratized and deregulated international relations.** There was a thesis that the proliferation of information became a source of polarity as much as the proliferation of weapons. The point is that the power was dispersed not only vertically, shortening the hierarchy, but also horizontally: filling the trench between the centre and the periphery of world politics. **Information in the world of international politics, just like in virtually organized communities, transforms hierarchies into networks.**

The digital message has become the main means of communication, also in international politics. **Almost all information generated in the world comes from emails, video clips and www. One thing is certain: without the Internet, a cardinal change in the international policy paradigm, which is the entry of an individual as an active political subject, would not be possible.**

World policy has ceased to be the sole domain of governments. **Governments are losing control of the agenda!** Everyone is able to influence it, if only because the costs and barriers to entering the information flow are getting lower.

Of course, the virtualization of politics also has its dark side. It opened a new channel to do evil. It is most often associated with using the Internet to create networks associated with terrorism. **The Internet has provided a virtual shelter to terrorists.** The current formula for organizing terrorist camps and networks in failed and rogue states no longer guarantees security. Followers are recruited virtually and virtually trained and instructed.

Cyberspace is a combination of physical and virtual properties. Servers must be in physical form and be located somewhere. Information not any more. It can circulate without control and influence. Cyberspace geography is more plastic than other environments. **Countries, especially those with an authoritarian political system, cannot accept the loss of the information monopoly. Their restrictive practices directly affect the freedom of the individual. The movements to protect the sovereignty of the digital citizen (netizen) are taking strength.**

**Cyberspace has become an arena for the clash of two visions of world governance: libertarian, liberal, and statist, restrictive, censoring.**

The Internet is a special space – there is no uniform international regime. From the very beginning, cyberspace was treated as a public good not subject to state control. However, unlike other goods, such as the "open sea", some cyberspace is, however, under national management (infrastructure). The main question is whether this national control will expand or will it liberalize in a liberal spirit? There is no doubt that governments, even those who would very much like for domestic political reasons, will never be able to manage cyberspace fully.

The problem of cyberspace is its cavernous size, countless number of users and uncertainty as to the directions of system evolution. Even if it is possible to repel state attempts to subordinate the Internet, there may be "fragmentation" of the system, the emergence of *walled gardens*, private networks, corporate control of network functioning, etc. The problem is real, but the political overtones of the initiatives of states with authoritarian governments only hamper international discussion.

The ease of operating in cyberspace has been the catalyst of an increase in the threat of economic espionage and cybercrime. **The new and most serious phenomenon that influences the paradigm of violence in international relations is, of course, cyberterrorism, and in a conceptual sense – cyberwar, i.e. aggressive actions directed at a foreign state, its infrastructure, management systems and functioning of the state.**

Political and social awareness of aggressive capabilities in cyberspace undoubtedly spurred the activity of "activists" attacking Estonian servers in 2007 during the political dispute between Russia and Estonia regarding the relocation of the monument to the Soviet soldier. Georgia also experienced botnet attacks in the context of the conflict with Russia in 2009. Just like Ukraine after 2014. Many countries have decided to take seriously the building of defence capabilities against these types of cyberattacks. Cyberspace has been used to influence the outcome of political elections and referenda in other countries. **Cyber manipulations have become the hidden political weapon used by some countries to influence domestic developments, sometimes even openly sow discord and disintegration in other countries.** Even the coronavirus crisis of 2020 has been used for spreading fake news and distortions for political purposes.

The problem is serious, of course. In a cyberwar, attack is practically costless. This is a war everyone can afford. The attack has an advantage over defence. Deterrence is possible, but on a limited scale (if only because you do not know exactly whom to hit).

A specific feature of cybernetic villains is his practical unnoticeability – most victims of cyber attacks are not even aware that they have become the target of assault. On the other hand, the state is hardly able to help the citizens and institutions that are under attack. At most, it can warn them, and not without suspicions of unduly violating privacy. It can also filter IT traffic with foreign countries, but also exposing itself to allegations of censorship and restriction of freedom.

Governmental institutions can cause serious damage via the Internet (censorship, blocking operations, but also undertaking offensive activities: **infrastructure paralysis in foreign countries, etc.**). **However, they are at risk of losing their good reputation. Therefore, even when undertaking destructive actions, especially towards foreign countries or foreign entities, they carefully hide their role. Now a cyberattack is not only an instrument for governments to complement aggressive activities conducted through other channels but even to replace other channels.**

Non-governmental entities (including criminal ones) usually cause less damage than in the case of state-supported actions, but these are still damages that can be defined as serious (primarily: data theft).

Unorganized or loosely organized entities (including solo hackers) can only be selective. But blocking their attacks involves considerable security forces (including governmental), if only to create safeguards against accidental assault. Hackers are not only described as a special evil because of this. It is not about the extent of theft or fraud, but about the fact that their activities completely deregulate the system of information and goods flow, and ultimately destroy the trust of network members.

However, the most important phenomenon in cyberspace in terms of strategic importance is the crossing of a specific war Rubicon. The use of a malicious virus to infect computers controlling Iran's nuclear centrifuge machines (Stuxnet) and a giant virus cleaning the hard disks of computers in the Middle East (Flame) were the first highly publicized cases of using the cyber technology for clearly military purposes.

They showed that cyberspace can be used to conduct offensive operations against another State concerning the defence potential. **Just wait for the outbreak of the great cybernetic world war.**

## **SESSION V: LIES, DEEP LIES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

**We are witnessing now less violence in international relations but more lies and theft. The IT has made a particularly strong impact on the behaviour. It made it easier to lie and steal.**

Why is lying still more acceptable and even preferable when dealing with other nations?

There is no moral system under the sun that does not treat lies as a reprehensible form of behaviour. It is a sin in all major religions. Calling someone a liar is a painful epithet. But **in relations with other nations, and in diplomacy and foreign policy in particular, a lie is not only permissible, morally neutral, but even treated as customary.** Please ask any ordinary bread eater what diplomacy is associated with. In response you can hear that it is about the privilege of lying to foreign governments for the sake of state interests. A lie in diplomacy not only escapes condemnation, but it can even be considered a virtue in some situations (Kant condemned lie in every form and situation, but utilitarian philosophers believed that lie sometimes has sense and justification). One of the diplomats' most frequently cited adages is (after Henry Wotton): "The ambassador is an honest man sent abroad to lie for the good of our country." For the same reason, Camillo Cavour was to say: "I found a great way to cheat diplomats. I tell them the truth and they never believe me."

What is the origin of this moral dissonance? Why such hard and steadfast norms such as the duty to tell the truth ("Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour" has a commandment status for Christians!), are suspended or even negated as soon as we enter into relations with other nations. A lie in international politics is widely regarded as the usual method of conduct.

From today's perspective, it is difficult to make a sensible answer. Some explanation may be the fact that international politics, especially diplomacy, is a kingdom of "**white lies**". They are usually meant not to offend a foreign partner, but rather to show respect. The classic canons of diplomacy proscribe not to say unpleasant things directly to a representative of a foreign country. Especially multilateral diplomacy has developed a kind of communication code. An "interesting proposal" is usually a term for a document full of surprising and questionable ideas. A "proposal that requires careful consideration" is usually a proposal that you would rather not go back to again. A "proposal that raises some important questions" is a document that contains elements that clash with your current instructions.

**The more powerful the country making a proposal, the harder it is to openly reject it** on a wider forum. Sometimes this leads to a situation in which this game of appearances ends with the adoption of a project, which then few people want to implement. Example: the idea of the OSCE Conciliation and Arbitration Tribunal. It was submitted by France and developed by a person trusted by its President. Experts from other countries had a lot of fundamental doubts about the idea. However, no one dared tell France about them in a way that would question the sense of the proposal. As a result, the proposal was adopted, but the Court has been essentially inactive since 1992, as confirmed by most of the doubts raised at the discussion stage.

Frequently, courtesy messages from foreign countries have been and are over- and misinterpreted. Especially, if it's difficult to verify their truthfulness. Everyone who has conducted a campaign to elect a country or its representative for an important international position knows something about it. The number of statements of support submitted before the election usually exceeds the number of votes received if the election is lost. The number of confirmed assurances of support for voting, made after the election, exceeds the number of votes received if the election was won. These are the elementary characteristics of election practices in international fora.



John Mearsheimer in his pioneering analysis about lies in international politics concludes that appearances are sometimes deceptive.

**Leaders lie in foreign policy matters more often towards their own society than towards leaders of other countries.** This applies especially to democratic countries. Leaders often lie not so much for their own political benefit as out of a sense of state duty. They lie because they are convinced of the moral imperative of lying in the name of caring for the good of their own state. They lie, however, rarely, less often than commonly thought of. They lie with impunity because there is enormous social acceptance of a lie in foreign policy, even a lie directed to their own society, provided it produces socially desirable results. Only a political failure can mobilize society to account for its leader from an international lie.

Mearsheimer attempts to explain the gap in the moral assessment of lies, depending on whether it concerns intra-national or international matters, the different nature of the environments in which it is applied. Society within the state is based on the principle of order and harmony, arranged in a hierarchical structure. The lie is reprehensible because it decomposes this order, eluting the sense of trust. **No society can function without a minimum of capital of trust. That is why people within their own society are telling the truth, although it sometimes harms their immediate personal interests.** The international environment is anarchic by nature. Each state is on its own, and its leader has no higher command than taking care of the survival of the state even at the cost of resorting to lies, manipulation and deception.

Lie is a form of cheating, but not every deception is a lie. Mearsheimer analyzes deception and manipulation techniques in detail. Deception consists in careful hiding of unfavourable facts, manipulation lies in their proper exposure, exaggeration of beneficial, underestimating unfavourable facts. **Both concealment and spinning do not cause any serious moral discomfort. They are widely treated as morally acceptable in every dimension of life. But the lie as such has become permissible only in diplomacy and international politics.**

There are situations where a lie has the right to escape moral judgment. This is definitely **the time of war**. Lying is a legitimate method of conducting policy towards the enemy, as well as an instrument of propaganda for both one's own society and the enemy. Allies lie to each other in war as well, but rather only in extreme desperation.

Truthfulness is therefore a moral good of lower value in war. Usually only the defeated are accounted for by the lie of war (The Gliwice provocation had to naturally stand on the agenda of the Nuremberg Tribunal). Winning leaders usually do not want to justify their deeds and do not have to explain themselves. For the sake of the coalition, the Western Allies did not raise the Katyn lie during the war, although at least their passivity in unmasking the Katyn lie in the post-war years raises moral doubts, when relations with the USSR were already characterized by confrontation. In modern times, there is no lack of voices that for the false theses of the Bush administration, suggesting Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, there would be no significant angry public reaction if the stabilization action in Iraq went smoothly and without major casualties.

In terms of the admissibility of lies, civil war is hardly different from international war. In other words, a lie in war operates according to uniform standards.

Another situation where a lie has a strong *raison d'être* are **international negotiations**. It is naturally assumed that the starting positions of the parties are bargaining positions. Each side keeps in secrecy its real red-line positions going beyond which makes the transaction unprofitable. Each side protects information about its real objectives and needs from unauthorized access. A lie, for which Mearsheimer finds a euphemistic form of bluffing in this situation, is permissible and treated as part of the art of negotiations. **The parties do not expect truth from the partner.**

Bargaining power is seen as "the power of confusion and bluffing." In this sense, business negotiations internationally are no different from business negotiations within countries. There is no duality of ethics between dealing with your own compatriots and when negotiating with strangers. **Business ethics is essentially universal.** There is a certain margin, however. From today's perspective, it is clear that Greeks tried deliberately to distort the picture of their public finances when negotiating entry into the Euro zone. The real dimension of the public deficit was already above the allowable threshold. Perhaps the EU policy towards Greece in 2010-2011 would be publicly more benign and milder, if not for the pressure of the exposed lie from the past.

Mearsheimer distinguishes seven types of lies in international politics.

First, **interstate lies** which aim to gain or prevent strategic advantage in relations between states.

Secondly, **fear mongering** uses lies for the sake of raising anxiety. Its purpose is to convince one's public opinion about the impending threat, real or not (in order to divert attention from other issues, for example).

Third, strategic **cover-up lies**, strategic smoke screens, covers that are intended to hide from the public or foreign countries the weakness of your own policy or wrong decisions.

Fourth, nationalist **mythmaking**, in which a historical lie becomes the basis of a national myth.

Fifth, there are **liberal lies**, the most typical expression of which is the justification of an alliance of a democratic state with a dictatorial state violating human rights.

Sixth, these are lies of **social imperialism**, which aim to promote the interests of a narrow group or social class.

Seventhly, these are **ignoble cover-ups**. They are to cover the incompetence or unworthy behaviour of politicians and serve only their personal interests.

The above typology proves that lies to one's own public opinion are often difficult to separate from lies made to strangers.

Mearsheimer tries to prove that **state leaders and diplomats usually tell each other the truth.**

They do it mainly because politicians care now more about their personal international reputation than they used to. Truthfulness is the criterion for assessing

the ability to be a statesman. For politicians in many countries, especially European ones, an international career is a natural path for pursuing a career after ending active life on their own political scene. A politician caught lying will always have less chance for an international career. Moreover, the risk of a lie being exposed is much higher today than it was years ago. We live in a transparent world. Secrets have narrowed down considerably. Everything comes to light sometime. The exposed lie strikes with double force on the politician and the state he/she represents. The more serious the lie and the effort to hide it, the greater the negative effects on external relations. The factor of trust increases in foreign policy. Also domestically, the times when leaders escaped consequences of lying to their own public opinion about the international situation, contrary to what Mearsheimer claims, are gone. The Bush-Blair lie about Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction, came to light faster than one might think.

