In the Polish history of diplomacy, the doctrine of equal distance (equilibrium) in an almost canonical form is identified with the politics of the Second Republic of Poland in the 1930s. It was Józef Piłsudski who in the early 1930s decreed the imperative of the policy of balance in the relations of Poland with Germany and Russia (USSR). This doctrine became one of the three pillars of Poland’s foreign policy at that time. The first pillar was undoubtedly the alliance with France (and also with Great Britain), and the complementary (third) pillar was the search for bilateral ties with other (smaller) partners (like Romania) while displaying scepticism about the role of the League of Nations and the concept of collective security.
The first years after independence, Poland in its foreign and security policy, by necessity and by choice, relied entirely on France, its guarantees, goodwill, and its understanding of Polish interests and the French military assistance in building sovereignty, demarcating borders in the East and defending Poland (including in the war with Soviet Russia in 1919-1921). The French tilt in Polish foreign policy aroused critical reflection after the Locarno Pacts of 1925. Locarno relativized Poland’s security in relation to its Western partners, and divided Europe into two security zones (of better and worse security). The deal guaranteed the inviolability of the German-French and German-Belgian borders, but left open the question of Germany’s borders in the East. The Polish-French guarantee pact, which was to alleviate Polish fears after Locarno, was put subject to the multilateral procedure of the League of Nations. France could come to the rescue of Poland, but the casus foederis required a stamp from the League of Nations.
Piłsudski did not see any immediate worries about this. He called the years 1926-1931 “the five-year quietude”. He believed that both the USSR and Germany would not be capable of offensive military actions against Poland for at least a decade. At the same time, he did not believe in French declarations to stop Germany from hostile actions against Poland. The fact that France, with its military withdrawal from the Rhineland in 1929, did not consider it appropriate to consult Poland on this matter, did not cause much shock in Warsaw (although it was met with open dissatisfaction there). And the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck, after assuming the position in 1932, looked at French politics with visible reserve. (To put it mildly, Beck was not liked by the French; as our military attaché, he left France in 1924 after a rather short stay in a not very friendly atmosphere full of unflattering rumours; and perhaps it left an imprint on his views on France),
Locarno and Germany’s accession to the League of Nations introduced temporary disruptions to Soviet-German cooperation, whose common strategic goal from Rapallo was to dismantle the “Versailles system”. And despite Soviet accusations against Berlin that Germany had made concessions in Locarno, the binding factor for both countries was the “Polish issue”, i.e. the mutual efforts to revise Polish borders in the east and west, in line with the German concept of “forcing Poland into ethnographic borders” (Germany taking over Upper Silesia and the “Pomeranian corridor” with Gdańsk, and the USSR incorporating the Polish borderlands east of the Curzon line, i.e. east of the Bug). The Polish elite did not see the existential consequences of the Soviet-German community of interests for Poland, and even if they did, they overestimated our ability to deal with this challenge. One could frown at France, one could feel a grudge against Great Britain, but without constant and strenuous work with them, Polish security policy was hanging in a vacuum.
The policy of equilibrium was made possible by the departure of Germany, after Hitler gained power in 1933, from close cooperation with the USSR. But it was in the Kremlin where “Mein Kampf” was read thoroughly (and in Russian) and the Soviets could no longer trust the Germans as they did under the Weimar Republic. In other capitals, including Warsaw, the program from “Mein Kampf” was not treated so seriously. The Polish ruling political elite was under the illusion that Hitlerism would liberate the German policy from the influence of the Prussian anti-Polonism practiced by the Weimar Republic.
Indeed, openly confrontational actions against Poland carried out during the Weimar Republic were discontinued by the new regime in Berlin. Anti-Polish propaganda was suppressed (after all, during the Weimar Republic, Poland was called a seasonal state). In 1934, Germany signed a protocol with Poland on the end of the economic war, which Germany unleashed in 1925 by blocking the import of Silesian coal and escalating customs restrictions. Hitler made statements about the necessity to break the age-old hostility between Germany and Poland, and called Piłsudski a great patriot and statesman.
