Let’s sum up: negotiations have their stages. We have already talked about the preparatory phase, about negotiations about negotiations. We have already said that the proper stage begins with the presentation of positions. This is the so-called preliminary phase of negotiations. The parties lay out their starting position, present the motivation and general argumentation of their views. The positions presented must be carefully analyzed. And well reflected upon.
What sometimes looks like an insurmountable contradiction in initial presentations can be explained quite easily and removed as an obstacle in the talks. One of the visible discrepancies at the beginning of the negotiations between the EU and Armenia on the Partnership Agreement in 2016 related to the process of amending Armenian legislation in terms of the so-called Community acquis. The EU position referred to the “harmonization” of these regulations, Armenia vehemently rejected this position, demanding the use of the term “approximation”. However, in the course of detailed discussions, it turned out that the differences resulted only from the linguistic interpretation of the meaning of both words, because there were no differences as to their effects in practice. So the EU agreed to “approximation”.
But sometimes this procers of explanation can take a long time. The more mistrust between partners, the greater the need to explain even the simplest concepts to each other.
The next phase is a discussion on the presented positions. Here it is already necessary to determine what in them generally suits us and what does not. The purpose of such an initial discussion is primarily to examine the extent of flexibility of the partner’s position, its openness to change. This is the time for additional arguments and counter-arguments, testing the firmness of each other’s positions. This is the time to submit proposals to develop initial positions. It’s even time to signal options for resolving contradictions in positions.
After the discussion, it is time for a deeper internal reflection. We have to determine for ourselves the areas of convergence and divergence of interests and positions. The smaller the field of convergence and the larger the field of divergence, the deeper this reflection should be. Then it comes to assess the chances of concluding an agreement and its price for us. We should never, especially then, lose sight of the political goal that guided us when we started the negotiations, i.e. resolving the conflict while respecting our interests. Unless we were just negotiating for the sake of negotiating. If the substantive and political gain of the negotiations is important, it is the best time to decide whether they can still make sense for us. The worst thing that can happen is when we start to get bogged down in negotiations, we become hostages of the process, we start investing material and political resources in them, and these investments will chain us to the negotiating table, even though the assumed goals will not be satisfactorily achieved in the end.
Of course, you can withdraw from the negotiations at any time, even just before they are finalized. And even after they end. This is what Armenia did in 2013 after the initial agreement on the text of the Association Agreement with the European Union. It was later explained to me that the Armenian authorities knew about the impossibility of concluding this agreement as early as mid-2012. Nevertheless, the Armenian negotiators were moving forward like top performers and were ahead of other Eastern Partnership countries in terms of the speed of the drafting. They gave no signs that there might be a problem with the conclusion of the agreement. And then (at the insistence of Moscow) they withdrew from the agreement. The irritation in Brussels was pyramidal. Because everything looked like the Armenian side was negotiating in ill will.
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This negotiating reflection should allow us to review our negotiating strategy. Of course, we sit down with some strategy already starting the talks. Often the choice of strategy is obvious. It depends on who we are negotiating with, about what and for what purpose. It is clear that when negotiating with allies and friends (within NATO or the European Union), we will adopt a cooperative (partnership) strategy. When negotiating with countries that are hostile to us, we will instinctively choose a confrontational (competitive) strategy. The subject of the negotiation is also important. If the negotiations concern a territorial dispute (and other zero-sum disputes), i.e. they fall under the term of distributive bargaining, it is obvious that a confrontational attitude will prevail. If we talk about trade or the use of common goods, where the so-called integrative type of negotiations apply, a cooperative attitude will prevail (therefore, even in the times of the Cold War, treaties concerning Antarctica or activities in space were relatively easily agreed). We will choose a different strategy to solve the existing conflict of interest, a different one to set the rules of action in taking up the challenges of the future.
Of course, sometimes the cooperative mindset will be saturated with competitive elements. This is the case even in the European Union when it comes to negotiating the multiannual financial framework. But always a partnership approach among friends will prevail.
In turn, the confrontational attitude within the OSCE silenced the voice of reason so much that the cooperative factor did not work at all, when, for example, for several years in Vienna it was impossible to agree on neither the organization’s budget nor any new political commitments.