But sometimes politicians find absolution in the logic so precisely described by George Constanza in “Seinfeld”: “Jerry, just remember. **It’s not a lie if you believe it**”. Many politicians when talking to each other, especially when deeply in the psychological state of denial, can say very absurd things while still claiming that they are telling the truth.

Of course, there are foreign policy spheres in which secrets still play a significant role. This applies primarily to security policy and trade and investment policy. But there the scale of using lies to protect the secret is shrinking. Before decades, it was natural practice to distort data on military potential. This was often done for negotiating purposes. It was not a secret that the Ministry of Defence of the USSR retouched data on the Polish armed forces, which Poland subsequently submitted to Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces in Central Europe (MBFR) in the eighties. The Polish military knew that it would make them present false data. The main reason was not so much hiding the truth about defence abilities, but obtaining convenient starting positions for possible reductions. Similarly, the Russians misled the Americans at the negotiations on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). During informal consultations, they convinced Americans to accept the so-called concept of object of verification, presenting their number that gave Americans hope for the right to a satisfactory number of on-site inspections. After the conclusion of the Treaty and the presentation of the first data, it turned out that the number of sites suddenly became significantly lower. It was also found that many armoured personnel carriers were painted white to pretend to be medical equipment. It was evident that it was not so much a strategic intention as a reluctance to bear the costs of destroying the equipment and accepting inspections.

The reasons for distortions, especially within the Euro-Atlantic world, have now become very mundane, prosaic. There is no strategic intention behind it. At most the intentions are tactical and political. Outside Europe – security policy still often uses deception and strategic lie. In general, however, countries in difficult security situation, countries exposed to increased risk, countries involved in confrontation or fierce competition count on more freedom in lying.

How to predict the role of lies in the future? Realists say the world is doomed to live with it. States will continue to care about their own security and will have to protect themselves with a lie.

**In a systemic sense, however the global challenges, the growing interdependence will require to invest in building global trust capital. You can't build it with lies.** All those who believe that foreign policy cannot be practised without lying, sooner or later will reach the point where they ask themselves whether states can work together addressing complex global agenda practising lies and deception.

In addition, **the international responsibility of politicians for deeds, but also for words, will grow.** It is becoming increasingly difficult for politicians to hide behind external immunity. Leaders guilty of crime will not cover it up with a lie. There are international tribunals that are able to find out the truth. It seems that the stronger international justice (global justice), the greater the fear of responsibility for lying.

It has become also morally questionable to hide real intentions of actions in the international field. The current code of political correctness rejects all elements of possessiveness, domination, dictate and national egoism. Which in itself can be interpreted as the victory of moral reasons in assessing the behaviour of states. What really is the main driving force behind the behaviour of states will always be surrounded by a haze of uncertainty.

That is why international politics is still a field where politicians and analysts come to assume that decisions are made under the influence of sometimes very subjective perception of interests and motivation. It's no secret that historically, even significant political decisions were dominated by a very personal perception of interests (determined by dynasty, family, faith, national community, sympathy, business interests) by the decision maker. And the real motives of actions are often kept secret by the decision maker for a long time, if not forever, and before everyone (domestic and foreign politicians, domestic and foreign public opinion, family and friends, etc.).

**The disharmony between actual and declared objectives made international politics a very fertile field to conspiracy theories.** For this reason, gossip has become such a frequent and strong weapon in international politics.

**Lying does not pay off. The only hope that politicians can have is that they can escape responsibility because of the short and selective memory of the public, in particular in their own country.**

**Technology made lying much easier: fake news, trolling, deep fake. And post-modernity offered a handy justification: there is more than one truth. The concept of post-truth took it even further.**

But the vision of one-world demands trust. The world's complicated agenda requires more trust than ever before. **How can we trust each other if we constantly lie?**

### **Theft, bribery, betrayal**

**Conducting intelligence against other states has long been the embodiment of cynicism and amorality in interstate relations. No significant state dared to conduct foreign policy without intelligence support.** There was essentially no moral aversion to espionage if it concerned collecting publicly available information. Two of its forms, however, caused serious moral reflections: recruiting agents among

citizens of foreign countries, and above all – secret operations, especially with the use of violence, against a foreign state (its citizens) and on the territory of a foreign state.

The necessity of resorting to morally questionable methods of espionage is treated by politicians as a kind of test of credibility of noble ideals of international politics. These noble ideals of international politics are confronted with brutal reality (*reality check*), which shows that international relations remain the Hobbesian world, the battlefield of national egoisms, and the environment of competitive and antagonistic attitudes.

Spy practices are a shameful part of international politics and an undoubted way to act to the detriment of another country. Of course, **attempts were made to create moral justification for espionage**. First, the justification is supposed to derive from the democratic mandate of the state. By definition, a democratic state has the moral right to spy. In turn, the intelligence services of dictatorial states would be deprived of such legitimacy. Espionage by a democratic state is treated as part of the "social contract" upon which the state is based, and seen as morally justified.

Intelligence is also sometimes justified by the higher idea of a just (good) case served by foreign (state) policy. In particular, the moral mandate to spy is derived from the state's duty to care for security, territorial integrity, and economic interests. It is not only the right but also the duty of the state to recognize external threats in advance. This cannot be done without a good understanding of the potential (especially military), but also the intentions of foreign partners. However, the key question is to what extent the moral validity of the primary goal can justify some, commonly considered "dirty", "immoral", "unworthy" methods used in practice by intelligence services. This kind of reasoning moves moral dilemmas from the essence of espionage to its methods.

First of all, recruiting agents is considered such a morally questionable method. Espionage against one's own state is widely regarded as an act of the highest betrayal. If the agent does so for ideological reasons (because he/she does not accept the political system in his country, and he wants to act to its detriment because of that), this undoubtedly alleviates the moral dilemmas of the foreign intelligence recruiting him. But moral doubts are not entirely dispelled. These mitigating arguments are no longer there, however, when it comes to using blackmail (e.g. sexually motivated), bribery or deceit (the so-called false flag) to attract people to betray their own state. Moral condemnation is strengthened by the fact that in most intelligence services the recruitment and operation of agents is perceived instrumentally, almost in a cynical way. The agent and his/her act of disloyalty to his/her own state as such have no value in this view. The value is getting information.

Secondly, morally questionable are secret operations conducted against a foreign state. With some exceptions like, for example, providing financial support for political, social or ideological movements. If financial support is within the law of the country in which the activity is conducted, and the type of activity itself does not violate the law, even if the true source of funding remains camouflaged, then everything is morally acceptable. Unless the views are not authentic, but are generated to order. Soviet secret services financed the activities of the communist movements in many ways, but in many countries these movements were genuinely communist, firmly rooted in people's views. Which does not mean that the financial

factor did not mean that sometimes these movements zealously supported the USSR foreign policy. And they could then be reasonably suspected of playing the role of agent of influence.

Buying political sympathy from outside with more subtle forms (study visits, scholarships, scientific projects and even gifts, etc.) is not morally dubious either. It can only compromise the recipients of these promotions. Not only when there is an obvious conflict of interest.

There is even a view that secret support for opposition political leaders in foreign countries may in some cases have the value of humanitarian intervention.

On the other hand, there are also views that any form of financing public activity from abroad, even non-governmental organizations, is at least morally suspicious. In extreme form, this leads to assessments such as this, heard from the current Russian leadership, that all "colourful revolutions" in the post-Soviet area were planned and implemented for money (if not by the hands) of the CIA. And NGOs are ordered to register in Russia as foreign agents.

The most amoral of all covert operations are of course political killings. The murder of Trotsky by Mercador received wide attention. The case of Bandera's murder is interesting because the Munich court not only judged Stashynsky - the direct contractor, but also tried to hold accountable his principal, i.e. the head of the KGB. The circumstances of the murder of Yandarbiev, Litvinenko or Skripal were interpreted as the continuation of these practices. Political killings were also practiced by other services of the communist bloc (in clear connection with the KGB sometimes).

The most glaring case of acting to the detriment of another state is the murdering of foreign leaders on behalf or with the participation of other states. The CIA's plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro have been made public. From the mid-1970s, US intelligence agencies cannot plan, commission or execute political killings. Such a ban does not seem to be practised in the services of other countries.

But even the killings of foreign leaders are not subject to unequivocal moral criticism. **The principle of lesser evil would also apply.** If the removal of a foreign leader is the only way to prevent civil or international war, mass oppression, murder and terror, then it would be for some people morally acceptable. It would be part of the Western philosophical doctrine of **just tyrannicide**. Even if it concerns a foreign tyrant. However, this view is increasingly marginal. Similarly, the situation when, in special operations in a foreign country, dangerous terrorists, and especially political leaders of separatist movements, are subjected to extrajudicial execution does not give moral peace.

Doctrinal doubt is caused also by the fact that state officials use the territory of foreign states to conduct activities that would be prohibited by law on their own territory and liable with criminal consequences. This kind of dualism, not even moral but legal, is hard to justify. **It treats foreign countries as an area of reduced moral and legal standards.** Some real and alleged CIA practices in connection with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have given rise to serious concerns.

Less morally sensitive but very important form of obtaining information is **economic espionage**. Economic espionage was in the past for the countries of the communist bloc, and still today for many other countries, not only with a significant share of state ownership in the economy, an important element of intelligence activity. However, there are countries in which conducting economic intelligence is practised only in a very limited form (technologies with military use). The problem is that **technological ("industrial") espionage as such grows and extends with the proceeds of globalization**.

Firstly, because globalization intensifies international competition. Companies increasingly have to compete with each other and with diminishing protection from their own state, so they are forced to gather deeper information about competitors. Secondly, technological progress, not only related to cyberspace, facilitates espionage. The limits of the moral admissibility of intelligence practices in this field are changing, which is particularly evident in the emergence of new and "grey areas". Collecting data about competitors, their products, technologies and intentions cannot be morally reprehensible. On the contrary, in the sense in which it serves the development of competitiveness and better satisfaction of consumer needs, it has a strong moral mandate. Also, to the extent that it does not create double standards of operation: inside the country (towards companies of the same national flag) and outside (towards companies of a foreign country), it should not raise questions as to how such practices can affect the moral standards of international relations.

**There is no doubt that the field of moral tolerance is narrowing in certain situations, even if this is not yet reflected in legal norms.** Reprehensible practices include stealing information from protected computer files, knowingly intercepting information from undamaged media found in e.g. rubbish bins, hiring private detectives or sending spies to work in other companies, surveying the opinions of other company customers claiming to be their representatives, organizing fake competitions for positions to examine the opinions and knowledge of employees of a competing company, etc. Other simple and explicitly condemned ways include renting rooms in neighbouring buildings only for the purpose of surveillance, eavesdropping and monitoring. These activities are widely recognized as morally reprehensible as contrary to the principle of honesty in business practices. Experts suggest that information gathering practices be tested on the "golden rule" in line with Kant's categorical imperative. Practices that, when universalized, would harm all participants of the business game, should be morally rejected according to this logic. But one can meet a view that the moralizing approach will not do much good. **Spying is cheaper and more effective than conducting your own research and development and will always be tempting.**

At the same time, however, the amount of sensitive business information, including directly relating to property rights, is growing steadily. Unintentional escape of information, accidental theft, hardware failures are a frequent reason for the emergence of a large amount of valuable information circulating on the Internet. Is it morally reprehensible to use it for espionage purposes?

It is accepted to say that different standards apply to the use of ideas and inventions in the world. In the West, strictly defined standards protect intellectual rights. In Asia, **invention and innovation are treated as a public good**. This concept of innovation

is more and more widespread especially among Internet users. The massive protests against ACTA were undoubtedly a reflection of this.

**A real problem is the blurring of borders between state and industrial espionage.** Technologies are increasingly dual-purpose technologies, while asymmetrical threats make it necessary for intelligence activities to enter a wide field of business relations (financial transactions, etc.). One of the new good examples of the blurring of these borders is the relationship between the world of banks and the world of tax services. Nevertheless, ethical problems in this respect are depoliticized and do not have a greater impact on the perception of the strength of moral standards in international relations.

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Even if a universal code of international morality ever arises, compliance with its rules will probably not be an end in itself. There will always be values in the name of which the states will give up moral standards: **values related to the survival of the state, the nation and its basic interests. However, the point is that transgression of ethical boundaries should be the last resort, not routine.**

Globalization is an impetus for important change in international relations. The rise of the individual is the engine of bringing moral considerations to the process of political decisions. Is the change systemic enough to bring moral considerations to the fore of politics is another matter.

## **SESSION VI:**

### **JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Justice is one of the basic concepts used to evaluate the world, also in its political dimension. It is one of the most primary concepts and, it seems, with a great future.

Descriptions of the desired social and political order, including international order, have always tried to highlight the demand for justice. Aristotle and other Greek philosophers wrote extensively about justice. It occupied the great philosophers of the Enlightenment with John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau at the forefront. William Penn postulated the principle of justice as key in human relations.

**Justice is seen as a binder of every order.** It is a fragment, a narrow, but relatively well-defined, of a moral factor in politics, also international. Justice was considered a key concept in organizing relations between the community and its members, and to ensure the continuity of order.

**It was understood in two dimensions: retributive, dealing with the responsibility of members of society for violating the norms of relations; and distributive:** regulating the manner of sharing the burden and benefits resulting from being a part of a community.

**The principle of justice has not found a uniform legal international interpretation,** although it undoubtedly shapes the logic of the development of the system of international relations. The UN Millennium Declaration of 2000 contains



references to "global justice", "just and lasting peace", "just sharing of costs and burdens" in managing globalization, but does not define it and does not attempt to interpret justice. The slogan of justice is propagated by non-state actors. Also today – by alterglobalists or movements of indignados.

