I mentioned a week ago that after World War II, the Yalta division of Europe gave a new context to the doctrine of neutrality. Neutrality was part of the (flank) buffer between both blocks. The centuries-old experience of Sweden and Switzerland’s neutrality gave some answer to the challenge of how smaller countries could function in the conditions of a total inter-bloc confrontation. But Finland and Austria had to develop it from scratch in order to avoid falling into the orbit of the Soviets. Today, Sweden and Finland are making a historic turn, saying goodbye to neutrality. It turns out that in the conditions of a neighbourhood with an aggressive and militarized state violating all the rules, neutrality no longer guarantees security. Paradoxically, the Soviet Union, despite all its expansionist and cynical ideology, was a more predictable partner for its neutral neighbours than today’s Russia. Putin has beaten Stalin himself in terms of unpredictability.
Sweden’s neutrality grew out of the trauma of the Napoleonic Wars. But it resulted from the unquestionable recognition of Russian domination in northern Europe. The rivalry with Russia was basically settled by Poltava in 1709. The Swedes agreed that they would not be able to challenge Russia, even with external help. And in 1809 they lost Finland to Russia. From 1812, thanks to Jean Baptist Bernadotte, neutrality became the official policy of the country. It is true that in the years 1813-14 Sweden still participated in the war against France (and Denmark), but also chiefly in order to give a proper signal that it was on the side of the anti-Napoleonic coalition, despite being ruled by the regent “Napoleonid”. And the loss of Finland was compensated by taking (forcibly) Norway from the Danish hands, which was confirmed by the Treaty of Kiel of 1814.
Since then, Sweden has not participated in any war operations. The only recognized exception was the support of the Danes in the first war against Prussia over Schleswig in 1848-1851.
Sweden assumed its neutrality to be an armed one. It was always developing a military potential to deter a potential aggressor. And it emerged unscathed from both world wars. After the Second World War, it withdrew from applying for membership in NATO, and did not strive (until the early 1990s) to become a member of the European Union. Nevertheless, it cooperated in the field of intelligence with the West. And it counted on the fact that if the USSR attacked it, Sweden would be able to expect NATO assistance. Indeed, in 1994 it turned out that the Americans made such an assurance in the 1960s in the context of the US deployment of Polaris ballistic missiles on submarines in the waters surrounding northern Europe.
And the Swedes, in obsessive fear, tracked the escapades of Soviet submarines in their territorial waters, especially the Stockholm archipelago. They prepared the country for a massive guerrilla war by keeping tanks, combat vehicles, and artillery stored in barns, sheds, and stables, hoping to prevent the Soviets from considering invasion. I visited such barns in 1993 with confidence-building experts at the invitation of the Swedes. They wanted to convince us that neutral states cannot afford military transparency.
In 1992, the doctrine of “military disengagement in peacetime” became a new form of neutrality. The Swedes actively took their policy to a global level. They have become the vanguard of thinking about ecology, development aid, and women’s rights. They diminished their military effort. Did they start believing in the end of history? The membership in the European Union (and the development of the Union’s defence identity) presented it with the dilemma of how to define its neutrality today. This dilemma has been clearly settled by the application to join NATO.
Switzerland wanted to practice neutrality in its most orthodox form. Its neutrality was to be an unshakable and categorical (integral) one. Switzerland adopted a policy of neutrality after the Congress of Vienna, which recognized Switzerland in the shape known to this day. It was confirmed in the Paris Act of 1815 and entered into the constitution of the Confederation. The Paris Act adopted by Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain by no means made them guarantors of neutrality, but rather made the Swiss neutrality dependent on their judgments. The result was that during the times of the Holy Alliance, great powers interfered more than once in Switzerland’s internal affairs (e.g. in the matter of political refugees received by it).
In practice, Switzerland has remained neutral from the 1516 peace treaty with France after the infamous spanking at Marignano in 1515. This status boiled down in particular to not getting involved in any war intrigues that France might consider hostile to it. And Switzerland has not consistently plunged into any intrigues.
