Neutrality is a state of equal distance to partners in its pure form. A lot is written and said about it again, because Sweden and Finland will abandon their neutrality status, and Russia would still like to force neutrality on Ukraine.
The policy of neutrality flourished after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Neutrality became an integral element of the balance of power that emerged in post-Napoleonic Europe. The breach of Belgium’s neutrality was the reason why Great Britain joined the First World War. World War II put the doctrine of neutrality to an even more serious test. The Nazi Reich did not respect neutrality (of the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway) if it was required by the strategic interests of the war. After the Second World War, neutrality was the way of oragnizing a military buffer from the Soviet Union, especially in northern Europe.
Neutrality (and disengagement) became the ticket to a prominent political role in the days of the detente. The process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe promoted neutral and non-aligned (N+N) states politically and in terms of image, gave them a unique opportunity to influence East-West relations and shape European security. Soviet (and Russian) diplomat Yuri Kashlev compared the role of N+N to that of a ring referee in a boxing match (between East and West).
The core of the group were four neutral countries: Austria, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden. Yugoslavia joined the group as a leading non-aligned state. However, every more serious political initiative came from one of the four neutrals. They also took on the main burden of mediation within the CSCE. These countries were never a formal bloc. This would conflict with their status of neutrality. But they met regularly ( as the “Five”) even at the level of foreign ministers, submitted joint proposals, and most of all, from the beginning of the process, tried to mediate within the CSCE, submit proposals for compromise solutions. They assigned a certain division of roles within the group. Switzerland was considered to be a member of the group most knowledgeable about the American views. Finland knew best how to meet the expectations of the Soviets. Sweden and Austria took care to take into account the sensitivities of Western Europeans.
Cyprus, Malta, Liechtenstein and San Marino completed the composition of the N+N group, joined as a rule the N+N proposals, shared a common position, but the group’s direction of operation was determined by the “Five”. The N+N countries did not always manage to ensure an agreement. The enormous effort of the N+N ambassadors (especially from Austria and Switzerland) did not save the 1978 meeting of the CSCE in Belgrade from a fiasco. Sometimes the so-called comprehensive compromise packages submitted by the N+N group were born amid great internal tensions (such as at the CSCE meeting in Madrid) and were initially not approved by the USSR or the USA. It leaves no doubt, however, that thanks to the N+N countries, it has always been possible to extract the maximum from the objectively possible common denominator of the interests of both blocs. More than once, such as at the CSCE meeting in Madrid in 1980-1983, their efforts to reach a compromise were assessed as “heroic”. When the negotiations stagnated, constructive impulses and compromises were expected from the N+N group, which would make the negotiations more dynamic.
In 1986, I was included in the Polish delegation to the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures. There, diplomats from the N+N countries played the role of chairpersons of informal meetings within working groups, mediated between NATO and Warsaw Pact members, sought compromises, and prepared draft agreements. Even if the main parameters of the final compromise were defined in the bilateral deal by the USSR and the USA. When I went to the CSCE review meeting in Vienna in 1987, their role, especially in politically important issues such as human rights and humanitarian cooperation, was even more significant. Every small and medium-sized country that had an important issue to solve at the meeting was looking for a good connection with the coordinators. The impression was that the entire European policy at the CSCE level revolves around a group of N+N countries. The Vienna Meeting turned out to be the “swan song” of the N+N group. The fall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet camp made the function of the inter-bloc mediator redundant. Preparations for the Paris Summit in November 1990 showed that the demand for their mediation had decreased.
I found this out for myself shortly after the Paris Summit. In the spring of 1991, I drafted a package of five new confidence-building measures in the military field. My ideas were accepted by both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence. As a sovereign Polish contribution, without consulting its former or future allies, the proposal was submitted at the Vienna negotiations. The surprise of partners was considerable, because at the end of 1990, the Vienna Document, rich in provisions, had only been adopted, and it was expected that it should first be well-tested in practice. However, the Polish initiative quickly won over a strong support of the West. A high-level American diplomat then admitted that it saved NATO from a situation where the negotiations would be dominated by Russian ideas that the West had rejected since the 1980s, such as notification and restriction of exercises by naval and air forces. We were applauded by the general staffs of many NATO countries. The essence of the Polish package was to extend some of the undertakings in the field of military information exchange introduced by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, concluded by NATO and Warsaw Pact members in 1990, to all CSCE member states. For the parties to this Treaty, the implementation of the Polish proposals did not present any difficulties, and even saved them effort in organizing the data that they were to share with other countries. This is how the process of the so-called harmonization between different military information regimes started. And at the Viennese negotiations, after the decision to start drafting the agreement on the basis of Polish proposals, I was entrusted with the role of the main coordinator of the negotiation work. This role was previously reserved for N+N countries. I felt the burden of reconciling the interests of states, neutralizing the influence of the bloated ego of some diplomats (this is sometimes the most destructive factor in negotiations), and looking for ways to help save face for those who had to make difficult concessions. And paradoxically, the greatest resistance to reaching an agreement was put forward by some N+N countries, i.e. those which, in the recent past, were considered the engines of compromise. It turned out that some of them, supporting the greatest possible transparency of the military potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, in the new conditions themselves still treated the secrecy of data about their own potentials as a factor of balancing the advantage of states – members of military blocs. But negotiations proceeded well, and in early 1992 we agreed on a new Vienna Document.