In international discourse, justice is a term that is often and routinely used today. One could say – thoughtlessly. For years, diplomatic communications have used the concepts of "lasting and **just peace**", especially in relation to the Middle East. This is a duty phrase in the positions of almost all countries. It is not surprising, then, that the slogan of a just peace devalued over time into an empty phrase. It can be interpreted that in the concept of justice it was about peace based on taking into account the interests of all parties, peace forged with the participation of all parties (not arbitrarily imposed), peace that benefits everyone (and not only the privileged), and therefore an impartial peace, mutually beneficial, honest.

The concept of "**just international order**" had different connotations. In political narrative, it was primarily associated with the aspirations of developing countries for the so-called **democratization of international relations and changes in the rules governing global economic cooperation**. Therefore, it was about providing developing countries with real influence on political decisions taken in international organizations, softening the hegemony of Western powers, especially the USA, in the process of settling political issues, and in particular by rebuilding economic relations, including trade, so that developing countries could reduce the gap dividing them from the developed world.

In the ethical dimension of international relations, the term of a just international order has been associated with **reducing violence, ensuring the primacy of human rights, including economic and social rights, strengthening the development aid system and implementing the principles of sustainable development**. Justice in international relations also extends **to the respect for diversity of cultures**.

**There is no doubt that the more the paradigm of values is transpiring in international relations, the more intensely the idea of justice will influence the shape of normative and institutional decisions determining the international order.**

The criterion of justice plays an important role in assessing international order. To a large extent it determines its legitimacy. The bipolar world system in the post-World War II years did not stand the test of justice. The problem with the so-called inter-epoch, that followed after the end of the Cold War, is that in large areas of the world, the idea of an order based on Western domination and Western values has not generally met the basic criteria for justice. For many societies of developing countries, the way of managing the world, in which the first violin is played by Western states (the United States), and the economic model remains the liberal model of capitalism, contains a strong charge of injustice. So it was flawed, deprived of legitimacy. **The process of political and economic (and cultural) emancipation of the South is largely due to the conviction that the order is unfair.**

It can be assumed that the importance of the justice factor in international discourse will grow. Globalization has awakened egalitarian and reconciliation attitudes in social relations. Internationally, it is marked by the political "awakening" of developing countries.

New political phenomena in Western countries overlap with the global context. From 2008, austerity policies in Western countries gave rise to social protest movements,

initially in Western Europe (*indignados, then Gilets jaunes*), and also in the US (*Occupy Wall Street*). These movements formed themselves around demands for justice. They advance, among others, postulates to limit the position of financial circles or bridge the income differences between the richest and the rest of society.

If we measure the differences in wealth in society, then in general the Gini coefficient (in IMF calculations) has increased in the last twenty years in most countries. Countries with a fast development path show the largest income disparities. Therefore, Gini co-efficient increased dramatically in China, but also significantly in India. However, even in the most egalitarian Scandinavian countries, where the Gini index fluctuates around 0.25, it has increased noticeably recently. On a global scale, however, due to the dynamic growth of China, India, Brazil and other emerging countries, income disparities have decreased significantly. **So even if income disparities have increased within countries, they have been levelled out globally.** The global Gini coefficient, which grew alarmingly at times over the 19th and 20th centuries, has been clearly decreasing over the past twenty years. The world as such has become more just!

The biggest challenge to justice has been the problem of condensation of wealth, that is, the degree of concentration of income in the richest group. And it has grown dramatically.

The differences in earnings (income from work) are also widening.

The Millennium Goals have placed the focus on the fight against poverty. Quite right. They could not, however, address the issue of bridging the income gap in the world, let alone inequalities within countries. They also did not mention anything about injustice in its retributive dimension. It does not arouse such emotions, although in the future it is a challenge that the international community should take. Without a solution to the problems associated with it, it is impossible to create an effective rule of law on a global scale. It is estimated that around 400 million people live outside the protective umbrella of law, without access to human rights protection institutions. This applies above all to people without IDs, birth certificates, places of residence, women, adolescents, slum residents, etc. Voices are being heard that without ensuring universal access to the mechanisms of justice it will not be possible to provide a sense of justice as such.

### **Models of justice and international relations**

The concept of justice is deeply entrenched in people's consciousness. As we mentioned, philosophers have been busy defining it for centuries. **Three main ways of determining justice have taken root: justice as a mutual benefit, justice as reciprocity and justice as fairness.**

The problem of justice arises when the demand for goods exceeds supply. When they occur in abundance and everyone can take them without harming others, there is no problem. The communist rule: to everyone according to their needs, in this sense was the most just of the rules, because it did not touch the dilemmas of justice at all. It could, however, apply when all goods were in widespread abundance. It is still difficult to imagine such a state in reality. David Hume, who described the "circumstances of justice", argued that there is no problem of justice when there is an extreme shortage of goods, either. Then no one can blame someone for taking as

much as they can to ensure survival. **Survival becomes a value higher than justice.** Describing the so-called subjective circumstances of justice, Hume believed that the problem of justice also reveals itself when there is a likelihood of conflict of interest. **The issue of the distribution of goods in a marriage or family does not touch upon the problem of justice, because it is not treated as a conflict of interest.**

It can be assumed that – in support of Hume's theses – **in international integration conglomerates, based on a sense of a special, if not a kind of "family" bond, the concept of justice operates on different principles than in international relations as a whole.** The closest example: the European Union.

The European Union is seen as a kind of wealth redistribution mechanism. Its budget is undoubtedly an instrument of fiscal redistribution. From the beginning, however, several distribution theories emerged to explain it. Representatives of the first, referring to Article 158 of the Treaty of Rome, treat the Union as a mechanism to ensure economic and social cohesion, and see its strategic goal in levelling development disparities and lifting the poorest regions from underdevelopment. The whole cohesion and regional policy of the European Union, structural funds, etc. are to serve this purpose. Analyses of the redistribution of funds over the 50 years of the Community / Union's operation show conclusively that there is no simple relationship between the level of wealth/poverty of countries and the size of funds paid/received through the EU channel. However, **the Union is the first and the most significant international creation in which the principle of distribution according to economic and social needs is elementarily inscribed in relations between Member States.**

Another theory stipulates that the basis of the redistributive function in the European Union is the calculation of national gains and losses arising from the principle of the open market (especially on trade flows). **The Union, favouring export-based economies, must properly compensate for the resulting losses of countries that cannot protect their markets.** But the redistribution within the EU is the result of bargaining among countries where each one from the very beginning determines its own profit and loss ratio, resulting from the principle of unfettered market access.

There is also a third school. According to this already quite realistic interpretation of EU distribution mechanisms, it is assumed that **the Union's distribution practices are based primarily on the strength of the country's bargaining position in the decision-making procedures within the Union.** Proponents of this theory emphasize the fact that smaller countries have always gained relatively more from membership in the EU than larger countries, because (especially before the Lisbon Treaty) they had relatively more voting power than would result from their population and economic potential.

The issue of rescuing Greece from financial collapse by other Eurozone countries raised the question about the degree of responsibility of small and poorer countries which were poorer than Greece and were called upon to contribute to save it. Especially in Slovakia, this aroused understandable emotions.

**One thing is not in doubt: the European Union is perceived as a *sui generis* mechanism of distributive justice, even if the stream of funds flowing through it still remains at a symbolic level of just over 1% of Gross National Income of all Member States.**

**Other models of justice applied in international relations are based on the principle of mutual benefit, resulting from the assumption that goods are better**

**divided on a cooperative rather than competitive basis.** The problem, however, is that when the potentials of the parties are unequal, the stronger side will always be in a privileged position - it can ensure for itself a greater advantage, although still mutual. Relations between metropolises and colonies in the past could be perceived in such categories (because the benefits of cooperation were undoubtedly reciprocal), and for years in these categories neo-colonial relationships between former metropolises and former colonies were seen in developing countries. The concept of justice as a mutual benefit must therefore sound anachronistic today.

In another theory, **justice was based on reciprocity:** you get as much as you put in. The problem arises when those who enter the exchange are unable to contribute anything. In international terms, the principle of justice understood in this way would reduce the problem of equalizing development opportunities for states to charity.

A concept of justice based on empathy is **justice as fairness.** It can be assumed that if empathy is a trait driving the development of human civilization, then the formula of justice as fairness is a natural stage of historical development. And justice as fairness inevitably leads us to the legacy of John Rawls, an eminent philosopher who gave the principle of justice almost a canonical form. His theory of justice fundamentally influenced the understanding of justice also in international relations.

### **Rawls dichotomy in the era of globalization**

John Rawls confirmed that the idea of justice is central to order. He claimed that society is well-ordered when it not only supports the well-being of its members, but is also effectively regulated by the societal concept of justice. According to Rawls, the principle of fairness is to be the basis for regulating people's claims, the starting point for determining the system of social relations (its rules and institutions). One of the features of this concept is the assumption that the parties in the initial situation are rational and mutually interested in each other. The original principles assigned to this situation would be equality of basic rights and obligations, and compensation for social and economic inequalities for the benefit of all, especially the most deprived.

John Rawls, however, treated the issues of justice as they apply to the law of nations and international relations only casually. He extrapolated the mechanism of shaping the social contract within nations on relations between nations. So he assumed that representatives of nations are deprived of all kinds of information. They know that they represent different nations that all live under the normal conditions of human life, but they know nothing about the specific conditions of their own societies, their power and strength compared to other nations; they also don't know what place they occupy in their own societies. They have as much knowledge as needed to make a rational choice to protect their own interests, but not so much that those of the better-performing countries can take advantage of their particular position. It is impossible not to notice that these initial conditions differ from today's conditions, above all in terms of the knowledge about ourselves and other nations.

John Rawls introduced a kind of two-phase method of analysing the issue of justice in international relations. According to it, one should first consider how the principle of fair justice is applied in each society, and then consider the interrelationships between societies/nations and inter-social (international) norms in which the principle of justice manifests itself.

The principles of justice first introduced by Rawls at the level of relations between societies are not surprising. **The principle of equality** took the leading place ("Independent peoples organized in states have some fundamental equal rights"). **The principle of self-determination** grew out of it, the right to decide on one's own affairs **without interference** from foreign powers, and **the right to self-defence** followed. Another of the principles was that **the treaties are to be respected if they are in line with other principles governing relations between states.**

Rawls analysed how these assumptions translate into restrictions on the means of warfare. In today's international practice, this kind of contextualization of the theory of justice has a limited effect. Rawls himself was aware of this, so he added an extensive argument about the principles of justice in international relations. He catalogued them in seven points (**respect for the freedom and independence of peoples, their equality, the right to self-defence, prohibition of intervention, honouring contracts and obligations, compliance with restrictions in the law of war, the obligation to respect human rights**).

On the international plane, he accepted that the principles of justice may apply not only to the **relations between liberal societies organized around the idea of justice, but also to "hierarchical societies"**, provided, however, that these societies will not conduct expansionist policies, the concept of morality will be socially inclusive and society will respect "basic human rights". The assumption that it is enough to comply with "fundamental human rights" is increasingly failing with the social instincts of a sense of justice in the modern world. The concept of the universality of rights and their natural essence, which fundamentally affects international relations and social sensitivity, seriously undermines Rawls' assumptions. Years ago, Rawls's conclusion was decisive: **the principles of distributive justice do not apply in relations between societies to the extent that they apply within societies. He justified the axiom of international relations that had been in force for centuries.**

Rawls also had to add explanations regarding the "non-ideal" dimension of his theory. They stipulated that in cases of societies departing from the principles of justice (including by rogue states today), ostracism and even sanctions are permissible.

The dichotomous treatment of the principle of justice by Rawls confirms the difficulty in transposing the principle of justice into international relations. **This difficulty is mainly due to the fact that while a man (citizen) as an entity of social relations is indisputably an integral unit, nations (states) possess such a feature only nominally.** The human individual can be internally contradictory, inconsistent and incoherent. However, it cannot be broken down into subordinate primary elements. From the point of view of the social contract, it is an indivisible unity. In turn, it is impossible, especially today, to perceive the nation (state) as equally indivisible. The international relations of the 20th century were in their own way the relations of division and creation of nations. The problem of tension between the whole and the part, the majority and the minority within the subject of the "nation" was revealed with all its might. Civil wars and internal conflicts especially marked the dynamics of international relations in the second half of the 20th century. After the Second World War, more than 80% of conflicts in the world were civil wars, the others were mostly internal conflicts that have been internationalized. Interstate conflicts have become rare.

**More importantly, the trend in international relations is the international empowerment of individual citizens. Its prominent consequences are, among others widespread procedures of seeking justice in international judicial**

**institutions by citizens versus their own state (government), and international criminal liability of state leaders for acts committed against their own citizens.**

All this led to the conclusion that the theory of international justice must be integrated, i.e. to mitigate (as far as possible) the dichotomy between the principles of justice in domestic relations and the principles of justice in international relations, as well as between the dimension of interstate justice and justice arising from direct relations between people on a global scale. Therefore, the idea was to combine the principles of justice in social relations with the principles of justice in interstate coexistence. In other terms, **the integration postulate emphasized the need to establish a relationship between international justice and global justice.**

Crowds of philosophers have tried to mitigate the dichotomy created by Rawls.

In particular, the key issue is to reconcile the principle of equality of citizens with the principle of equality of nations. In today's world, **unsustainable is the formula that only "independent peoples organized into states" have "certain fundamental equal rights," as was implied by Rawls's theory.** We would then accept the phenomenon of "subordination of peoples" and the lack of rights for "peoples not organized into states." It is a well-known trap of the nation-state concept.

The postulate **that international policy should be based on the primacy of the rights and interests of the human individual was traditionally attributed to the "cosmopolitan" school of international relations.** From these positions, the "cosmopolitans" criticized the concept of the nation-state. International policy was to be a transnational policy. Its foundation was to be natural moral laws exceeding the dimension of national interest.

