Russia unleashed the war against Ukraine under the slogans of, inter alia, neutralization and demilitarization of the country. Ukraine would itself commit itself not to joining NATO and not having significant military infrastructure. Regardless of the fact that Russia wants to impose such obligations as a result of war hostilities, they would be a significant detriment to Ukraine’s sovereignty. In 1994, Ukraine voluntarily gave up possession of nuclear weapons. This instrument can be accepted as an act of voluntary self-limitation with respect for sovereignty, although Ukraine did not come out well on the guarantees it then received in return.
The mere fact of a voluntary resignation from the right to develop the state’s defense potential (in part or in whole) may have a doctrinal dimension.
After World War II, Japan adopted the most pacifist constitution known today. It renounced force as a means of dispute resolution and dissolved army, navy, and air force. The subsequent development of the international situation (primarily the Korean War) forced Japan to revise its interpretation of constitutional restrictions. In 1954, the Self-defence Forces were created, which today have quite a significant military potential (and over a quarter of a million people under arms), and Japan’s spending on maintaining this potential places Japan in the top ten of the world ranking of military budgets. But still the Forces remain a civilian formation, and the people serving in it formally remain civilians. Japan is sending troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and was even present in the stabilization forces in Iraq.
In 1949, the army as an institution was abolished in Costa Rica. It is estimated that the most significant positive effect of this step has been the lack of any military coups in Costa Rica since the disbandment of the armed forces, quite unique for South America. One can only speculate whether, in other Latin American countries, this would somehow prevent military dictatorships and serve as a cure for political instability.
In foreign policy, many countries have practiced various forms of the doctrine of low-key, inconspicuous politics. China has been cultivating it until recent years, fulfilling Deng’s political will, according to which they were to hide their power and play for time. Xi has brought Chinese policy out of the shadows, but the coming years will show whether it will be beneficial for China. Once a genie has been released from a bottle, it becomes usually futile to herd it back.
The policy of global abstinence was undoubtedly the policy of the USA in the interwar period. The Americans remained outside the League of Nations, withdrew completely from European affairs, cared for their domination in the oceans, controlled affairs in the Western Hemisphere, but their power was far greater than the breadth of their policies.
I had the opportunity to follow how the ambitions and expressiveness of the policies of some Western European countries have changed over the past thirty-five years. Some narrowed their profile out of necessity, because their relative weight clearly decreased in the balance of forces. Great Britain, in the declining period of the Cold War and in the first years of transformation in Central Europe, wanted to get involved in the affairs of Eastern Europe much more than later in the new millennium. Even then, it was not a voice comparable to the times of Lloyd George and Curzon, when the British had the ambition to define the fair course of borders in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Today as a result, there are no Brits in the Normandy format, or in the Minsk Group, or in the Geneva consultations on Georgia, or in the 5+2 formula for the Transnistrian conflict, not to mention other examples. The exit from the European Union has moved Great Britain to an even more sideline in European politics. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has awakened the British political elites noticeably. Their commitment and activity are visible again (with good results for the West). For how long, however?
At least a few other large European Union countries have clearly decreased their activity in the Central and Eastern European region in the new millennium. At the time of the geopolitical breakthrough at the beginning of 90s last century, the Netherlands proposed many important initiatives. Even in the difficult times of the mid-1980s, they wanted to work towards a return to detente politics. Hans van der Broek, who in the years 1982-1993 was the head of Dutch diplomacy, undoubtedly had the ambition to support not only European integration but also East-West relations with important initiatives. I myself had the opportunity to participate in the negotiation of the Dutch-Polish trial inspection project as part of the CFE Treaty negotiations (1989-1990), which contributed to the facilitation of agreement at the Vienna forum. Van der Broek mediated peace at the end of the war for independence of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991. He articulated the Dutch initiative to create the office of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities (I had the honour of coordinating the negotiations on the mandate of this office in 1992 and I worked closely with the Dutch, for which personally the Minister thanked me). Today it is difficult to find Dutch initiatives comparable in terms of ambition. Their policies took on evidently mercantilist characteristics. They focus mainly on promoting their own exports and investments in Eastern Europe.
Several Western European countries have generally adopted a policy of “hiding” behind the common position of the European Union on issues related to conflicts in the post-Soviet area, the human rights situation in Russia and other sensitive topics. They give the impression that they are just waiting for an opportunity when their “low key”, sustainable (i.e. withdrawn) policy becomes a decisive argument in appointing politicians, diplomats and officials from their countries to positions of responsibility in the European Union and other international organizations. In the last decade, the ambassador of the European Union in Moscow was, inter alia, a Spaniard, in Kiev – a Portuguese. The Managing Director of the European External Affairs Service for Eastern Europe and the Balkans in 2011-2015 was a Spaniard, the Head of the Russia department at a similar time – a Portuguese.
A peculiar peripheral policy spreads in Europe, especially among countries far from the sources of instability, the equivalent of which may be the life philosophy professed by the president of one of the European countries: “stand in a corner and they will find you”.
I found out in my diplomatic practice that such a philosophy can produce unexpected but pleasant results. In June 2005, I headed the Polish delegation (as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) to the OSCE ministerial conference on anti-Semitism in Cordoba. Ambassador Maciej Kozłowski prepared an excellent text for my speech. However, I decided to “speak off the cuff”, using my own language, adding personal comments and some necessary emotions, that is, to do everything to make my speech noticed. And it cought really much attention.
The King of Spain, Juan Carlos, invited the heads of delegations to a lunch. Since there were a dozen full ministers, ministers of state, and secretaries of state among us, I was seated quite a distance from the King. Good two tables from the “presidential” table. After the dinner was over, the King stood up and began to say goodbye personally to the participants. Of course, everyone wanted to shake his hand, so there was a dense line along the length of the room. I didn’t want to feel squeezed in the crowd, so I receded back to the wall. The king moved slowly. Suddenly I saw that out of the corner of his eye he saw me standing away. He moved on, but suddenly he opened the line and approached me stuck against the wall. He shook my hand and began to speak Spanish. Not understanding exactly what he was saying, I replied in English. The King continued still in Spanish, me in English. It almost turned into a conversation in front of the whole room. As a goodbye, the King warmly squeezed my shoulders and went straight to the door. Several of my colleagues gave me questioning (and even jealous) looks. I didn’t know what to say, so I said, “We know each other for years.” Not everyone took it for a joke although I saw him then the first time in my life. I could not develop a suspicion that the King might have mistaken me for a member of the service staff, and he just wanted to thank me for a good job of serving the table. Although he must have noticed that I did not wear white gloves.
A manifestation of self-resignation was the attitude of some Central and Eastern European countries which, after joining the European Union and NATO, started to believe that the fundamental goals of their foreign policy had been achieved. NATO and the EU were to solve their problems a priori. There was nothing for these countries to do other than to ensure that NATO and the Union were enduring (in good health). They almost blindly accepted the joint Franco-German initiatives within the EU, or the American proposals within NATO, which were supported by the so-called Quad (USA plus UK, France, Germany).
Undoubtedly, these states can afford their own assessment and analysis, their own ideas and ideas. But they simply ceased to have such ambitions. Russia’s aggressive policy in the region, if not from the invasion of Georgia in 2008, certainly after the attacks on Ukraine in 2014, and especially the war crisis around Ukraine at the turn of 2021 and 2022, and the war itself from February 2022 undoubtedly disturbed their sense of bliss. Made them reflect much deeper on their policies.
The “new Europe” (of Central and Eastern part) is still seen as a junior partner both in the European Union and NATO, under-represented in managerial and ambassadorial positions, unable (or unwilling) to make its own voice audible in decision-making bodies.