Neutrality as a term comes from the Latin “neuter”, meaning neither of the two, indifferent, impartial. Thus, in principle, neutrality is conducive to the consolidation of balance in international relations. With time it was considered useful to distinguish neutrality at war from permanent (perpetual) neutrality. Perennial neutrality is generally about refraining from participating in defence alliances in peacetime, not undertaking international obligations that could involve the state in a conflict.
The status of neutrality is enshrined in either unilateral or multilateral legal acts. It is either voluntarily accepted or imposed. The policy of neutrality may constitute simply a directive that may change depending on the circumstances.
Neutrality was made a moral virtue, seen as a reflection of civilization maturity expressed in resignation from violence, or even in general opposition (admittedly passive, but still) to violence. However, it was more of a pragmatic choice resulting from a realistic conclusion and a critical assessment of one’s own military (or political) capabilities. And if imposed, it was undoubtedly a detriment to sovereignty.
Neutrality loses its rationale when the prohibition of violence becomes a general civilizational norm, also under conditions of hegemony. And it provokes a moral reproach when it means not joining the collective effort of the international community for noble purposes, including those related to stopping evil.
In the early, intertribal stage of political development, it was unimaginable. It could only mean a conscious resignation from active participation in the struggle for survival. And the dominator in the forfeited competition annihilated the defeated anyway. Neutrality was associated with the risky choice of a passive attitude, but it did not guarantee that it would be respected. As described in the Bible, the only way to avoid fighting, in the Old Testament times, was to succumb to death and destruction.
In ancient Greece, timid attempts to remain neutral in incessant wars led to shameful, even existential, consequences. We know from the descriptions of the Peloponnesian Wars how Corinth appealed to Athens to remain neutral in its dispute with Korkyra. Athens, however, ignored it and entered into an alliance with Korkyra (although Athens did not consent to its full membership in the Athens League). And thanks to Thucydides and his Melian dialogues, the fate of the Melians became already then a textbook case. The Melians, though sympathetic to Sparta, wished to be considered neutral in the war between Sparta and Athens. The Athenians, however, ignored Melos’ declarations of neutrality, set up an exemplary punishing mission, sacked the city and slaughtered the entire male population of adult age, and sold the women into slavery.
Neutrality was not recognized by the ancient Romans. Under Pax Romana conditions, foreign tribes were divided into “hostes” or “socii et amici.” The world had to be black and white. You were either with the Romans or against them. As long as Rome had the strength to deal with anyone who was not with them.
In the medieval conception of the “bellum iustum”, neutrality was seen not only as morally reprehensible, but even illegal. Unless the case did not meet the basic condition of a just war, i.e. of acting in a just cause, a right purpose or intention. Back then, the state not only had the right, but even the obligation to remain neutral. There was not much room for neutrality, especially in religious wars. Although the Byzantine Empire usually chose neutrality during the Crusades, as long as it served its political interests.
Feudal wars sanctioned the so-called law of retaliation. And retaliation narrowed the possibility of neutrality.
Neutrality acquired full status of legitimacy in international politics only in the era of colonial expansions and was associated with the growing movement of sailing ships on ocean routes. The neutral flag on the sailing ships was to save them from attack and confiscation. Unless they were involved in contraband. The Peace of Utrecht of 1713 introduced rules of conduct towards belligerents and neutrals. It made neutrals subordinate to the rules of the naval blockade. It was on this basis that in 1780 Sweden and Denmark declared armed neutrality in the British war against the Franco-Spanish coalition. But Poland, which remained neutral in the Northern War (1700-1721) until 1704, was the main arena of hostilities (the Swedes burned down, for example, the Wawel Castle), suffered the greatest losses in it, reaching even 30%. our material resources (devastated and looted cities, depleted villages).
The Geneva Convention of 1864 made medical personnel neutral in the war, protected hospitals and ambulances, as well as civilians helping to rescue the wounded. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 codifying the laws of war defined the rights and obligations of neutral states, as well as the rules of conduct of parties in an armed conflict towards neutral states.
The golden age of neutrality is the 19th century. Neutrality was part of the architecture of post-Napoleonic security system in Europe. The great powers recognized that the subjugation of one or another of a smaller state by one of them would disturb the continental balance. Independent Belgium could inevitably fall into the hands of France (or the German Confederation, which was, however, unlikely at the time). Likewise Switzerland. And that could rock the whole formula of the European balance. So Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands declared neutrality, which was honoured either by the guarantees of the great powers or by customary law. And it was for many years respected.