The weak part of Rawls theory was the omission with regard to international relations of the principle of distributive justice (offsetting social and economic inequality between countries). This gave rise to the development of various theories of **global justice.** Their message was above all about the need to introduce the principle of common benefit into the way the world economy works, characterized by widespread inequalities in the level of well-being of nations.

Rawls's thesis that international relations cannot be governed by distributive justice principles has been overtaken by international practice. Since 1971, it has been commonly accepted that developed countries should allocate 0.7% of GDP to development aid. However, it was assumed that in order to achieve the UN Millennium Goals, the aid ceiling should be raised to 1% of GDP. Although objectively more and more countries could afford development assistance at this level, in 2009 only five countries exceeded the 0.7% of GDP ceiling: Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. However, it cannot be ruled out that, nevertheless, the standard for providing development assistance will not only be part of the code of good conduct, but also at least a politically binding norm.

Another form of redistribution has become debt relief. Debt reduction has become a common practice in bilateral relations.

The inevitable consequence of the Rawls doctrine has become the separation of discourse on justice in international relations into two autonomous currents. Representatives of the first one reduce justice to just war (the so-called political dimension), and of the second one – to economic inequality (economic and social dimension). The first trend has grown into a substantial and unquestioned collection

of axioms and theses, generally anchored in the provisions of the United Nations Charter on the principles of the use of force in international relations.

Similar coherence in discussions on distributive justice (economic dimension) is difficult to observe. Participants of the debate argue whether the subject of distributive justice are states or persons, whether it extends to economic goods or other areas of needs (human rights!), As well as to what kind of argumentation (needs, rights, abilities, etc.) the principle of distributive justice should be based upon.

These conceptual and definitional discrepancies between the two pillars invited to build bridges combining both theories.

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An attempt to create a coherent overall concept of justice combining its political and distributional pillars has been proposed, among others by Terry Nardin. This attempt assumes the separation of coercive principles as cementing the theory of just war and translating them into international distributive justice. The principle of distributive justice would therefore be based on the concept of permissible coercion. Non-military coercion would become an acceptable means of alleviating inequalities (injustices) that translate into poverty, disease, hunger, etc. The concept of **humanitarian intervention** may be quoted to illustrate how this principle works. According to it, states have not only the right but also the duty to protect people against violence resulting from the unlawful use of force and from suffering resulting from illness or malnutrition. It is therefore unfair to tolerate suffering. If someone allows others to suffer with countermeasures, they can become subject to forced intervention. From this concept derives, among others, the justification of solidarity (based on compulsory taxation) in solving the problem of global poverty.

The idea of **global taxation to fight poverty** is not new. It is associated today with the idea of James Tobin, put forward already in 1972, to introduce a tax on currency transactions. Tobin's tax would bring \$ 150-300 billion a year (and up to a trillion if one believes some other calculations). The most basic needs in the fight against poverty could be met by spending of 200 billion. Obviously, different views are held on the effectiveness of the Tobin tax and its enforcement. The idea of global tax remains attractive especially in the circles of international civil society.

### **Global justice**

Amartya Sen, whose views derive from the Rawls school, recognized early the need to bridge the gap between the concepts of international justice and global justice. The progress of the development agenda of contemporary international relations has posed the question of whether social justice mainly refers to relations within countries or to relations across borders: relations between nations. Another dilemma is: to what extent the identity (based on nationality and citizenship) is dominant (if not exclusive) in relation to the human being, and to what extent other identifications like social group (class), based on gender or profession matter.

Amartya Sen abandoned the solutions offered by both universalistic (cosmopolitan) and particularistic (realist) schools. He proposed a third concept. Its foundation is the thesis of "**multiple affiliation**", i.e. recognition of the fact that the human individual has many identities, and each of these identities generates specific needs and

problems, sometimes consistent and sometimes incompatible with the needs arising from other identities. Each identity, in turn, is realized in a different kind of social bonds. It is not easy to assess the strength of individual identities. Marxists' overinterpretation of the strength of class ties was a classic example. There are, however, identities that clearly cross the borders of national divisions (Sen gives, among others, the example of feminist movements). **These supranational affiliations are increasingly difficult to suppress by the supremacy of belonging to a national (state) community. Sen admits that the political concept of a person as a citizen of a state - no matter how important - cannot overshadow all other concepts and behavioural consequences of other forms of group association.** These forms of association are reflected in the growing number of mechanisms and institutions that are not an emanation of the actions of states (their internal policies and interstate actions) like business associations, intergovernmental organizations etc. Even international institutions, which were born of inter-state agreements, such as specialized UN organizations, become independent over time and alienate themselves (in a positive sense) from states.

Sen's general conclusion is simple: it is impossible to reduce the problem of justice in the world to only one plane – the interstate context. Each dimension of contacts must be measured in a separate way by the means of justice. Each of these dimensions should be subject to different normative descriptions.

For some authors, the central problem determining the illusory nature of global justice is the issue of *enabling institutions*. Proponents of this thesis refer to Hobbes, who deemed the state of justice achievable only thanks to the sovereign and government as creating conditions for the implementation of the idea. In a world without sovereignty, the concept of justice (or injustice) ceases to apply. Two conclusions can be drawn from this: first, **the idea of global justice without a world government is by definition a chimera; secondly, the only optimal model of a just world would be a world composed only of internally just (in Rawls' view) states.**

However, is the lack of world government (and any prospects for its creation) an obstacle in constructing global justice? Of course not. People, on a historically unprecedented scale, enter into mass contacts with people outside the area designated by the borders of the national community. With these interactions, an altruistic motive for developing fair relationships with people outside the national community develops. The stronger the repeatability of interactions, the greater the pressure to consolidate the desired pattern of behaviour and institutions to ensure it. Globalization undoubtedly increases the aspirations for justice.

To a limited extent, **global justice can be ensured by supranational, confederate creations of states.** They assume that the mutual obligations of the member states of such a union towards citizens are greater than towards the citizens of other – external states. The European Union is considered such a creation (despite the lack of fully confederate features). **Member States shall provide protection to citizens of other Union countries on an equal basis with their own.** The Union, on the other hand, deliberately redistributes income, reducing differences in levels of development and wealth. And the ideals of justice are guarded by supranational institutions.

A substitute for global justice is also seen in the **international justice system**. This is not only about tribunals or arbitration mechanisms that settle disputes between states, such as the International Court of Justice. Conceptually, they are not a novelty.



In recent years, the practice of establishing criminal tribunals adjudicating crimes after bloody domestic conflicts and mass violations of human rights has developed; Tribunals for crimes in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone were established. The culmination of this process was the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The jurisdiction of these tribunals is obviously limited in nature, as are the matters in which they rule. Conceptually, they are not a breakthrough either. The defendants are human beings (natural persons), and the tribunals are, in fact, an extraordinary substitute for national courts. Still, they are important.

On the other hand, there are international tribunals bringing new quality to the system, which allow citizens to complain about their own countries internationally.

In this sense, **international human rights courts have significant potential for creating global justice**. The European Court of Human Rights has become a true symbol of success.

Latin America and Africa followed the European model of transnational judiciary. There, however, transnational case law did not achieve such an impact on the functioning of national justice systems as in Europe.

There were even ideas to set up a world human rights court. For two reasons, such a tribunal will probably never emerge. First of all, it would be difficult to inscribe it into the growing network of regional tribunals. Europeans could certainly not find added value in it. Secondly, a large group of countries (primarily the US, China and India) would have trouble accepting its jurisdiction. Unlike in criminal tribunals, these are states not just natural persons or even former prominent persons who are put in the box. Even in Europe, this barrier was not easy to cross.

Various models of the world tribunal have been elaborated. They all have one thing in common: low probability of implementation.

### **Distributive justice: new dilemmas**

Experts are debating how far the limits of distributive justice should reach. To what extent can distributive justice manifest itself in international positive rights? There are authors who believe that while absolute poverty is a legitimate concern for the international community, relative poverty is not. However, new issues are emerging that affect the understanding of justice.

**International sanctions and justice.** A new light on the understanding of distributive justice in the global dimension is shed by the issue of so-called non-military international sanctions. They are firmly anchored in international law as a reasonable means of coercion. Rawls indisputably included them as legitimate in his theory. Practice, however, is evolving towards such sanctions that would not cause noticeable harm to the ordinary citizens of the country against which they are applied. They are so-called selective, targeted or smart sanctions. They are to harm a selected group of people - usually leaders or high officials of another state. They may concern business or financial activities, introduce a travel ban, etc. However, it is not always possible to reduce in practice the unintended effects of such sanctions. At the same time, the old variants of comprehensive sanctions (e.g. US sanctions against Cuba) remain in force. However, the trend is clear: it is increasingly assumed that it is unfair for an innocent society to suffer from the policies of its leaders, especially in a situation where the rulers do not have democratic legitimacy. In just a few decades, the concept of

sanctions has been significantly reinterpreted on the basis of the idea of justice. But this reinterpretation seems to go even further.

States long since have lost their unlimited sovereignty in dealing with their own citizens. They also lost a significant amount of freedom in proceedings against citizens of other countries. The trend is clear: they must comply in their proceedings with the principle of not harming nationals of other countries. For now, this applies to extreme situations (including cases of refusal to accept refugees or illegal immigrants in emergency situations). This makes the concept of universal, supra-sovereign human rights increasingly visible in practice. And thus a new interpretation of global justice is being created before our very eyes.

**Justice and access to raw materials and goods.** Another aspect of distributive justice that can become significant is access to shrinking natural resources. Scarce deposits of raw materials or their depletion are undoubtedly factors that can increasingly affect the development prospects of countries.

In the first decade of the 21st century, dynamic growth in developing countries accelerated the prices of some raw materials to unprecedented levels. Regardless of attempts to regulate the supply of these raw materials in order to maximize profits (and the OPEC cartel activity on the oil market is the best example of this), the problem of non-discriminated access to these raw materials is, in principle, still not so acute.

However, one could already taste its foretaste when in 2010 China introduced so-called export limits (or even a ban) some rare earths, used primarily in electronics and mobile phones (and the country meets 97% of global demand). These export restrictions were justified by environmental protection and public health. Rather, commentators saw them as a form of indirect sanctions against Japan in the context of the tensions that occurred between these countries in 2010.

The World Trade Organization, regulating trade disputes, however, found this embargo to be unfounded; its main argument was that these restrictions did not apply to domestic production and consumption. Chinese restrictions (including tariff) for rare earths exports had some justification, including ecological (devastating exploitation). But environmental considerations cannot be solved by the method of export restrictions.

WTO regulations allow the introduction of export restrictions to prevent or alleviate "critical shortages". It is true that this category is foggy and inconsistent, but states consciously refuse to specify it. In the sense of distributive justice, these norms confirm the right of every resource-rich country to treat the needs of their own citizens better than the needs of citizens of other countries. WTO rulings, although undoubtedly motivated by economic considerations can be read as clarifying (restricting) these priority rules, as well as encouraging the joint development of global principles of equitable access to raw materials the world. Will this kind of thinking pave the way in the distribution of other scarce resources?

**Access to water** is much more complicated from the point of view of distributive justice. Water is a finite resource, so the problem of justice, as in the case of the distribution of every finite good, can theoretically be raised. Access to water had a practical dimension. Since ancient times, it has been the subject of disputes and conflicts, both internal and international. Population growth, industrial and agricultural use of water, as well as climate change are putting the problem of water

security on an increasingly high place on the international agenda. Improving water resource management is becoming a global challenge.

From a conceptual point of view, the problem is increasingly acute in the discussions: is water a human right or a commodity? So, should it be regulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or trade rules? Of course, the answer largely depends on the region and the country, and it comes down to a simple determination: for what purposes water is consumed there. In developing countries, especially with high population density and systemic poverty, water is seen as a human right. There, 95% of its resources are used for household needs. In developed countries, household consumption is around 40% (45% industry and 15% agriculture), so water will always be treated as a commodity. There are more and more voices in the international debate in favour of sanctioning the right to use water (but not the right to own it). In this prism, the ideological dimension of the decision on the price of water is growing. Historically and universally, water prices were undervalued. In the conditions of growing demand, they cannot be guaranteed at a low level.

Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali feared that the next war in the region of the Nile basin would be a war for water. The issue of regional cooperation in managing water resources in Central Asia is less explosive. But it also becomes a strategic problem there.

Is the world threatened by water wars? Rather not, because still (despite climate change) the problem in the global dimension is not water deficit, but the management of access to it. However, water is already becoming an aspect of distributive justice.

**The effects of climate change and the principles of justice.** Another challenge is climate change. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions has become subject to international regulations. The global instruments of this regulation to strengthen the greenhouse gas emission reduction regime are still fully not universal. A strong argument of developing countries is whether, in the name of the wider interests of the international community in limiting the effects of global warming, they should be obliged to sacrifice their development opportunities. For rich Western societies, this is not a dilemma. They are ready to give up the further accumulation of material well-being in the name of improving or even maintaining ecological quality of life. They are ready to sacrifice economic growth (and most importantly – consumption levels) to avoid social perturbations caused by uncontrolled climate change. For many dynamically developing countries in the South, this is an important political problem. They fear that limiting "dirty technologies" will reduce the competitiveness of their economies (access to "clean technologies" will make them dependent on the West, and the higher price of these technologies will reduce the competitiveness of their own production). Most importantly, the issue of self-limitation in the name of common global interests does not find wide social support there.

A new phenomenon is that the problem of climate change has ceased to be linked solely to the issue of distributive justice. It also has a reference to political justice.