In the literature on the subject you will find descriptions of a wide range of strategies and negotiation attitudes. So we have an altruistic strategy (where the main goal is to satisfy the partner), a cooperative strategy (focused on a common gain), a competitive strategy (where we want to maximize our own profit and minimize our partner’s profit), an egoistic strategy (where only the maximization of our benefits counts), aggressive strategy (where we are primarily concerned with maximizing the partner’s losses).
Behind the strategy there is always a choice of political stance in a broader dimension. Do we mean to show our own dominance or willingness to adapt? Is it about highlighting disputes or avoiding them? Is it about deconflicting relationships or integrating them?
Of course, we must be aware that the initial phase will clarify the true face of the partner’s strategy. Often, the strategy declared at the beginning of negotiations is only a cover for the real strategy. Our strategy must take into account (although it does not have to adapt to) partners’ strategy.
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Let us repeat once again: when you sit down at the table, you must know what you are sitting for. And you sit down if you hope to get a result that will be better than the existing reality and its predicted development. If there is no such hope, it is better not to negotiate. But if there is such hope, then one must not be afraid of negotiations. As John Fitzgerald Kennedy once said, “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.”
Experts from Harvard once developed the term “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA). You need to be aware of it not only when you sit down to negotiate, but also keep it in your imagination throughout the negotiations.
BATNA will answer the question of whether it makes sense to negotiate and how much effort should be put into reaching an agreement. If our BATNA looks good and the negotiations do not give reason for optimism, then there is not much point in investing either time or energy in the negotiations. However, if BATNA looks unattractive or is not visible at all, it is better to stay at the negotiating table and look for solutions that can bring us real gains. Then it is better to sit down and work on compromises.
In the process of reflection, one should also consider what BATNA looks like on the other side of the table. And compare it with your own.
Of course, policy makers overestimate their own BATNA and underestimate their opponent’s BATNA. Too distorted assessment may lead to incorrect negotiation decisions. Such a mistake was made by Pashinyan’s team in Armenia in 2020. They ignored the efforts of mediators in the conflict with Azerbaijan, overestimated their own possibilities (BATNA) and, as a result, suffered a disastrous defeat on the battlefield in the 44-day war.
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The risk of our imagination failing us will always be there. The Bolsheviks were made aware of this when they began peace negotiations with Germany (and its allies) at the end of 1917. The Germans presented them with an ultimatum then for the first time, but Trotsky put forward the concept of “neither war nor peace.” He declared that Russia was no longer at war with Germany, and at the same time refused to sign the peace treaty. Soviet Russia decided that negotiations were pointless, and the better alternative would be to delay the process, hoping that the revolutionary flame would ignite the mood in Germany, or at least among the German soldiers at the front, who would refuse to fight in a situation where the Russian army itself would not resist. The Bolsheviks, however, then miscalculated cruelly. The Germans repeated the ultimatum, but on even more painful terms, and when it was not fulfilled, they moved the army eastward, threatening even Petrograd. And on March 3, 1918, the Bolsheviks, in humiliation, had to sign the treaty, because there was no alternative to it (except the collapse of Soviet power).
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I watched as in 1994, from the already advanced negotiations on the so-called OSCE-led peacekeeping, Russian negotiators in Vienna suddenly withdrew. And it was Russia that had come up with the initiative to start negotiations on this topic. It was guided by the hope that the OSCE would legitimize, and even finance, the presence of the so-called Russian peacekeeping forces in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). And perhaps the OSCE will ask Russia to deploy them in other conflict areas in the territory of the former USSR. Negotiations took a lot of time. But unfortunately for Russia, Western countries have begun to raise the bar on the conditions under which the OSCE could embrace such peacekeeping by its mandate. These conditions became so stringent that Russia decided that the game was not worth the candle. Russia opted to bury the negotiations it initiated. And it continued its policy of sending the so-called peacekeeping forces under the aegis of the CIS or CSTO.