In World War I, it was the violation of Belgium’s neutrality that served as the detonator of the war in the West. It forced Great Britain to declare war on Germany. Because Belgium’s neutrality was firmly established by law in the London Treaty of 1839, signed by the United Kingdom, Austria, Russia, the German Confederation, the Netherlands and Belgium. Chancellor von Bethman Hollweg, however, called the Treaty just a scrap of paper because it clashed with Germany’s war plans, which unfortunately was an ominous precedent for the later disregard of the neutrality of states by the Nazi regime. In World War I, the United States initially declared strict and impartial neutrality. New York Governor Martin Glynn reported in 1916 that the doctrine of neutrality was so woven into the fabric of American identity that abandoning it would tear the fabric of American existence as a nation. Nevertheless, the development of military events forced the US to abandon the doctrine of neutrality. Like many other states it sided with the Allies of the Entente. Mexico was tempted by Germany to give up its neutrality. The Zimmerman telegram became, after all, an argument in favour of the US entering the war.
But after Versailles, despite such a daunting experience of neutrality, many European nations still believed that it was an effective doctrine to avoid the consequences of entanglement in great power rivalry. In World War II, however, the concept of neutrality was again put to a serious test. Belgium’s neutrality was confirmed by Germany back in 1937 with its guarantees, and it was breached again in 1940 without a blink of an eye. Because it was once again demanded by the plans for the war against France. The Netherlands remained neutral from 1830 (after the secession of Belgium), although in its case it was a political line, not a legal status. It survived, however, in 1914, when the neighbouring Belgium was taken over by Germany. The Netherlands repeated its declaration of neutrality after World War I. Also in September 1939. But this did not stop the German invasion in 1940.
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia jointly declared neutrality in 1938. They soon lost their independence due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Norway remained neutral in World War I, although in 1917 it began to define itself as a neutral ally of Britain.
The Danish neutrality announced in 1914 was initially pro-German, but was corrected as the situation developed. And Denmark emerged from the war enlarged by northern Schleswig, following a favourable plebiscite. Denmark and Norway declared neutrality together with Sweden on September 3, 1939, and were invaded by Germany a few months later. In the 1920s, Sweden tried to create a block of neutral states. Apart from Sweden, also Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were to be included in it. But only the Swedes managed to save neutrality. All other of these countries became the target of aggression. On September 1, 1939, Sweden declared neutrality, and on September 3, it confirmed it together with Denmark and Norway. But throughout the war years, it supplied Germany with raw materials, especially iron ore. It agreed to allow transports of unarmed German soldiers in transit to and from Norway (mainly for vacation purposes), it allowed the Germans to transfer soldiers to the war with the USSR in 1941, and provided humanitarian aid to Finland during the Soviet aggression. The invasion of Sweden simply did not pay off for the Germans. The risk of it being taken over by the Allies was small, and the Swedish government satisfied Germany’s basic demands.
Ireland persisted in neutrality in World War II. It consistently interned German pilots who forcibly landed or catapulted over its territory. Most Allied pilots in a similar situation were released home. Irish ships rescued the crews of allied ships in convoys hit by German torpedoes. Ireland accepted the plan assuming an active engagement of the UK in its defence in the event of a German invasion. But it maintained diplomatic relations with Germany until the last days of the Third Reich. Prime Minister de Valera even went to the German embassy to express his condolences after Hitler’s suicide. Churchill, moreover, allowed himself to make a biting comment on those “pranks” with Hitler, to which Great Britain looked through its fingers.
Neutral Iceland was taken under the care of the Allied forces deployed there as early as 1940.
Swiss neutrality after World War I was officially confirmed in the decision of the League of Nations (to which it acceded). In the interwar period, it applied the doctrine of “differentiated neutrality”, which allowed it, inter alia, to join economic sanctions introduced by the League. In 1938, however, it returned to integral neutrality. During World War II, it conducted economic business with the Reich and its citizens. It interned Allied airmen, threatened to intercept bombers flying in combat formations over its territory.
Portugal in its neutrality (announced to keep Spain from the temptations of engaging into war) clearly favoured the Allies. Which was not surprising, because ultimately it was bound by an alliance with England for 600 years. It held on to its status as a non-war party, but in 1944 it opened the Azores bases to the Allies. Spain, also neutral, sympathized in its neutrality with Hitler. Franco did not let Hitler be persuaded to join the Axis at the meeting in Hendaye in 1940. The conditions he set (including the exclusion of Morocco from French sovereignty and the handing over of it to Spain) were impossible for Germany to meet. Over time, it changed the status of neutrality to that of the non-belligerent party. And it took Tangier nonetheless. Turkey was also not persuaded to join the Axis. It remained neutral, although in 1941 it concluded a treaty of friendship with Germany. Iran was neutral in World War II, but Soviet and British forces were introduced to stabilize it.
In World War II, neutrality raised more and more moral doubts. On the one hand, it was understandable and even useful, because neutral states could act in the name of higher goals for solving humanitarian matters. More and more, however, when the war took the form of the struggle between good and evil (fascism), standing on the sidelines was a form of moral abdication.
The Charter of the United Nations indirectly (to ensure the obligation to carry out the coercive measures taken by the Security Council) implied possible derivations from the policy of neutrality.
But about modern incarnations and the usefulness of the concept of neutrality in a week’s time.