Broad and ardent support for the idea of halting the pace of climate change can be seen in the group of small island states. Countries such as Maldives, Kiribati or Tuvalu are facing complete disappearance. The vanishing of entire island states from the surface is reportedly inevitable. Regardless of the greenhouse gas emission restrictions, the level of ocean waters will rise. The problem affecting the essence of justice is the right of citizens of these countries to retain the attributes of sovereignty

("there is no equality without sovereignty") despite the loss of territory. It has even been proposed to introduce a new category: *detrterritorialized States*. They would preserve international legal capacity (personality), the right to territorial waters and the economic zone (and revenues from them), to dispose of their own financial resources and a place in international organizations. The citizens of these countries would have to move to the territory of other countries (probably dispersed), but they would retain the citizenship of the country of origin. And the right to preserve the attributes of the state, such as citizenship, is derived by the proposers of such solutions from the ideals of justice.

### **The imperative for a distant perspective**

Globalization is thickening the network of interests. Interests are becoming increasingly interdependent, they overlap. One of the biggest challenges to justice is to avoid the trap of parochialism. If the discussion about the requirements of justice is limited to a specific locality - a country, or even a larger region - there is a possible danger of ignoring many important counterarguments that could emerge elsewhere and which are eminently worth considering from an impartial perspective. National habits, traditions, blind algorithms and evaluation matrices become limiting factors. For Sen, so understood "closed impartiality" is something incomplete, defective in relation to the original idea of fairness and honesty as the essence of justice. Following Adam Smith, he introduces the postulate of an impartial observer, but from a more distant perspective. He writes about distant scrutiny. He encourages distant perspective.

We are accustomed to breaking and unclogging "closed impartiality" by a supranational factor: standards and institutions. This look is not so much from a distance as from above. It is associated with the creation of supranational institutions, the sharing or ceding of sovereignty. Judgments of international tribunals in the legal dimension and resolutions of the Security Council or European Union directives (in the political and legal dimensions) are examples of such a top-down view with imperious features. Recommendations and monitoring of international institutions - this is also a rather top-down view, but with more advisory features.

More effective can be a look from the side. Not only in the *peer review* formula more and more often practiced in international organizations. It is possible even without the participation of international organizations. At least by inviting foreigners to help in settling domestic matters. For example, the practice of inviting foreign referees to hold particularly important matches in national football leagues is becoming more frequent. Similar customs may prevail in the political and legal dimensions.

In the past, a glimpse from afar raised concerns that it would become an instrument like the Trojan horse, followed by imposing foreign customs and evaluation standards. And today such fears are strong, especially among countries in the past under foreign domination. On the other hand, for some countries, resorting to foreign judgments is the basis for guaranteeing justice. In the courts of San Marino, only judges-citizens of a foreign country (Italy) adjudicate and they reside at a certain minimum distance from the borders of the country. The inhabitants of Andorra did not want to have their own justice system. In such cases, only foreign judgment was a guarantee of impartiality.

A distant perspective can cause natural resistance. Amartya Sen, for example, advises it on the issue of the death penalty. It seems that in every case, Americans would find

it difficult to accept a distant perspective. Not just Americans. In 2011, there was considerable international echo of the nervous reaction of British political elites regarding the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights demanding a change in the British principle of depriving prisoners of electoral rights. The substantive and legal arguments did not matter. The point was that the Court questioned the age-old practice sanctioned in the British Isles. It was not about the importance of the matter, but about the importance of tradition.

And yet the distant perspective makes deeper sense.

\* \* \*

In the American series "The West Wing" in one of the episodes of the fourth season, the presidential speech-writer "digs up" the speech of the incumbent president from many years ago, in which he postulates basing American policy on values and principles, and not only on interests. He uses this text as an argument to convince the president to intervene in the fictitious state of Kundu, where mass genocide occurs. The speech-writer's dialogue with the president touches on a key issue for our above considerations in a simple question:

- Why is the life of a Kundunian less worth to us than the life of an American?

- I don't know why, but it's worth less.

**In international relations based on the principles of tribalism, the axiom is that the life of a fellow tribesman (and his well-being) is more valuable than the life of a stranger. Moral confusion is that it's getting harder to explain why.**

\* \* \*

**Rawls advised to understand the principle of impartiality as the principle of equal distance between citizens of the same state and the principle "blood is thicker than water" in relations between compatriots and strangers (citizens of a foreign state). Globalization, however, extends empathy to the borders where we apply the principle of not so much equal distance, but also equal closeness in relations between ourselves and strangers. Perhaps not yet to the limits that cosmopolitans think about. Man still remains a local being. But his horizons of empathy are clearly expanding.**

**"Black lives matter" protests in 2020 went far beyond the USA where they originated. Discrimination against black people captured the imagination of the world. The fate of Rohingya or Uighurs still not yet. But it definitely will.**

## SESSION VII:

### THE ULTIMATE UTOPIA

One of the reasons for the psychopolitical tremor that accompanies the current transitional era in international relations is perhaps the fact that **there is no clear, transparent, attractive vision of their transformation.**

The nineties in international relations are seen as a great failure of the **"utopia of the post-Cold War order" based on liberal peace.** That utopia predicted the triumph of Western values, multilateralism, and the end of power politics. Conflicts were to be predictable and manageable, wars would occur rarely (as anomalies) and not involve larger casualties. International law was to prevent degeneration in the policies of state leaders. International civil society was to play a significant role in shaping politics, displacing states from their traditional exclusive role. This utopia, Western in its genealogy and mentality, was undoubtedly born from the intoxication of victory over communism, from the conviction that the West would remain unchallenged in its political, economic and ideological leadership.

At the end of the nineties of the last century, a new utopia appeared: a **"globalization utopia"**, a blind faith that globalization processes would solve all problems by themselves – the globalization would bring prosperity to states and human individuals, and prosperity would in turn stop conflicts and wars based on Thomas Friedman's McDonald's theory and alike (the countries in which McDonald's restaurants operate do not enter into wars with each other). McDonald's theory did not work, at least (and not only) on the Indian subcontinent, to which it was applied in its original form. Friedman had to transform it into Dell's theory (countries that enter the network of supply components within a joint global company, do not wage war among themselves), but also in this form it is characterized by a large dose of wishful thinking. Just like the thesis that globalization was to render unnecessary international politics and relieve states of the burden of foreign policy.

We seem to have a period of noble deceptive idealistic elation irrevocably behind us. Today, at least in politics, pragmatism dominates. Individual actors of world politics focus on practical (and partial) political visions. Americans are often credited with a simple vision of transforming the world according to the American fashion. The world is to be like America: full of democracy, freedom, private entrepreneurship and open to trade. President Obama will remain in historical memory as a politician who refreshed the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Europe is associated with a vision of the world of the rule of law and institutions, norms and regulations, and in detail: a world free from the death penalty and discrimination, including against vulnerable groups, such as LGBT. China, India and other emerging powers are credited with a picture of the world where no one is interfering in internal affairs, no one dictates what to do, and the fate of the world is determined by consensus. Russia has the image of a country that postulates a world fairly divided into spheres of influence, a multipolar one, where none of the poles disturbs the parade of each other.

All in all, idealistic notes have disappeared from political discourse.

**World politics is no longer driven by any beautiful utopia.** The only utopian idea that could aspire to this role is **the vision of a world government.** But it is also an institutional rather than a moral idea. However, has the time of utopia been irrevocably past? And if utopia is gone and there is none, then what can serve as a noble inspiration to reconstruct the world in terms of moral reasons?

### **Practical usefulness of utopia**

Human beings used to need utopias. Everyone, even a very practical project of rebuilding the world, refers to our civilization-based demand for utopian thought and the emotions associated with it.

Utopias mobilized to change the world, although they were rarely, if ever, suitable for practical implementation. Zygmunt Bauman reminded that since the times of Thomas Moore and thanks to him, it was believed that a society without a utopia driving it was a society unable to live, and a life without utopia was not worth living.

The visions wrapped in utopian theories were a kind of light illuminating the darkness on a difficult path of progress, even if the ideas on which the vision of utopia was based were not necessarily of practical application. According to Bauman, **progress was not so much about the realization of utopia but about the pursuit of it.** Implementing utopian plans did not matter. It was about the drive, motivation, conviction embedded in utopias that a better state of the world is the destiny of humanity. Thus **utopias filled existence with positive energy.**

In essence, however, Bauman argued, **progress was in practice not so much about the pursuit of utopias but about a practical escape from failed utopias.** Societies used to set out on a path of progress with the desire to reject what had not worked in practice. Less often it was about fascination with the possibilities of implementing new plans.

Utopias also played a motivational role in shaping individual lives of people. Władysław Tatarkiewicz organically inscribed utopias in the concept of human happiness. There was no doubt for him that "for a man to be happy, he must be happy with his life, and for him to be happy with his life, he must be happy with the world anyway." **The concept of utopia was a concept of building happiness.** And "they are influenced [not only] by individual events happening in the world, but also by the overall structure of the world, or at least the image of this structure that man has created for himself." And "life satisfaction and contentment with the world are most often combined with each other, because according to one's own life man creates a picture of the world, and according to the picture of the world he interprets his own life." Utopias, therefore, give the necessary structure of the world in a broader sense, without which man would not be able to effectively assess his own life, even if the life of people around him remains the basic reference plane for assessing satisfaction with his own life.

**The mobilizing role of utopia was noticed in principle only with the opening of the minds of the Enlightenment era and the acceleration of progress of the industrial revolution.** Utopias flowed from people's conviction that they could shape

tomorrow according to their wishes. There is no utopia without a sense of control over time.

**Early utopias were religious and philosophical constructs for giving consolation and comfort.** It was no accident that they referred to the vision of a lost paradise, a past world. **The ancients, as a rule (e.g., Hesiod and Ovid) placed the "golden age" at the beginning of time.** The utopias of the past were necessary in the age when time stood still, tomorrow was a replica of today, and the world demanded sacrifice, not promising to alleviate suffering. The hope for improvement in fate was low. So if not tomorrow, at least distant yesterday had to offer consolation.

This was also the Old Testament world order, along with the description of the world of the three religions of the Abrahamic family. What these three great religions gave people, however, is the belief that despite losing paradise, time will close full circle, and the era of happiness and harmony will return.

**The great philosophical question that surrounded utopias was the question about the sense of a more perfect arrangement of the world. Was it about making the man better or about giving him a sense of happiness?**

The original utopian concepts focused on rationalizing the human individual, extracting the best qualities from his/her personality, and to a lesser extent on satisfying his/her needs that would give a sense of satisfaction and happiness. For Plato, the goal of utopia ("the State") is good order, not happiness. Moore created his island of perfection so that people could free themselves from the bondage of the body and develop a free spirit. The moral idea of just distribution of rights, duties and goods was to rule over Utopia. Campanella, in turn, built his "city of the sun" on the concept of order, where every human virtue is managed by the proper office with the Ministry of Love at the forefront.

Even when the concept of utopia was a concept of building happiness, it was about more than eudaimonistic satisfaction. Early utopias were morally hard utopias in their own way. It wasn't until the 19th century that utopias were inspired clearly and mainly by the idea of making people happy. Saint-Simon referred to earlier ideas of making people happy by prosperity (but, unfortunately, difficult prosperity, resulting from the eradication of idleness and the introduction of dictatorial governments of professionals). Bellamy designated the year 2000 to achieve happiness through prosperity. But material wealth was not everything. It was best recalled (many years later) by Aldous Huxley. His World State was to provide people not only with material goods, but also good psychological conditions. It was a model utopia focused on happiness, not people's perfection. A brave new world was to be brought by the tablet of happiness.

**Modern utopias, unlike paradise visions produced by religious systems or idealized images of societies, which philosophers used as a foundation for moral teachings, were already practical utopias, and therefore based on the belief that their realization is in the hands of people.** Socialism (communism) was such a practical utopia. An attempt to implement it turned out to be, however, a cruel and unsuccessful test. Perhaps it was the failure of communist utopia that took away once and forever the desire to construct new philosophical utopias.



Modern utopias, as Bauman emphasized, needed two conditions. First, the common and overwhelming (even if not articulated) belief that the world is not functioning as it should and is not able to generate a repair process by itself. The second condition was the faith that people were able to transform the world for the better, they could make an accurate diagnosis of deficiencies, and they had an idea and tools to remove deficiencies.

According to Bauman, early, **premodern utopias were ruled by the mentality of a shepherd**, whose first duty was to defend the natural balance between nature and the herd, defend the pasture against intruders (people and predators). The shepherd's mentality is based on the belief that the real world is the best of all possible worlds, it is the embodiment of a higher idea, its condition is part of a higher plan, not necessarily realized by us. Therefore, we must first of all protect the world from artificial interference, refrain from the temptation to tamper with it.

**Modernist utopias in turn were permeated with the gardener's mentality.** According to it, without constant care and attention, without sustained effort and work, the world would plunge into chaos and disarray, like an unattended field, would overgrow with weed, yield no crops. The gardener's mentality assumed that the first idea should be a garden development plan, an idea for setting out flower beds, planting appropriate trees and shrubs, in the right neighbourhood and quantity. Then the plan is to be implemented, starting with the removal of unwanted plants, weeds and self-seeders. Then the gardener attentively supports the vegetation of planted plants. The gardener's modernist mentality marked the golden age of utopia.

**Bauman connected postmodernism with the fall of utopia.** Today's lack of attractive visions for the new international order would therefore stem from deeper sociological premises. Bauman explained the fall of utopia by the process of **replacing the gardener's mentality with the hunter's mentality.** The hunter hardly bothers with the concept of harmony and balance. All that interests him/her is the goal, capture, pursuit, and hunting. If the hunting ground does not give hope for successful hunting, then the terrain simply changes, if necessary the hunter enters the already occupied area. **The world has become a world of hunters - lonely or connected in tactical communities. There is no place for utopian fantasies in the hunters' world.** Time goes from hunting to hunting. All thinking focuses on the nearest prey. Even if someone had a plan to repair the world and enthusiasm to proclaim it, it is impossible to organize efficient action among the individualized community of hunters. It is also impossible to find resources and tools. Changing the world is beyond the reach of people. And you just have to give it up. Just think about the costs of switching the world to ecologically friendly farming, eradicating the plague of hunger, poverty and disease. It would be good to find strength and resources, but it can't be done. This is the logic of this thinking in short.