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Of course, negotiations can sometimes be conducted in a feigned way, when one or both (all) parties are not really interested in an agreement. But they are conducted so as not to expose the participants to criticism from the public. The negotiations then become a propaganda game. A case in point is the fruitless negotiations on the reduction of the armed forces in Central Europe conducted in the years 1973-1989. It is impossible to accuse both parties, i.e. both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, of bad intentions when the negotiations began. To the best of our knowledge, the negotiations were started in good faith. Later, however, it turned out that with the then asymmetry of potentials and geography, any gain from them in a strategic sense would be risky. So the negotiations were faked. But, in fairness, some attempts were made to move them out of the deadlock. Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, appointed in 1983 as the head of the American delegation for MBFR negotiations, recalled that the US delegation then prepared a draft proposal that met the other side’s expectations and could break the impasse. The text was sent to Washington. It received a positive opinion from the State Department. The draft was discussed twice at meetings of the National Security Council, under the personal chairmanship of Ronald Reagan. But it was blocked by the Pentagon. Pentagon saw no advantage in the success of the negotiations. Abramowitz noted that the Soviet delegation looked at the Americans with a visible inferiority complex: “They at least saw us as “seven feet” tall, incredibly omnipotent.” But this seemingly all-powerful delegation proved powerless in overcoming differences in the approaches of different agencies in Washington itself.
The MBFR negotiations ended when an alternative emerged – the CFE negotiations began in 1989. And unquestionable success was achieved there.
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Very often the interest in negotiations is asymmetric. One side wants them more than the other. Too much asymmetry of interest bodes ill for the course of negotiations. Chamberlain became victim of this in 1938. He did not hide that he wanted to avoid war at all costs. He flew on September 15, 1938 to Berchtesgaden, on September 22, 1938 to Bad Godesberg, and on September 29, 1938 to Munich to humiliately submit to Hitler’s demands. Moreover, he wanted to negotiate alone, without the use of theses for conversations, maps or opinions of advisers, which of course further weakened his position in relation to Hitler. We remember the result.
Very rarely, in negotiations, one of the parties wants to admit that it acts as a humble petitioner, begging to satisfy its request (“demandeur”). This undoubtedly weakens its negotiating position.
If you show the other party that you believe that BATNA does not exist on your side, that you are willing to pay any price for an agreement, you are pushing yourself to a losing position. The other side will quickly “smell the blood” and confront you with a painful deal.
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The politically relevant question is whether to negotiate with everyone, including terrorists, murderers, criminals and criminal regimes. Unfortunately, it comes to negotiating with them if no reasonable alternative to it emerges (no BATNA!). The Americans even negotiated with Iran to free their diplomats in 1981 – through the Algerians. The Algerians later said that their role went far beyond mediation. They had to educate Iranians about the functioning of the US legal system and the limited powers of the federal government. And they had to illucidate the Americans in relation to the cultural constraints in the negotiating possibilities of the Islamic authorities.
Israel has had a firm no-negotiation policy with Hamas for years. But it arranged armistices with them through intermediaries (Egyptians). The Americans had to negotiate with the Taliban their withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
Voices of protest were raised in Poland when Chancellor Merkel contacted Lukashenko in the midst of the 2021 migrant crisis on the Polish border, or when President Macron and Chancellor Scholz called Putin after the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022. With all right moral resistance and political doubts as to the point of conducting such conversations, if there is no other way out, you have to talk. Unless you can get by without talking.
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Sometimes the parties just need to mature to negotiate. And this maturity becomes only clear in this reflective phase. In the early 1970s, the US and the USSR were ripe for talks on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT), but they were by no means mature for agreements in the field of conventional arms (they only matured in the late 1980s). It was determined by political and military conditions. The ability of the negotiators had nothing to do with it. It is always better to start negotiations when the parties are ready for them than to realize that they are not during the negotiations.
Three EU countries (UK, France, Germany) entered into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program in 2003. But the United States did not really mature to negotiate with Iran until 2013. The deal took place in 2015, but already in 2018, the Americans (Trump) withdrew from it. Then the process had to be saved again. Thomas Pickering argues that the negotiating process with Iran would have been completely different if the United States had entered into a serious dialogue with Iran in the early 1990s. But at that time the Americans were not politically or even mentally ready for it.
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Let us return, however, to the conclusions from the reflective stage of the negotiations.
If we have decided that there is no better option than further negotiations, we should proceed to identify convergences and differences in a conceptual sense. This is the time for a political conclusion, whether the positions of the parties are ripe for being able to start mulling them, or whether the process of exerting further argumentative or political pressure should continue. This often requires additional conversations, especially through informal channels. This often causes the official chat channel to shut down. There is little or nothing happening behind the negotiating table. Some call it a dead point in negotiations.