After World War I, its neutrality was guaranteed by the League of Nations, the seat of which, moreover, was hosted by Switzerland on its territory. After World War II, neutrality became an obvious axiom. The most complete interpretation of Switzerland’s categorical (abstentive) neutrality was formulated by the so-called the doctrine of Bindschendler (Swiss lawyer), written on four typescript pages in 1954. It has not been translated into legal instruments, but has been applied in practice. It excluded Switzerland from participating in any agreements and institutions that could affect its security policy. Switzerland did not initially join the United Nations (it did so only in 2002!). Switzerland joined the Council of Europe only in 1963. It participated in the CSCE (OSCE) process from the very beginning, demanding (with good results) that its neutrality status be confirmed in the CSCE Final Act of 1975. Joining the EU is still out of the question. But economic pragmatism meant that Switzerland had to join COCOM as early as 1951 and took money under the Marshall Plan. It has always been ready to provide good diplomatic services between states in a state of conflict. In many cases, its embassies represented conflicting parties when diplomatic relations were broken, for example after the Russia-Georgia war in 2008.
In the military sense, Switzerland maintained military self-reliance. It trained conscripts (the famous rifles kept by reservists under the bed), digged plenty nuclear shelters, maintained extremely efficient bicycle infantry regiments until the 21st century, but counted that NATO would not allow it to be subjected to Soviet strikes and would come to the rescue if needed.
Today it is not thinking about abandoning neutrality. However, it consistently joined the EU sanctions against Russia and, in a political and moral sense, clearly sided with the West in the conflict in Ukraine. It is geopolitically lucky that it does not experience any threat in its immediate environment. There is still a strong sovereignist mentality in the society, which sometimes complicates the elite’s relations with the European Union and tempers political involvement in the world. But also in the case of Switzerland, neutrality may narrow over time and be limited to symbolism only.
In the case of Finland, neutrality became the state’s way of survival. It did not want to share the fate of Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary after World War II. With a brave attitude in the winter war of 1939-1940, Finland avoided the fate of the three Baltic states. It wanted to survive as a democratic and Western non-communist state and offered its neutrality as a guarantee of loyalty to the Soviet Union.
The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 limited the size of Finland’s armed forces, gave Petsamo to the Soviets, and turned the Porkalla peninsula (in practice until 1956) into a Soviet base. In addition, the treaty imposed on Finland reparations for the sake of the Soviets (over half a billion USD was repaid by 1952). Finland humbly accepted these conditions. And in April 1948, it concluded the Treaty of Friendship with the USSR. The treaty obliged Finland to resist any attack by Germany and its allies. In the Russian interpretation, this provision ruled out Finland’s membership in NATO (at least as long as Germany is a NATO member, but the Treaty expired in 1992).
In such circumstances, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine and the concept of finlandization as a means of survival were born. The doctrine resulted in the absence of Finland’s participation in the Marshall Plan, its absence from NATO, the European Union (until 1995), and even, until May 1989, from the Council of Europe. Elements of censorship were introduced in domestic politics after the Second World War. Books marked by the Soviet embassy as anti-Soviet were withdrawn from bookstores, and some Western films were not allowed to be shown. The “Gulag Archipelago” could not be bought. The Finns did not know much from the local press about the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, and, God forbid, they did not read any criticism of the USSR there. The USSR Embassy interfered in internal political life by tracking down Sovietophobes. Still the Finns lived in fear of a possible invasion (not only by land, because a mass landing from Estonia was also planned in Moscow).
The game, however, was worth the trouble. Finland saved independence and democracy. And finlandization has become the peak of dreams of opposition circles in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Finns did not particularly like the term, seeing it as a pejorative synonym of geopolitical opportunism. Nowadays, finlandization has returned as a model that some post-Soviet states could adopt to allow them to build Western democracy on the assumption that they are neutral towards Russia. Some politicians in West, during the tension produced by the Russian threat to Ukraine at the beginning of 2022, suggested that finlandization could be the only solution to save Ukraine’s independence.
During the forced negotiations with Russia after the February invasion, Ukrainians made public announcements that they would be ready to give up their aspirations to NATO membership and assume the status of neutrality, but on the condition of appropriate guarantees. There is no doubt that the only effective guarantees can be guarantees obliging certain NATO countries to provide assistance to Ukraine in the event of violation of its status. So indirectly involving NATO. That is, linking NATO with its security. And today NATO states are supporting Ukraine with armaments, training, reconnaissance and political support on a scale unknown in the history of the Alliance.
And Finland joins NATO. As President Biden said: Putin wanted the finlandization of Europe, he got its natoization.
It took Austria quite some time and effort to achieve neutrality after World War II. It was understandable considering that it was occupied by the armies of the victorious powers, including the Soviet Union. After all Stalin said that where the Soviet soldier was present, there should also be the socialist system built.