**According to Bauman, post-modernism changed the concept of progress. From the concept of *shared improvement*, the paradigm of progress has moved to the level of *individual survival*.**

Staying in the group of hunters became the driving force of the action. Whoever falls out of this group inevitably becomes a victim. **The world began to split into two simple groups: winners and losers.** Has this mentality been translated into the actions of larger social groups, into the actions of states in the international

environment? This syndrome in international politics is definitely reflected in a dizzying popularity of the saying that you are *either at the table or on the menu*.

Focusing on the goal (on prey) does not allow deeper reflection. The hunter's utopia is a utopia of the momentum, the pursuit, and at the same time it is an individualized, deregulated, privatized utopia. Chasing becomes a habit, reflex, compulsion, and obsession. Capturing gains does not release tension. It only sharpens the appetite for the next prey. All the time knowing that quitting hunting will turn a hunter into a victim.

The personalized utopia may be the collateral of the new role that the individual brings to international politics. Perhaps political leaders are under daily pressure of utopian pursuit.

This metaphorical vision outlined by Bauman is certainly a vision that, even if exaggerated, yet accurately reflects the mental state of many Western societies. **Syndrome of eternal run, a sense of unreachability of rest, contentment, accomplishment of the mission well describes the attitudes of members of consumer societies.** It is a kind of endless utopia, utopia as a process. Unlike the utopias of previous eras, postmodern utopia is not so much a distant, unattainable goal as a series of achievable, tangible goals. **It is not a goal at the end of the road, but the path itself.**

**Such utopia does not give meaning to life, but removes the question of its meaning from life.**

Changing the paradigm of social utopia inevitably affects politics. The horizons of political action are closed within parliamentary and presidential terms. Politics in Western countries is limited by the horizon of the next election. **Like a postmodern hunter, the politician concentrates all his attention on the next election.** He lives from election to election, from post to post. Winning the election does not bring satisfaction, it does not give a sense of fulfilment. It only turns up the appetite for the next race, the next office.

**It is harder to give up utopia in international politics.** Not only because they are still a conglomerate of three mentalities: shepherd's, gardener's and hunter's. It is interesting that the classical utopias of distant times (Moore, Campanella, etc.) did not attempt to build the illusion of turning the whole world into a utopian model. They operated on the image of an oasis of perfection. A kind of anomaly against the background of imperfect reality. Today, not only because of the logic of globalization, it may seem that all oases are only a transitional stage in the universalization of behavioural patterns.

### **Utopias of international relations and the world state**

Interestingly, the utopias of international relations rarely appeared under the banner of utopia. They were mostly revealed to the world as teleological visions inscribed in philosophical concepts.

Kant is the philosophical patron of many seekers of the perfect formula of the world system. ***Civitas Gentum*, inscribed in the postulate of eternal peace, was to grow**

**until it embraced all the nations of the world.** Kant's world republic, however, remained a classical utopia. It was to be a peaceful federation (*foedus pacificum*) that would protect the freedom and sovereignty of the confederate states. This peaceful federation was to be governed by a cosmopolitan law that would allow people to move, though settling in a foreign territory would require the consent of the people there. **For centuries, Kant's utopia of a world federation inspired the acolytes of the world state.**

Another utopian vision of cosmopolitan world governance was embodied in **the Marxist idea of a global community without a state.** The world proletarian revolution was to embrace the whole world, abolish classes, and thus also the instrument of class exploitation, which the state was to be. Lenin had to adopt this original thesis to the conditions when the revolution would not have a global character and the proletarian state would have to function in a hostile environment. He confidently assumed that proletarian states would inevitably multiply, and when they embrace the whole world, **the universal proletarian state** would begin to die immediately.

**The idea of a world state also appeared as a classical utopia.** Even Dante wrote about a world government. In "Feast" he argued that the most effective way to eradicate wars is to proclaim the world monarch with the government under his protection, because in this way all lands would then be under one rule and there would be no one to fight for territorial gains. Having everything, the world monarch will not have to covet new lands, and most importantly he will have no one to fight for. Perverse logic, but always logic. In "De Monarchia", the idea of a world state has already found its ideological backup. The world state symbolized the unity of humanity, a community of purpose, aspirations and values. This community could be realized only in the conditions of political unity of the world, and this unity could only be ensured by the supreme sceptre of the World Monarch. He would be the supreme judge and mediator of disputes between the lower rulers, he would guarantee the applicability of universal rights. He would be the political governor of the world, just as the Pope was then recognized as the spiritual governor.

Other political thinkers were more sceptical of the idea of a world state. Hobbes, when describing the expansion of the national Leviathan, never saw the need to expand it to cover the entire world space. A more desirable alternative was to build a global community of national leviathans. Rousseau, in turn, believed that it would be enough to implement his idea of social contract in individual countries to eliminate the need for a world government.

Nevertheless, since the times of Grotius, the idea of a world state has brought together all the features of a logically designed project of transforming the world.

**The world federalism was a vividly discussed idea at the end of World War II.** Karl Popper associated the vision of an open society with the idea of a world government. The projects of the world state captivated the mass imagination then, and the enthusiasm around the creation of the UN made people think about the further stages of development of this organization. The Chicago Committee published a detailed draft of the world constitution in 1948, which was to become the basis of the World Republic.

The idea of a world state was not just an emanation of idealism in the theory of international relations. Eminent representatives of the realistic school: Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, argued that the development of nuclear destruction capabilities makes a global state a logical need. Despite this, the popularity of world federalism fell with the rise of the "Cold War".

**The idea of the world state was treated by the political class as a fantasy devoid of any chance of being implemented, lacking any signs of practicality.**

The critics questioned its benefits. A typical argument was that the existing system of multitude of states dissipates power while **a unified centre of world power would concentrate too much of it. It could turn into tyranny.** It would destroy the pluralism of political (if not national) cultures and thus impoverish the world. It would create another layer of power over the citizen instead of creating a global citizen as a subject of international politics.

Still, the idea of a world state did not fail. And even in the last two decades, it has come alive. Mainly due to globalization.

In 2000, Jürgen Habermas saw **the world's state as the only effective guarantee of respect for human rights.** He called for a world parliament to be established on a civic initiative. A world criminal court would also be set up. The direction of political decisions could be determined by global referendums.

The relative renaissance of the idea of a world state is understandable. **Globalization has highlighted the weaknesses of the nation-state concept.** It turned out that global problems cannot always be solved effectively by intensifying local activities. **Scissors were opening between the scale of global challenges and the limit of the effectiveness of national activities.** The growing number of international entities, including the number of states (grown almost four times after World War II, reaching the level of almost two hundred countries), has deepened the so-called **problem of "collective action"**. This problem is explained by the effect of diffusion of responsibility. Although all countries are affected by the same global challenges, and each would benefit from their successful solution, most would prefer someone else to take the burden of solving the problem. As a result of this natural reflex of looking at each other, no one feels the obligation to act, and everyone incurs the cost of not solving the problem.

Supporters of the world government argue that its establishment does not guarantee a solution to global problems, but it is the only hope that they will be successfully addressed. The 2008 financial crisis gave world government supporters a new argument - the need to tame the global power of capital, which nation states cannot control in the age of globalization.

For years, however, the most important argument was the fear of universal nuclear war. During the Cold War, the world was stabilized by a reasonably predictable confrontation of two systems, in which peace was guaranteed by the principle of *mutually assured destruction*. After the fall of communism, stability was impaired. New proliferation threats have emerged (Iran), and the threat of possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist and criminal groups has increased. This made the deterrent system vulnerable to uncontrolled escalation, which could be caused by the careless behaviour of a nuclear state, or mere panic or fear. Building a

rocket shield that would protect against the irresponsible use of weapons of mass destruction is also, in the opinion of some experts, a surrogate response to the threat of uncontrolled escalation. Whether the perspective of a nuclear-free world, refreshed by President Obama in 2009, is possible without a new global governance institution is debatable.

The idea of a world state is by no means only an idea propagated solely by left-wing intellectual and activist communities in Western countries. It can also be found in the contemporary political science of the Orient. Chinese models, for example, refer to the traditional Chinese concept of *Tianxia* (everything under the sky). In China, it is believed that the West has a hard time looking at the world as one, it sees primarily national dichotomies, and mutual relations are perceived there as dominated by competition and conflict syndrome. Chinese models replace the ideas of hegemony with ideas of harmony.

The idea of a world state is often inscribed in the canon of a cosmopolitan school of thought. The main postulate there is to separate the state from the nation in the same way as it was once possible to separate the state from religion in the Peace of Westphalia. A cosmopolitan state would allow coexistence in one state organism of many national identities.

**There are two main trends in world government projects - postulative and teleological.**

### **The world state as a postulate**

The postulative vision does not try to prove the inevitability of world government. On the contrary, sometimes **it considers the chances of implementation to be negligible or none**. However, it arises from the belief that a world government would be the most effective way to solve the world's problems. It seems that it found the most mature expression in the concepts of Jacques Attali.

Attali's reasoning logic is simple. Globalization will put the world under the control of market processes. Globalization will not stop until it forges one single market. Market processes cannot function properly without the rule of law. In turn, the global rule of law is not possible without a world state. The world state will not survive without global democracy and related institutions.

The imperial formula of managing the world, whose recent (and perhaps the last) incarnation was *Pax Americana*, is exhausting itself. The United States remains the undisputed hegemon - with an army balancing all other military potentials combined, with the most powerful economy and the dollar as the world currency, with unsurpassed technological potential that marks the progress of thought. According to Attali, America's main mission has become only to protect America's hegemony, its freedom of action, and not to solve world problems. And **the world has become too complex to be managed by a single power**. No single power, not even a coalition of powers, is able, as Attali describes, to face the systemic problems of the world: population movements, uncontrolled financial flows, breach of international law norms, proliferation of weapons, catastrophic pollution of the environment, shrinking natural resources, cross-border crime, and so on.

Neither China, nor India, even if developing successfully their potential, will be able and willing to exercise the responsibility for the global leadership. There will be no Sino-Indian duumvirate over the world, either.

Other candidates for world leadership are hardly an option (time for Africa will not come long, Europe will be handicapped by problems stemming from demography and integration of migrants).

In the projection by Attali, globalization processes will develop unstoppably. The world will become a single common market. The market will globalize, democracy (public affairs management) will remain institutionally and procedurally - local (national). **The global state will not reveal itself even in an invisible role.** Attali, recalling the classics of political economy, argues that such a market, deprived of state supervision, must lead to a demand deficit, cause mass unemployment and facilitate the development of industrial monopolies.

However, life will know no vacuum. Risk management institutions will take over the role of the welfare state. Insurance companies will regulate and supervise the market. Over time, the insurance sector will assume the role of masters and rulers of the world. It is the insurance companies that will set the norms for desirable and effective behaviour on the one hand, and on the other, they will ostracize (through prohibitive insurance rates) unacceptable behaviour and delegitimize it. The demand imbalance will be compensated by the artificial growth of private debt.

Attali paints a catastrophic vision. He proves that **social inequalities, shadow economy, economic crimes, and mafia connections will transform the world into "mega-Somalia"**. The final stage of this vision is to be the world as a new, great Easter Island, once a paradise on earth, now stripped of its raw materials and natural resources, a testimony to the fall of civilization with sad relics of the past splendour (like statues of Moai on Easter Island).

Attali's pessimistic vision is obviously exaggerated and unlikely to materialize. He ignores the natural de-globalization trends observed, in particular, at present. Neither has he underestimated the ad hoc management possibilities using existing structures and platforms.

The global systemic risks that make the postulate of the world government so categorical are twofold in Attali's description. First of all, these are **locally generated threats** that would entangle and immerse the whole world on a chain reaction basis. Such a pandemic phenomenon would be inflation, resulting from a mass of money uncontrollable on a global scale. It is already difficult today to control the money supply, but also to effectively control the transnational activity of financial institutions. Another risk on this list is demographic problems, especially the uncontrolled population growth (11 billion in 2050, 15 billion in 2100?). Population growth can lead to tensions, disputes and conflicts and can be the reason for wars for food, water or the right to settle migrants.

The second category of threats involves global risks in their nature and with global geographical coverage. First of all, it is about **shrinking reserves of natural resources**. The technical peak of the oil production curve (supply deficit due to lack of investment in deposits) may already occur in a few years. The absolute peak would take place between 2040 and even 2060, but its effects would obviously be more

serious. Similar consequences, and for some countries even more severe, because even existential (see the fate of small island states) may be **climate change**. Nobody is able to manage these risks today.

Attali suggests that despite awareness of these threats, selfish and myopic disorder syndrome still dominates in the approach of states. Countries, especially large and rich ones, are not so much looking for a systemic solution to threats, as they are trying to minimize their possible effects on their own citizens. **So only a great misfortune: total nuclear war, great political turmoil, global natural disaster, could cause a general and diametrical change in approach. And as a consequence: the emergence of a world government as a form of shock therapy.** Confusion, however, can also feed on authoritarian tendencies. It can make the world a hostage of totalitarian ideologies. Attali describes the threat of the emergence of two new fundamentalisms: ecological and religious, from which sinister synergies can arise.

An ideal world government in Attali's vision would not replace national governments. It would leave a wide margin of freedom in their hands, not only regarding the cultural identity of nations.

**Perhaps the world government would prove to be the only effective way to transfer the primacy (and civilization hegemony) of the West to new demographic and economic realities of the world (Chinese-Indian dominance).**

The world government would fulfil two basic functions. First, it would stop violence that would threaten global affairs. So it would have to have effective means of coercion itself. Secondly, it would solve global threats. Therefore, apart from military means, it would have to have the prerogative of mobilizing all resources (financial and material) at the disposal of humanity in order to effectively address these threats. It would therefore need to have supranational powers.