The achievements of the policy of equilibrium were the non-aggression treaty with the USSR concluded in 1932 and the declaration of non-violence adopted by Poland and Germany in 1934. The assumption of the policy was therefore to have almost symmetrical guarantees preventing aggression from the East and the West, and not to cooperate with one from the two partners against the other. Poland did not want to go with Germany against the USSR (which Hitler encouraged), nor to create a regional security block with the USSR proposed in Paris. So we criticized the idea of a pact of four – Italy, France, Germany, Great Britain (1933), but also the Franco-Soviet idea of the Eastern Pact (1934). Both ideas did not come into effect. Although the Polish opposition was not decisive in this regard.
Beck explained in 1935 the necessity of a policy of equilibrium by the fact that a tilt of Polish policy towards the Soviets (as the French would have liked) would lead to a conflict on the western border, and vice versa: a tilt towards Germany would trigger a clash on the eastern border.
The policy of equilibrium, however, was not a policy of equal distance. It was also not a strategic vision, but an ad hoc solution. Unfortunately, it was not treated by partners (and Germany and the USSR) in accordance with our intentions.
Equal distance was therefore not really equal. Piłsudski recognized that the threat posed by the USSR was much more significant. As he claimed: “If our seismograph shakes, it will be from Russia.” In 1934 he said that we had four years of peace with the Germans (and he was basically right). Beck followed this path of thought, also after Piłsudski’s death. Anyway, he was later criticized for being too naive in his relations with Germany. And he called Hitler barely a screamer whom the West would call to order if necessary. Interestingly, our generals from the General Staff over time became more and more inclined to the fact that the threat from Germany was more inevitable and more serious.
The Polish policy of equilibrium was an ad hoc policy. Piłsudski himself said that it meant sitting on two stools. “It can’t go on for long. We need to know which one we will fall from and when. ” Before his death, however, he did not have time to formulate a far-reaching vision. And Beck was not capable of doing it on his own. He was inertly following a course that had no strategic sense since March 1938.
When Hitler started his plan to dismantle the Versailles Treaty, he feared that France would in fact build an anti-German bloc in the East, and he adopted the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty as an announcement of possible further actions (regardless of the failure of the Eastern Pact idea). And Hitler needed peace in the east. Until March 1939, he focused on rebuilding Germany’s military potential (restoring universal military service, terminating Part V of the Versailles Treaty in 1935, entering the Rhineland and terminating the Locarno agreements in 1936). The Soviet help to circumvent the restrictions resulting from Versailles was not so important any more. Then he started to “unite the German nation” (Anschlus in 1938, the annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938), in which he also wanted to be able to count at least on the passiveness of Poland. Normal relations with Poland were therefore only the tactic of the moment for him. And he had peace from Poland, even when he was invading the Czech Republic in March 1939.
Russia, in turn, was afraid that the German-Polish rapprochement would direct Germany’s aggressive attention to the Baltic states, subordinating them to its influence, including military one. Meanwhile, Poland, with German consent, would embark on the Promethean detachment of the parts of Ukraine and Belarus remaining within the Soviet borders.
The Polish policy of equilibrium ended with the presentation by Nazi Germany (through the mouth of Ribbentrop on October 24, 1938) of demands regarding the status of Gdańsk, the Pomeranian corridor and Poland’s joining the anti-Comintern pact. Even then, Beck seemed to underestimate the German power. “With the help of nine divisions, Germany is now making its mark all over Europe. Nobody will take Poland with this strength”.
Poland began to rebuild its alliance with France. On March 31, 1939, Poland was offered security guarantees by Great Britain. The British guarantees were undoubtedly intended as a necessary stimulus to revive the Polish-French alliance. Without Great Britain, France in the psychosocial state of the time would have felt solid resistance to intervening to defend Poland.