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The choice of strategy is followed by the choice of tactics and negotiating style. Experts divide the negotiator’s attitude into two main schools. The first is the so-called warrior attitude, which means hard and consistent pursuit of victory, even if it turned out that the end result would be a mutual defeat (no agreement). The second is the attitude of the shopkeeper (salesman, peddler) where the goal is to make a deal, conclude a transaction. Of course, it is best to be able to apply both of these attitudes in practice, depending on the moment and the need.
Ambassador George Vest, already quoted on this blog, praised the abilities of Canadian diplomats in this respect in bilateral talks with the US in the 1960s: “They have a nice genius for knowing when to move from total hard-line position to search for compromise that’s palatable to both sides”.
This is the most important turning point in the negotiations. When to make such a turn in attitude yourself? Very often the only solution is to trust your own intuition.
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If the general map of positions shows that there is a sufficiently solid basis for starting detailed negotiations, work on the content of the agreement begins. Of course, at the beginning, the general contours of the agreement should emerge (form, substantive scope, structure, etc.). Later, there will be time to fill it with specific decisions on specific matters.
At this stage, the parties may submit proposals updating their vision of the final agreement, which may include ideas for compromise solutions. Of course, it is not always the case that the first to signal a compromise is more interested in it.
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A strategically important decision is the selection of the basis for the work. It can be one of the drafts presented by the parties, their mechanical merger, or a project submitted by a third party, i.e. a possible mediator.
If the design is accepted in principle as a basis for further work, drafting starts. You need to study the draft together and mark the formulas that are acceptable and those places where the positions diverge. Since the negotiations of the Westphalian treaties, there has been a rule in Western negotiating culture that no part is agreed until the whole is agreed: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. This safety clause then allows us to undo the agreement process when necessary. This is not welcome. Questioning the already agreed formulas may cause indignation and direct bad emotions of partners towards us. However, sometimes it is necessary, also for purely tactical reasons.
But sometimes agreement is reached without working on the text. The Soviet-American agreement to resolve the so-called the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was purely oral, not recorded anywhere. And it was successfully implemented and remains in force to this day.
Difficult cases should be arranged according to their degree of complexity. Studying what is important and what is less important is essential for the process of finding compromises. Because it is routine practice to move towards agreement from the easy to the difficult part.
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We have already mentioned the so-called negotiation trap. Sometimes it turns out that the parties to the negotiations are unable to free themselves from the costs and investments put into the negotiations that have been going on for some time and continue the process even though it will not bring the expected effect, and they do so only to justify the effort put into the process. For example, negotiators under the so-called the Doha Round of the WTO, launched in 2001. After only a few years it was clear that it would not bring a breakthrough. But negotiations were restarted and continued, even though they begged to be changed in purpose and structure. Back in 2011, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy dramatically called for rethinking „the consequences of throwing away ten years of solid multilateral work.” This is what the negotiation entrapment syndrome looks like.
Another example of the negotiation entrapment is the continuation of work on the decarbonisation regime within the European Union, even when the EU was threatened with an energy crisis as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead of postponing the goal for better times, work continued, because so much had already been invested in this area.
A negotiation entrapment usually arises under conditions of strong external pressure (from public opinion), doctrinal burdens on foreign policy, uncertainty as to alternative solutions to those negotiated, inability to take into account changes in external conditions.
The entrapment may be due to purely personal reasons. Negotiators involve their reputation as well as emotions in the negotiation process. For this reason, it is often difficult for them to soberly assess the costs of reaching an agreement, they wade into negotiations in the name of saving their own prestige. And the other side just takes advantage of it.
I have already blogged about my involvement in preparing fairer conditions for the holding of elections in Armenia in 2017. In the spring of 2016, I did my best to bring about an agreement between the government and the opposition, as well as to ensure funding for the implementation of the agreement from the European Union. When in July 2016 the authorities withdrew from the agreement, they probably counted on the fact that since I had put so much personal commitment into the process, I would not accept its fiasco and go along with the option proposed by the authorities at that time, and I would confirm the already secured financial support from Brussels. My friends at the US embassy were ready to do so and transfer the $1 million previously promised to the authorities. But I said a hard no. I was able to free myself from the negotiation trap. Unfortunately, the Armenian opposition fell into it and went to a new agreement that was much more favorable to the authorities. And I gave in to the opposition.