The constitutional foundation of world federalism would be the rights and obligations of world citizens. They would include, among others, the right to use the world's public goods (the right of access to water, air, food, laws protecting privacy, freedom of movement and cultural identity). **Every inhabitant of Earth would have the right to global citizenship.** These rights would be catalogued in the World Code, accompanied by the most important international treaties.

Attali, as already mentioned, did not succumb to the power of idealistic illusions. He was aware that the current great powers, led by the United States, do not see and will not see the need for changes as fundamental as the postulated world state. He assumes that when the leading countries of the world become convinced to change the systemic order in the world, they will no longer possess the driving force. So **without a crisis and a deep catharsis, a world government will never emerge.**

All that can be proposed now is a method of small steps: a method of partial agreements, e.g. on space management or environmental pollution, and simply a way to follow Europe's integration patterns. Attali argues that **the European Union in its logic of incremental development has even become a model for building supranational institutions.**

**A new global class of hypernomads (philosophers, intellectuals, historians, international bureaucrats, journalists, businessmen, financiers, people of culture**

**and artists) would become a social agent for building a global state, a driver of change.**

Attali's vision may raise justified doubts. Both as to the inevitability of catastrophic phenomena and as to his assessments of the ineffectiveness of current state and international structures. Hopes with the world federal state may also be excessive. However, the biggest problem with Attali's vision concerns the author's inclination towards statist thinking. His vision is based on the assumption that world problems cannot be solved except by creating institutions, hiring employees, writing codes, introducing taxes, etc. **Blind faith in the causative power of institutions can, however, cause a global government to become inevitably and relatively quickly a global Leviathan, growing through bureaucratic budding.**

Would the world state be free from suspicions that it is a new form of domination of one over the other, imposing on the weaker the will of the stronger, bearing in mind the drastic disparities in terms of economic, military or demographic potentials?

### **The world state as teleology**

Visions of the world state treating it as inevitability are based on a different logic. **Whether we like it or not, the world will sooner or later produce a world government.** This vision by definition is undoubtedly deterministic. It is reflected, in particular, in the concept of the global state of Alexander Wendt.

Wendt is a classic teleologist. Although his visions are neither linear nor deterministic in detail, he predicts that **within a hundred years a world state will emerge which will have a monopoly on the use of force and on legal coercion.**

Wendt rejects the scepticism of realists for whom international relations are the scene of cyclical wars and conflicts, and who see no real premises for controlling inter-state antagonisms. Nor does he share the idealists' faith in the power of international institutions and law, in the institutions' ability to free the world from anarchy and violence. He proves that **the world, and international relations in particular, have their own natural logic translating itself into self-regulatory mechanisms. Its culmination is to be the concept of a world state. It will be the product of a constant struggle for recognition.** The fight for recognition is treated by Wendt as a peculiar engine of history. It is governed by the development of technological thought (primarily war technology), and, on the other hand, by the experience resulting from the logic of anarchy that governs the actions of international actors.

The most important problem for the verifiability of this teleology is, of course, the truth of the assumption that the struggle for recognition is the main motivation for the actions of states and people on the international stage, and the logic of collective action is the logic of anarchy. Wendt admits that the powerful driving force in the international environment is the "logic of capital" which introduces distribution tensions and which cannot be reduced to a struggle for recognition. But, according to him, the logic of capital does not introduce much distortion to political processes in the teleological dimension. Capital has always been pushing for a global state. By definition, the world state is better for the functioning of the world market and the free flow of capital, which has always been the logic of capital. Marx built the theory



of world revolution on this logic. The logic of capital also energizes globalization processes. What is significant, however, is the fact that, at the time of trouble, globalized capital rediscovers its national identity. Only from the country of origin can one count, especially in the case of banks, for real support in a difficult hour. Not the logic of the world market, which was the starting point even for Attali, is for Wendt the proof of the irrevocability of the world state. **It is the psychological and political need for recognition.**

The fight for recognition is, in Wendt's description, a feature of both human individuals and social groups. Individuals want recognition within a group, a group (also organized in a state) - recognition with other groups (states). Recognition is undoubtedly the genetically programmed human need. In addition to elementary biological needs that are arising from the very existence, starting with the original need for physical security (protection of one's life). The need for recognition begins with the confirmation of one's subjectivity which is the recognition as equal within the community. People deprived of this elemental recognition, such as slaves or external enemies, often do not experience the minimum guarantee to meet other needs, including the need for physical security. The need for recognition also has a group dimension. And that is why the struggle for recognition is a feature of relationships between individuals and states.

**The struggle for recognition is about human identity.** Therefore it is a fight about ideas. But the way it is conducted is determined by material conditions. Material parameters of the struggle for recognition between countries are primarily determined by technological development, in particular the so-called arms race. The stake in the struggle for recognition between human individuals involves sometimes the highest price: life. And because of this stake, people are ready to accept a significant restriction of their freedom in the form of state power. It was assumed that in the event of a struggle between states, even if it could lead to the loss of sovereignty by one of the parties, it would never lead to the physical destruction of the citizens of the defeated state.

**Recognition is usually asymmetrical.** This is the reason why most social systems are hierarchical. People, and also states, always prefer to be the dominant party in the relationship of asymmetrical recognition. From this preference for being a stronger party in this asymmetry, came the beliefs that the quest for dominion and power is the inherent part of human personality and the driving force of its actions (Nietzsche).

Asymmetric recognition will lead to instability of social and political systems. An undervalued party will always seek to equalize the status. Either in the material (access to goods) or social (access to social positions and roles) sense.

It is hard not to notice that **levelling the asymmetry of recognition is an undoubted feature of the current stage of international relations. Perhaps it is even one of the main features defining the current stage.** Zbigniew Brzezinski considered the political emancipation of developing countries as the dominant characteristic of the current stage of development of international relations.

From the point of view of the human individual, there is no doubt that **his/her individual struggle for recognition is largely determined by the limits of recognition between groups. The horizons of the individual's consciousness are more and more global, the sphere of his/her activity and aspirations is**

**globalizing. Meanwhile, the concept of a nation-state is in itself a formula for unequal, asymmetrical recognition.** The essence of the tribal understanding of justice and morality is, after all, that people belonging to another (ethnic) group may be deprived of their rights or even an elementary right to life, just because they belong to another group (especially if they belong to another hostile group). **This moral dualism continues to burden the formula of contemporary international relations with tribal ballast.**

The human individual needs a sense of group identity. However, this identity can also be constituted at non-national levels: sub- or supranational. The tendency to engage the individual in such a "non-national" identity depends primarily on the degree of recognition by the group of the individual's identity, but primarily on the degree of protection for the individual identity that this group identity offers. The attractiveness of national identity has for centuries been based on a high level of protection (including physical protection).

Wendt leads us to a world state through several stages of the struggle for recognition. The driving force of change in this journey is the logic of anarchy, the boundaries of which are determined by the cost-benefit calculation of using violence.

The first stage in the history of the struggle for recognition was **a system of states whose interrelationships were based on the Hobbesian principle of "war against all", that is, the lack of mechanisms regulating international relations and general competition.** The instability of the system was restored either by conquest (the annihilation of a weaker state) and could, with the *ad absurdum* logic, ultimately lead to the building of a world state around a single state remaining on the world stage. Another way to restore balance was mutual recognition between equal powers (Greek cities and Persia, Rome and Carthage). But such stability can also be impermanent. Nation rivalry would normally not be interrupted in those days until one of the parties was exhausted.

The higher form of the struggle for recognition was **the association of states within a system based on rules and principles. Under this system, countries offered mutual recognition but not recognition for foreign citizens.** There were no wars for the total annihilation of the opponent, but they were considered as a legitimate means of territorial and other gains (economic, etc.). The main source of system instability was that the gap between the costs of struggle for recognition incurred by states (they did not have to bear existential costs like their total disappearance) and the costs incurred by individuals (these costs had the highest imaginable dimension: death, suffering, loss of recognition by forced change of statehood in the case of territorial annexations). The reluctance to make an individual sacrifice on the altar of the group fight for recognition has become the main force for ensuring peace within the system.

According to Wendt, **the higher stage is embodied in the formula of a global association of states.** It is our contemporary political experience. A universal security community is slowly emerging. States refrain from violence as a means of resolving disputes. However, this does not solve all the problems that make the environment more anarchic, including in particular the issues of the rogue states or non-state groups of organized violence (international terrorism). Eliminating the security deficit

understood in this way can only be achieved by phase four: **the global collective security system.**

The idea of collective security is based on the principle of "one for all, all for one", joint recognition by states (but also their citizens) of the inadmissibility of the use of force as a means of resolving disputes. Nevertheless, states retain a high degree of sovereignty. Assistance given to another state results from a sovereign decision and is voluntary. Like in Kant's peaceful federation. Like in global NATO.

Wendt does not stop at this stage. He sees **the inevitability of another, the highest stage: the stage of the world state.** First of all, because the principle of collective defence may not be enough to deter a potential aggressor. And any sovereign state can always move away from the attitude of a loyal participant in the collective defence system and challenge the system. In a Wendt world state, obligations would be rigid and enforceable. There would be no exit or transgression for any country. **The future would still carry threats, but as temporary anomalies, disturbances of order, and not as a judgment of history or a consequence of conscious politics.**

Wendt emphasizes that the necessary condition for the emergence of a world state is first and foremost the emergence of a universal security community in which states do not perceive each other as sources of physical threat, and resolve disputes between themselves by peaceful means. The second condition is to achieve a state of universal collective security, in which the Musketeer principle "one for all, all for one" would apply. The third condition would be the emergence of universal supranational authority to which the prerogative of managing and using organized coercion measures would be given. Wendt notes that initially such a global structure would not have to bear the characteristics of a state. It would be something like a "peace federation", "political system" or "neo-medieval" system. But these would be temporary forms. A world state would be inevitable.

The greatest difficulty would undoubtedly be to convince the "great powers" to such a system, especially the "contesting" powers, that is, those whose policies would go against the idea of a threat perception community. This is obviously a weakness of Wendt's iron logic. Small and medium-sized states would undoubtedly submit themselves to the laws of this logic without major reservations. But big powers? The belief of great powers that they are able to ensure by themselves the solution of their own security problems, would have postponed the global state perspective effectively beyond the observable horizon.

Even if such a global structure emerges, would it be permanently stable? A serious problem, for example, could be how such a structure would deal with **internal tensions** that would give rise to the temptation of secession. The more so that the process of emerging new entities: the creation of states, changes in their identity, would have a dynamic character as it does today. It would be quite likely that a democratic deficit would appear in such a huge political cluster. Frustrations would cause nationalist resentments, especially in times of crises.

The central issue for the credibility of the world state vision is whether it is possible to build a state without **a sense of group community.** All those who try to see the vision of a world state in the European Union must be aware that the limit of deepening integration within it is the factor of the lack of European *demos*. It is

impossible to get far with the plans to federalize the world without a sense of group identity.

**Each political entity therefore needs its *demos*.** There is a firm view that a world state would need a reference plane to determine its own identity. We need a different person to define our individual identity. To determine the identity of our group, nation - we need another group, another nation. Would a world state be able to define its own identity without a similar reference plane?

In the absence of information about other extraterrestrial civilizations, **the only reference point today to create such a planetary identity would be the past** - the world of anarchy existing before the world state. You can imagine that. Ultimately, the past became a counterpoint to German identity after World War II, argues Wendt. Even the political identity of the language is shaped by the political past.

**A world state would have to look different from the models of nation-states we know today.** Preserving the monopoly of legal violence, it would have to leave its entities with a sense of sovereignty in matters of economy, culture or education. It would not even have to have a joint military force. It wouldn't even have to have government in its traditional form. Wendt introduces this vision by calling it a globalized, complemented formula of the European Union. Can it have a similar persuasion effect outside the Western world, and outside Europe in particular?

The attractiveness of the utopia of the world state can be explained only by the lack of a sensible alternative: chaos and anarchy, the hegemony of a great or several great powers. This will never be a desirable option, especially for small countries.

**The global state will not come about without the active involvement of citizens. Indeed, in the goal of the global state they may find a powerful tool to counter the excessive powers of the nation-states and express their strive for a more sovereign role in shaping the international order.**

**The idea of the world (global) citizenship has been promoted for decades. It definitely has played a tangible role in promoting the awareness of the common problems and the need to forge a global community of action. Yet, to be successful it needs a concrete goal, a project.**

### **Hierarchy or network?**

Opponents of the world government, including those who look at the current shape of international relations with a very critical eye, not only try to prove the unreality of world government, but also its lack of usefulness. They claim (not without reason) that **a world government would be another bureaucratic instance, difficult to use and not effective in its operation, devoid of civic legitimacy.** They maintain that a flexible global management system built around international institutions (global and regional), states, civil society system, etc. would be better in practice. This system would be increasingly horizontal. It would be set in motion by the imperative of cooperation, not by the desire to subordinate and impose will.

**A network instead of a hierarchy.** The best known idea of the world networking governance is A-M. Slaughter's idea of **"world of governments" instead of "world**

**government"**. Slaughter supports the decomposition of national governments and direct outreach of individual government and state agencies into the world, towards the external partners. **A plural, disaggregated system of cooperation and solving global problems would emerge from this, which would become an alternative to centralized, hierarchical structures that would inevitably generate dominance and dependence.**

The idea of a networked world as an alternative to the hierarchical world, even if difficult to implement effectively (institutional chaos, contradictory messages and commitments, etc.) is publicly attractive. It assumes the necessity of cooperation and agreement. It assumes the ineffectiveness of coercion, subordination and domination.