But Europe did not have time to pull itself together to tame Germany. And the revival in August of 1939 of the German-Soviet alliance according to the concept of “forcing Poland into ethnographic borders” sealed Poland’s defeat.
Could the politics of equilibrium (even if done better) reverse the fatal tide of events? Doubtful. This could only be done by a more determined policy of France and Great Britain to unite Europe for the defence of the Treaty of Versailles.
Could Poland have influenced the partners’ behaviour? Doubtful. But it could undoubtedly try harder and not give the impression that it would manage without Versailles, and even provoke accusations of complicity in its dismantling (seizure of Zaolzie). Beck as the minister of foreign affairs had a terrible reputation in most European capitals (except Berlin), and already in Paris the degree of detestation of his person was unimaginable (which was largely due to the French ambassador in Warsaw). Can you pursue an effective policy while being so critically assessed, especially by your closest ally? It takes truly extraordinary circumstances for that to happen. Just like today in Polish-American relations, which would probably have been different in terms of not only interpersonal dimension, without the war in Ukraine. Beck reportedly used to acknowledge diplomatic failures with the phrase “Polonia fara da se”. But, unfortunately, Poland failed to cope with the fate in the final hour of truth.
At least a few countries in history that were in the vicinity of powerful neighbours had to adopt a policy of balancing between them, seeking balance, and keeping equal distances.
I once heard a very colourful story about Moldova’s policy from Petru Lucinschi, the gist of which was to keep the same distance from Romania and Russia. At the turn of 1992 and 1993, I was added to the team (i.e. to Ambassador Sławomir Dąbrowa), which assisted Professor Adam D. Rotfeld in his mission as the representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE for the conflict in Transnistria. Rotfeld visited Chisinau, Bucharest and Kiev. He also reached Moscow (and I accompanied him on this trip). There, after a day of meetings with Russian officials, he was served with dinner by the then Moldovan ambassador to Moscow, and the later president of the country, Petru Lucinschi. Many Moldovans, and today almost every third citizen of this country, considered integration with Romania as a natural course for Moldova. The post-communist elite, then represented by Lucinschi, just like Dodon today, focused on maintaining close relations with Russia. Also those from Moldovans who claimed that it would be impossible to keep Transnistria with Moldova without benevolence of Russia. Ties with Russia were also important due to the strong sovietization of Moldovans’ mentality, not only in Transnistria.
The habit of balancing persisted for long. Moldova signed an association agreement with the EU, but unlike Ukraine and Georgia, it remained a full member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Liberals dragged Moldova to Brussels, post-communists to Moscow (and the fate of Transnistria was held hostage by the choice of the final option).
Lucinschi made us feel at home. And the time in terms of food supplies was extremely difficult in Moscow. Ambassador’s wife cooked the chickens personally and the Ambassador’s closest associate, Mihai Popov, was helping at the table. In 1994 he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Moldova.
The split among the elite deepened the country’s lethargic drift. It has become a Russian money launder, a political guignol theatre, controlled by the oligarchs, a protractively weak and poor country.
The Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 shocked also Moldova. It turned out that the physical incorporation of Transnistria into the “Russian world” would be part of the “Novorossiya” project. And if the Russians could take Odessa and connect territorially with Transnistria, a deadly threat would hang over Moldova. It became clear that the only reasonable option for the future for the country is neither Bucharest nor Moscow, but only Brussels. The European Union should open up its doors to Moldova.
Rotfeld prepared a balanced report. Ambassador Sławomir Dąbrowa, later Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, assisted in editing its basic part. I was responsible for the annexes. The annexes included a draft mandate for the future OSCE field mission in Moldova. I must have written it quite well, because on its basis the decision to set up a mission was agreed quite smoothly. It functions until today. But a breakthrough in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict has not yet been achieved. If Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the settlement will emerge in no time.