An example of an institutional trap was the policy of the leadership of the Council of Europe and the leading Western states towards the issue of Russia’s membership in the Council in 2012-2021. Fearing the loss of existing “investments” (the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Russia’s substantial financial contribution to the CoE budget), the appeasement course was chosen instead of subjecting Russia to the necessary pressure and sanctions. Negotiations on the formula of the so-called Russia’s return to the work of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly in 2019 looked as if the Council of Europe cared more about Russia’s return than Russia itself.
The trap may have an interpersonal dimension. Often, especially in bilateral negotiations, negotiators on both sides are exposed to the so-called prisoner’s dilemma. Another source of entrapment is emotional dependence. I have been told how it emerges during bilateral negotiations between Germany and Israel.
There are, therefore, too many examples of entrapments in the history of diplomacy. So you always have to remember that it is easier to avoid them by not starting negotiations than to try to leave them when they drag on.
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Sometimes negotiations can be moved from a dead point and moved to the phase of solutions by launching informal communication channels and even informal (and secret) negotiation platforms.
Kissinger was obsessed with secret unofficial contacts. Of course, one can argue whether initially he was more interested in excluding the State Department or the Pentagon from the process of making arrangements with other countries and focusing decisions solely in the hands of the closest circle of the President (i.e. himself), or whether it was about satisfying Kissinger’s ego and sense of greatness, or whether he truly believed that secrecy was the shortest way to an agreement. That’s how he negotiated with the Soviets, with the Chinese. But the most spectacular case of secret negotiations was the peace negotiations with Vietnam.
In August 1969, a secret meeting between Kissinger and Vietnamese negotiators Xuan Thuy and Mai Van Bo was arranged in Jean Sainteny’s apartment on rue de Rivoli in Paris. The Vietnamese did not quite know what this secret meeting was for. They had already conducted open peace talks with the Americans. Xuan gave a forty-minute propaganda speech as a start. And he repeated the position known to the Americans from official talks. However, he agreed to further secret contacts. They did not resume until February 1970. But the Vietnamese understood the importance of this channel and sent a member of the leadership of the Communist Party, Le Duc Tho, to Paris. He was notified for the sake of concealment as Xuan Thuy’s adviser in official talks. The negotiations were conducted in secret locations. The Americans had three such premises. The Vietnamese had only one (provided by French communists from L’Humanité). They were conducted in complete secrecy from the staff of the US Embassy (the only insider was General Walters). Negotiations, although secret, proceeded with great problems, abounded in crises. But in the end they finally led to the signing of a peace treaty in January 1973, and both negotiators won the Nobel Peace Prize.
An informal negotiation channel was launched by Kissinger in negotiating the SALT agreement. In Vienna, the official dialogue was conducted from November 1969 by Ambassador Gerard Smith and Ambassador Vladimir Semyonov. Kissinger, however, launched parallel negotiations with the Soviet ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin. Very quickly the Soviets realized that Kissinger was not coordinating his actions with Ambassador Smith. They led to Kissinger hastily agreeing to their ideas like to keep one location for the ABM anti-ballistic missile site and to exclude restrictions on MIRV warheads from the agreement. Then Kissinger lamented that it led himself being outmaneuvered by the Soviets. He accused his co-workers of not being vigilant. He explained that he was overworked. But the problem was that he did not listen to his negotiators in Vienna. The SALT Agreement, though flawed, was signed in May 1972. And Kissinger, of course, played the role of the father of success.