Neutrality became a way in Vienna to get rid of foreign armed forces and build democracy.
Until the mid-1950s, the political and military situation in Austria remained hostage to the unsolved German problem. But politically, the presence of foreign troops made locally little sense there. Thus, the concept of neutrality gained more and more dynamics. The Soviets, however, wanted it to be applied to Germany first. Americans did not accept the concept of Austrian neutrality until the end of the 1954 Berlin Conference, but were afraid to use it as a precedent for Germany. However, they considered the risk of sovietization of Austria in the manner of the GDR unlikely. Austrian military forces could be a valuable support in stopping a possible march of Soviet forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
When the Soviets agreed to separate the Austrian question from the solution of the German problem, things moved quickly. The State Treaty of 1955, ending the allied occupation, did not, however, contain any reference to neutrality. It was introduced by the constitutional law of October 26, 1955. Austria proclaimed perpetual neutrality in order to ensure the inviolability of its territory and independence from the outside. It obliged itself not to join alliances and not to allow the functioning of foreign bases on its territory.
Austria was the only country partially occupied by Soviet troops to benefit from the Marshall Plan. It did not join NATO and the European Economic Community. It was admitted to the UN and the Council of Europe only after the conclusion of the State Treaty.
In the 1990s, Austrian neutrality was subject to significant reinterpretation. The Vedross doctrine of the 1950s assumed that Austrian neutrality was basically only about war situations. It did not restrict the freedom to express political views, and especially did not mean the so-called ideological neutrality. But in practical terms, Austria kept itself aside from the European integration process. This caution was discontinued with the collapse of the USSR and the communist bloc.
Austria’s neutrality contributed to its growing activity in the field of global disarmament.
In 1997, I was the main negotiator on behalf of Poland of the convention banning anti-personnel mines. The negotiation process then began with consultations in Vienna, and the negotiations were based on a project officially submitted by Austria. The decisive game took place at the conference which started in September 1997 in Oslo. My task was not easy. First of all, the Ministry of Defence was resisting our accession to the convention. It had considerable arguments for this, but strong signals from other centres of power (including the Presidential Palace) questioned the line of the Ministry of Defence. These controversies grew to the doctrinal dimension: whether the convention was a disarmament project or an act of humanitarian law. The dispute could be resolved through a compromise only when, after the parliamentary elections, Bronisław Geremek (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Janusz Onyszkiewicz (Ministry of National Defence) took over the leadership of the ministries. We signed the Ottawa Convention in December 1997, although we did not rush for years to ratify it.
During the negotiations in Oslo, I was supposed to do everything so that the parameters of the convention would not complicate our possible accession. So I had to attack the Austrian project, but from a constructive position, that is, motivated by concern that the convention should quickly become a universal instrument. It turned out, however, that for Austria and the group of states that supported it, the project was basically non-negotiable. When I tabled the amendment to relax the schedule for the destruction of mines, I was only supported by two or three other countries, and Austria felt there was not even much to talk about. They did not even want to go to the so-called indicative vote. After the session, however, I was approached by a few diplomats who silently supported our position. So I decided to launch (together with the Brazilian ambassador) a campaign to mobilize support. And overnight we managed to do it. In the vote the next day, a minority of the delegations voted in favour of our position, but it was a minority that had to be reckoned with. As a result, the Austrians were forced to amend the relevant provisions of the draft. And we achieved a symbolic, admittedly, but still a negotiating success. The draft turned out to be negotiable also on key issues.
The negotiating gain is much more enjoyable if you negotiated uphill, convincing initially reluctant partners. Because when your team plays “away”, against a stronger opponent, who is in addition favoured by the referee showing our player a red card and dictating an unjust “penalty”, extending the time of the game, a draw can taste more sweet than a victory. Because failure is always a failure, even if experienced in the most heroic style.
By continuing these glorious global traditions, Austria became one of the main promoters of the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty. It entered into force in 2012, and Austria and Ireland were the first members of the European Union to become party to the Treaty.
And as in the case of Switzerland, neutrality became part of the Austrian mentality (as was the army’s based on conscription and the pro-Russian sympathies of the political and economic elites). It is still believed there that it can be a lever in promoting the country’s image as a mediator with Russia. These are, however, illusory assumptions in the long run.