"Networked world" is *à la mode*. Politicians in many countries like to refer to networking. There is certainly in it an echo of the ecstatic success of social networks. We intuitively feel that a network of connections, not only institutions but also ordinary citizens, can generate causative power. Certainly networks help to consolidate public opinion. Analyses show that network is conducive to herding momentum, people usually follow network trends. They assume that the crowd knows more and better. But sometimes they unpredictably abandon trends, disconnect from the crowd, initiate a new direction and, as a result, can change the behaviour of the network. **Networking may not mean democracy.** No network will offset the asymmetry of influence between countries.

Simple logic suggests that, therefore, the institutions of international cooperation should be strengthened, at the same time eliminating their democratic deficit and improving efficiency. Network supporters, however, have trouble answering one crucial question: how to deal with forcing the desired behaviour in a network system when it comes to someone contesting and refusing to cooperate. By a threat of cutting off the violator from the network?

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Any form of real centralized order in a global formula, be it a quasi-government or international institution with supranational powers, such as the UN Security Council, can only be created and function if the great powers give permission to it. A world government would disperse and cushion the power of individual centres. But it would be attractive only if it was effective, i.e. it would provide a sense of security and recognition (dignity) for smaller nations.

Can great powers ever think of seriously considering the possibility of delegating sovereignty to any form of global power? Only if they are convinced that their power is ineffective in both one- and multi-polar dimensions. The limit of American power in the period in which it was to reach its peak under the sign of *Pax Americana* was assumed to be associated with the stabilization operation in Iraq. At the same time, Iraq is treated as a clinical case of powerlessness in the mission of managing the world. The key question is whether any world government would be more effective in an operation comparable in scale to the challenge with the Iraqi Operation. The thing is not only in the legitimacy of a similar operation, but also in the ability to generate the appropriate forces and resources. The question of added value arises. Certainly no world government would shed significantly more forces and resources compared to America to stabilize a country like Iraq. And legitimization? Iraq has shown that if there are reasonably strong premises for destabilization among the local population,

even an unquestionable international authority may not be able to cope with the challenge. Belief that the international government can make a difference can be a vain faith. Would the idea of a world government ever be able to convince the great powers that world governance would be more effective?

**Kant rejected the vision of a world state for fear of tyranny.** Indeed, today a citizen of almost any country may be looking for protection elsewhere when facing oppression in his own country. He/she may apply for political asylum, or assume the citizenship of another country. Where, after all, would he/she run if the world state became a tyranny? What would he/she choose if he/she did not like the world state for other reasons? Today, admittedly, wiser about Fukuyama's thesis, we know that the world is heading for the triumph of democracy, so we can create a temporal (if not cause-and-effect) bond between the world triumph of democracy and the creation of a world state. A simple conclusion: **first, there must probably be a triumph of democracy on a global scale to be able to think boldly about a global state.**

An alternative vision, not easier and more realistic, is **building a world state not at the expense or on the ruins of the sovereignty of existing states, but in parallel with their strengthening.** In this approach, **the world state would derive its raison d'etre above all from the need for joint management of spaces (territories) that would not be under the direct jurisdiction of existing states.** It would include the seabed (prospect of extracting minerals) or space and celestial bodies. So the world state would manage no-one's spaces in the name of everyone's interests. But perhaps even more tempting from the point of view of the interests of an ordinary citizen of the world would be putting under the jurisdiction of the world state the global cyberspace. A world state in this sense could even gain strong public support, because the fear of cyberspace being appropriated by individual governments is increasing. But if the world state were to become a cover for censorship and control of ordinary citizens, this option would obviously not "pass".

The struggle of the big powers for control over common global goods (open sea and seabed, air and space, cyberspace), as well as the way of dealing with water management and Arctic development are considered to be real challenges to global stability.

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**Can utopia have a real impact on the world of politics without a strong social medium?** Can the idea of a common world state make its way by itself? It will certainly not be supported by national political elites. They are organically attached to the paradigm of the primacy of nation-states. National politicians, and only a few of them, become "cosmopolitans" rather after the end of active activity in national politics.

Belief in the ability to manage globalization through the dynamic, spontaneous and morally healthy effort of the global civic community is obviously today an illusory faith. Certainly the **"globalized plutocracy"** – the international bureaucrats (120,000-strong army), journalists, media people, and people of international art and show business, is still too weak and thin a social layer which cannot play the role of leader in building a cosmopolitan world.

More hope for rebuilding the world can be associated with the utopian vision of the **transformational role of the middle class**. The middle class will rise (from today's two billion to five billion in 2030). It will dictate the political weather in the world. It will demand transparency of governance, fair access to education, and civil liberties. It will be the main engine of empathy. May this faith, however, not just turn out to be another belief in the fact that prosperity makes democracy and peace.

**The world state needs a solid engagement of ordinary citizens. The recent popular movements to fight climate change and global warming may serve as a catalyst for raising global awareness and foster global civic responsibility.**

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So how to manage globalization if there is no utopia? Maybe this question is superfluous at all? It may be better to agree with the theories of leftist scholars that managing globalization is an oxymoron, because globalization is inherently chaotic and not subject to regulation. Nothing and nobody can control the spontaneous deregulation. Not surprisingly, in such optics, **utopia is more and more displaced by dystopia. Its systematic expression is the formula of the world "G-0"**, in which no configuration of the directorate (G-2, G-8 or G-20) guarantees that it will control the course of things.

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**Are norms and institutions able to give a sense of control over globalization?** The problem is that all regulation processes at the supranational level - regional (e.g. EU) or global (WTO) are often seen as platforms lacking democratic legitimacy. They are seen as the tyranny of experts and technocrats, extending the scope of application of international standards beyond the proper measure and not very effective in the clash with the real interests of great powers.

The obvious institutional and political agent for promoting new global governance would be naturally the European Union. Is the European Union able to take on a cosmopolitan role and the task of filling a vacuum that "international civil society" cannot fill? One can doubt it. **The European Union has been promoting recently the concept of effective multilateralism (and rule-based order) but its political objective is rather to defend the existing good practices than to promote a qualitative change in approach.**

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The effort of most political scientists is still focused on finding, as in previous centuries, the most stable formula for power-sharing between the key actors on the international scene, especially the power-sharing formula between the West and the East.

As Joseph Nye wrote: the problem may not be a change in the hierarchy of powers, the problem is **the crisis of global power as such**. In Zbigniew Brzezinski's view, this crisis was a cumulative consequence of the dynamic shift of the global centre of gravity from the West to the East, the accelerated manifestation of the political phenomenon of the awakening of, above all, developing countries, as well as the flawed directions of American internal and international policy after 1990. All this is

complemented by the impression of universal political apathy, which makes it impossible to solve the simplest systemic problems, such as slowing down global warming or trade liberalization. Multilateralism is weakening. Institutions are inefficient. Europe as a traditional proponent of multilateralism is weak. USA is more and more susceptible to unilateral tendencies. China and Russia, in turn, see in existing institutions a projection of the Western model and ideas. Both states are suspected of being more guided by the paradigm of power than the paradigm of principles and norms. The real confrontation between the West and China has become a real possibility.

The essence of the dispute over the need and nature of a new deal in world governance is the view on the role and leadership capabilities of the United States. For some strategists, the world can be politically managed only under conditions of maintaining American hegemony. In this view, a world without American leadership can only break down and plunge into the abyss of chaos.

Others argue that the era of America has irrevocably come to an end. For the first time in its history, the world will have to do without a "global protector". The West as such should abandon the illusion that it can use existing institutions and orders to inoculate the cultural and political emerging powers.

The essence of Western policy should not therefore so much be holding back the East, attempting to rebuild supremacy, but taking into account the aspirations of the East in the new formula of "distribution of power".

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Years ago, Benjamin Barber announced that the future of the world would be the result of the clash of two trends: uniformed globalism and intolerant retribalization. And both trends can only accrue the deficit of a sense of democracy. Globalism is a noble force that builds open societies, unifies cultures and living standards. Retribalization - a parochial, isolationist force closing the horizons. But the effect of their collision would not be very attractive: authoritarian and fundamentalist. Barber's recipe was **a global confederation of semi-autonomous communities - smaller than nation-states, connected in associations and markets larger than nation-states**. He claimed that the future belongs to cities.

The noble attempt to reconcile tribalism with cosmopolitanism is also undoubtedly **the concept of cosmopolitization of states** described by Ulrich Beck. It has its deeper methodological basis. Beck demanded a cosmopolitan turn in sociology. It was to be based on the rejection of the national view, the habit of studying the problems of the world through the prism of treating the state, nation and society as natural forms of world organization. Beck rejected at the same time a cosmopolitan utopia, the conviction that globalization will universalize, unify societies, disintegrate politics and power, dismantle the system of nation states. In Beck's approach, cosmopolitization occurs across borders, by influencing the identity of the individual. It is **cosmopolitization from the inside**. Nation states do not disappear, they are only one of many actors in the global power game. They are transforming into cosmopolitan countries. States' cosmopolitization is to lead to a global construction, the closest ideal of which today was the prototype was the European Union (again!).



There is no shortage of ideas. The transmission belt is still missing. **The world of great politics and the world of ideas still give the impression of parallel worlds.** Is it possible to fundamentally rebuild the world without a clear ideological foundation? Regardless of the answer to this question, it is still an open question how the human individual finds himself in this new pluralistic distribution of global power.

Will the citizen be just an observer? He/she will always be able to respond to the new order by moving around the world, building his/her own network of connections, bypassing political barriers. He/she will always be able to rely on the "power of the brave," strong and determined individuals like Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Walesa, who could change the world with personal exploits. He/she will also always be able to count on the support of the masses, the "power of the powerless". **Will he/she ever be able to free himself/herself from the shadow of the state and great politics?**

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Human civilization, also in its political and institutional dimension, has taken on such a large and complex dimension that, like a giant tanker, it is neither able to stop nor change course on the spot.

There is no doubt that globalization has qualitatively changed the nature of political development in the world. The prophecy of a great change in the shape of institutions and laws that manage political and social processes may acquire quite a real dimension. The acceleration of the technological revolution is the unstoppable factor of change.

In international politics the change of these paradigms is noticeable in its own way. There is a challenge to the current model of relations regulated by the power of states. The way power is defined and its usefulness in solving problems is changing. Globalization has dispersed power. It redefined the balance of power between the West and the rest of the world. Above all, however, **it brought a human individual to the stage of world politics as its active subject. The empowerment of the human individual must disrupt the existing paradigms of international relations.** The concept of justice is particularly important. In a post-growth world, in a post-consumer society, the demand for justice will increase. Distributive justice will break tribal restrictions.

**Changing the growth paradigm will also force the change of moral paradigms.** "We are slowly moving from the ethics of "how much I can get away" to the ethics of "what good I did for the country and the world". Violence will be pushed out of international relations. Will there be a fundamental moral revolution based on universalistic code dictated by empathy? If so, it will not come quick and easy. But it is safe to predict that **countries will lose their monopoly in deciding how to treat their citizens.** They will be forced to solve problems, also disputable in mutual relations, not so much in terms of immediate interests as in terms of the consolidation of lasting values.

The way international policy is pursued will change significantly. If international politics is a great theatre, the difference between the stage and the audience will be blurred. Viewers will increasingly play acting roles.

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The longing for order has become a problem for our mentality in recent years. Chaos reigned over the image of international politics and has already tired us with its durability. To the extent that we have started to equate chaos with anarchy.

The strategic conclusion should be simple: the unpredictability and chaos of change should be included in the axioms of international policy for many years ahead. Because the scale and pace of change can only grow.

Globalization has empowered the individual in the world through a technological revolution offering a new quality of communication, primarily virtual. But we already know well that neither is the end of the story. Quite the opposite, arguments are becoming more convincing that the most serious change (caused by the civilization revolution) is coming.

Technology will change our lifestyles, transform society, economy, let alone politics. First of all, it will mean crossing the biological limits known to us and the possibilities of the human body and mind. It will give man power over the length of his life. It will also make the future more surprising than we can predict today.

Globalization, which was received twenty- five years ago as the next edition of the internationalization of economic and social processes, became a process of cosmopolitization and "individualization" changing the background of world politics. **It delivered a big blow to a concept of a captive audience where citizens of individual countries passively follow the political choices of their ruling elites. It has changed the very notion of citizenship. In the virtual dimension it gave birth to a new concept that of a netizen.**

But this is barely the beginning of the process of "individualization" and the subsequent reconstruction of international relations and their institutions.

Some dystopian visions see the impact of technology in the coming of the age of digital dictatorships, the end of human freedom, the ever-present control of the algorithms over human choices.

But there is no doubt that we are only at the beginning of a great technological acceleration. Even if this technological acceleration, to a small extent, improves work efficiency and improves the quality of our lives for the time being. But there is no doubt about the possibility of technological changes that will prolong our lives and keep us fit, improve the ability to process and collect information. And this must bring a revolution. Social relations, political institutions, and moral canons will change.

The traditional way of making political choices in the foreign policy domain will have to change. The global citizen will have to become part of it. **Perhaps only the selfless collective wisdom of citizens can expand tribal and temporal narrow-mindedness of the current-day political habits.**

The nineties introduced the fashion for appointing various panels of sages, statesmen, and eminent personalities. Each international organization, faced with a lack of ideas for its reform, set up a special panel. The problem with the credibility of the reports of these panels was that they were drafted mostly of former politicians who, while

outstanding, did not themselves show the courage or the ability to implement the proposals that they then, as wise men, made to their successors.

Probably, following the example of some countries, where the development of solutions to difficult, emotionally eruptive issues was given to randomly selected citizens reflecting the image of society (Ireland, Belgium, France), it is time to rely on the wisdom of randomly selected citizens of countries of the international community reflecting the diversity of the world.