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Sometimes the structure of formal negotiations encourages the launch of an unofficial secret channel. The decisive negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were held in Geneva at the turn of 1967 and 1968 at the forum of the Committee of 18 States. It consisted of 5 NATO and 5 Warsaw Pact member states and 8 non-aligned states. The leading role was played by the co-chairmen of the Committee, i.e. the USA and the USSR. The heads of these delegations were Ambassadors William Foster (the first director of ACDA) and Alexey Roshchin. The adopted mode of operation provided that the Americans and the Soviets first tried to agree on a selected issue. They submitted a ready-made joint proposal to the entire Committee, which could accept, reject or amend it by consensus. It so happened that for several weeks, the Americans and the Soviets could not agree on anything. Which, of course, caused concern and simple curiosity in the other members of the Committee. And Geneva is a small city. Wherever the diplomats met, the entire corps found out immediately. For greater comfort, the diplomats of both powers at the working level decided to go outside Geneva. And meet at country inns and tourist hostels. To good effect. Although the memoirs of diplomats participating in these secret meetings do not lack descriptions of being discovered by some intrusive colleagues from other countries.
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However, the main purpose of informal contacts is to build trust. Therefore, in any negotiation, there is always more going on outside the meeting room than at the negotiating table. And if it doesn’t, it means that there are no serious problems in the talks, or the parties are unwilling to come to an agreement.
Informal contacts are also used to examine positions, probe possible solutions, and prepare compromises. They are also used to signal the moves planned at the table, to prepare the other side for them. Especially if you want to avoid an immediate negative reaction.
At the SALT negotiations in Vienna, the aforementioned ambassador, Vladimir Semyonov, negotiated, apart from the main agreements, also minor agreements, including those concerning the so-called nuclear accidents. He wrote in his memoirs that in 1971 he was instructed to introduce in the negotiations the matter of joint action of the USSR and the USA in the event of the use of nuclear weapons by a third party. The Soviets wanted a joint response to China’s nuclear use, although the third party could well have been France or Great Britain. Collaborating with the Soviets against their American allies was in no way appropriate. But even negotiating with them against China was out of the question, for Kissinger was already secretly plotting a breakthrough with Beijing. Semyonov decided to act with great caution. First, on the sidelines, he tugged on Ambassador Smith’s sleeve to give him a general idea of the problem. After a few days, hoping that Washington had started thinking about the matter, he approached Smith in the middle of an opera performance at the Wiener Staatsoper and laid out the details. And only then, having waited properly, did he bring the relevant document to the negotiations. Smith nevertheless reacted negatively. And when Ambassador Dobrynin tried to use the channel of informal negotiations with Kissinger, this time (surprisingly) he heard a firm refusal. The Soviet proposal fell off the table.
Participating in informal breakfasts, lunches, parties, joint trips or cultural events, a novice negotiator may get the impression that the conversations on these occasions are empty, vague, chaotic, and even pointless. But there’s no better way to build trust and create a discreet communication channel that you can use when the need arises.
Ambassador Rudolf Perina, who participated on behalf of the US in CSCE meetings at the end of the Cold War, recalled how in the early 1980s in Berlin he was an interpreter for the regular bi-annual lunches of the US ambassador and the USSR ambassador on Berlin: “The amazing thing about the lunches, however, was how little substance was actually discussed between the two Ambassadors”. It was only years later that he realized that the ambassadors did not meet to talk about substantive matters.
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The reflection phase should not only concern your own aspirations (and serve to make the necessary corrections). Perhaps we should spend even more time analyzing the expectations of the other party. Jack Lew, who in the Obama administration was Treasury Secretary, White House Chief of Staff, and also Deputy Secretary of State, is said to have observed that “the most critical thing in a negotiation is to get inside your opponent’s head and figure out what he really wants. ” And when the other side doesn’t quite know what it should be about, you just need to help it. This way it will be easier for you to create compromises.
When the negotiations move after reflection towards the final phases, the so-called integration, oratory and cognitive-analytical skills are no longer of decisive importance. Creativity, imagination and the ability to think outside the box come to the fore. You have to be able to find ways to solve problems. By advancing even the most “weird” ideas. I remember in the early stages of my career I could scare my bosses with my ideas. But you always have to be able to separate exploration from decision-making. Because one decides by rejecting ideas, especially those that are dangerous, unrealistic or irresponsible. And the worst is when there is nothing to be rejected. The fact that someone comes up with even unrealistic ideas does not mean that he is unable to dismiss them calmly in the decision-making process. Especially when he takes over the function of the head of the delegation during the negotiations.
Well, and what counts in the final stages are bargaining skills, the ability to bargain. But on this one we talk on August 21, 2023.