Irish neutrality has never been enshrined in law. It is an unwritten political directive that has been honoured by all governments since pre-World War II. With the birth of the Irish Free State, Ireland agreed to entrust Britain with responsibility for defence. This dependence, however, was in conflict with the pursuit of full emancipation.
Ireland opted for neutrality, abandoning the option of ‘military neutrality’. Its army has always been symbolic in size. After the Second World War, Ireland did not join NATO (there was also behind it some resentment associated with the continuing division of the island). But it was ready to conclude a bilateral defence pact with the US. Ireland is a founding member of the Council of Europe. But it was admitted to the United Nations only in 1955, although it submitted its application already in 1945. However, the application was blocked by Russia (initially under the pretext of the lack of diplomatic relations).
Enda Kenny, who held the office of prime minister in 2011-2017, believed that Ireland was not neutral. It is simply “unaligned”. Ireland therefore allows foreign military aircraft to refuel at Shannon (provided they are unarmed, but after September 11, 2001, this condition was relaxed and does not apply to aircraft operating under UN Security Council mandated operations). Its armed forces may participate in overseas operations, but only on the condition that the operation is led or authorized by the United Nations and that Irish participation has the consent of the government and parliament.
Ireland, however, stays away from defence integration within the EU. Its constitution forbids Ireland to participate in the decision to establish a common EU defence. But Ireland participates in PESCO. It also takes part in the Partnership for Peace linked with NATO.
The above-described neutrality policies of Austria, and especially of Ireland, as well as of other countries with a specific security policy, are an important factor influencing the possibilities of developing the defense and security identity of the European Union. Already the Treaty of Lisbon turned out to be a real challenge for some of them. It contained, inter alia, the so-called solidarity clause and the prospect of creating a common security identity. As a result, the European Union had to go to the cooperation format of interested states in defense matters (PESCO). In the approach of some countries, it is as if the priority was given to the durability of their own policies over the possibly temporal perspective of the existence of the European Union. Because what if the EU collapses, if countries that are perceived as security providers leave it? It will be necessary to return to neutrality, but the return will not be credible. The strategic compass, adopted by the Union in 2022, does not resolve these dilemmas.
European cases of neutrality are not only about positioning a state in relation to the threat posed historically by the Soviet Union (or now by Russia). Malta is a good example.
Malta took a course of neutrality in the mid-1970s. Malta wanted its neutrality to be guaranteed by four Mediterranean countries: France, Algeria, Libya and Italy. And the guarantees should be additionally backed by financial aid. None of the partners showed any particular enthusiasm, especially when it came to the financial aspect. Only Italy quickly signed the document containing military guarantees.
The last British military ship (HMS “London”) left the base in Malta in 1979, and on May 15, 1981, Malta declared neutrality, recognized by Italy on the same day. In 1987, neutrality was included in the constitution. Malta committed itself to a policy of non-alignment and non-participation in military alliances. It did not allow the creation of foreign military bases on its territory, as well as any military installations (except for self-defence).
Later, however, it joined the Partnership for Peace, it participates in stabilization missions within the EU, but it did not join PESCO (Malta explained that it needed time to assess its possible effects).
Malta was admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement. So was Cyprus. Cyprus, moreover, was associated with the Movement at its inception. It took part in the founding conference in Belgrade in 1961 (and Archbishop Makarios even attended the conference in Bandung in 1955, i.e. before formal independence of the country). This policy was not hindered by the fact that British military bases still operated on its territory. Cyprus participates in PESCO and the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy).
By joining the EU in 2004, both Malta and Cyprus left the Non-Aligned Movement.
European neutrality seems to be exhausting its potential. Putin undoubtedly became its gravedigger. The unpredictability of his Russia makes the guarantees of neutrality illusory. In the confrontation with Russia, there is no room for neutral zones, let alone gray ones. The stronger the identity of the European Union, the more convincing the NATO mission (see the Madrid Strategic Concept of 2022), the smaller the need for real neutrality. If Ukraine withstands Russia’s pressure and defends its independence, it will become a member of the European Union and will also one day join NATO.
And globally, the neutrality of a rich European state, which does not doctrinally send soldiers on military missions, refrain from condemning aggression, or from using recognized coercive measures, must evoke more and more remorse. “It’s none of my business” is not a morally sound philosophy in a world struggling with the chaos. But when it comes to national security issues, parenetic appeals have still limited effect.
The world still celebrates International Neutrality Day on 12 December .
