Each ambitious idea for deepening European integration is jeopardised by the uncertainty as to its approval by the citizens of the Member States. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 has for many years instilled in politicians, even the most convinced of the need for further integration impulses, fear of the opinion of citizens. So what if referendums on European matters, such as those lost then in France and the Netherlands, or earlier in Ireland, were not a statement about the attitude towards Europe as such, but a typical lightning rod of negative feelings of the society towards its own governments. The idea of Europe has been made a scapegoat by politicians for their own inefficiency. Brussels has been blamed for everything that is wrong with the individual countries for years. This has become a habit especially for populists, even those who hold or held the reins of government and wanted to grab handfuls of money from the EU, like Orban in Hungary or Kaczyński in Poland.

In force until 2007 as a routine practice, the so-called treaty path of developing the European Union has so far been abandoned. Even some fundamental decisions, such as the adoption of the Recovery Plan in 2020, which many call a Hamiltonian moment for Europe, were made without addressing the public.

At the same time, in 2021, the European Union initiated an unprecedented process of public consultations for international institutions as part of the Conference for the Future of Europe. It ended with a rich volume of ideas and proposals. Which, again for fear of the lack of guarantees for their constructive consideration, were sidelined. They were standing there on the side track, waiting for better times, and it’s to be assumed that in large part they will stay there forever. Although in 2023 the European Parliament picked up some of them to push for deep reforms.

It is significant how small was the Polish contribution to the preparation of the report of the Conference. But that’s a separate issue.

There can only be one conclusion: without the European demos, integration will not go any further.
This demos may be weak, but it exists. Of course, one can dismiss this issue and call Europe an imaginary community, but after all, every community wider than a family or a clan is an imaginary community, even a nation.

Philosophers, sociologists and politicians have tried to define European identity. Husserl wanted to make philosophical identity dominant. The search for truth, rationalism, cognitive criticism, universalism, striving for change (existential conversion) or even existential doubt (philosophical reflection) are often referred to as its constitutive factors. The entire West, broadly understood, can lay claim to them, without a doubt. But in the sphere of intellectual debates, fundamental reflection, the European identity is still perceptible. One European lecturer at a leading American university told me: “I didn’t know I was European until I went to the United States. It turned out that the need for totally improvised intellectual debates after classes in cafeteria at the university was felt only by visiting professors who came there from Europe.”

Also, the cultural dimension of European identity, the one related to values, especially the rule of law, tolerance, empathy, human dignity, liberalism in a fundamental, non-political sense, can be extended to the entire West, but Europe, with its commitment to the abolition of the death penalty, for equal rights for women, respect for sexual minorities has become a recognizable trade mark.

Even at the political level, Europe is an increasingly visible actor on a global scale. Some non-European politicians do not always want to appreciate it. Putin did not want to see it for a long time. Then he noticed it, but ostentatiously refused to respect. Politicians in several important “global South” countries do not treat Europe as a collective player. In India, for instance. But in China they do. Therefore, Macron could talk to Xi in the company of von der Leyen.

So European identity is there, but still too weak in everyday civic reflection.

It was thought that institutions would strengthen it. Direct elections to the European Parliament have been introduced. European „electoral leaders” have appeared and there may be in the future even transnational electoral lists. But European elections in many member states are associated rather with races for warm (well-paid) jobs, and among the new members of the Union even sinecures, than with a serious political debates. The European Parliament is not seen as a real political force. Still. For ambitious politicians, it is deportation into political exile or pre-retirement “chill-out”.

The institution of European citizenship has been introduced, visible on the cover of our passports. But you are a European citizen only if you are a citizen of a EU member state (maybe it’s high time to overcome this limitation?). As European citizens, we can vote in local and even national elections. We have access to consular protection and the right to petition and initiate legislation. We can count on equal treatment in many everyday matters, but still some countries treat us as foreigners in access to work and social benefits, or purchase of land.

It was thought that identity would be strengthened by real benefits, such as student exchange under “Erasmus”, the abolition of border controls, the abolition of roaming charges. Still, even in countries where European funds are used to transform infrastructure (not only roads) on a large scale, the sense of real benefits of being European is weak.

It was recognized that it is necessary to take care of strengthening the common cultural identity. European awards have been introduced for the creators of cinema, but also for architecture and literature (other areas of creativity also have their European awards, but not as spectacular). But with the Oscars, Caesars or Pritzkers, they are not yet comparable. Well, there is Eurovision and the European Games. There are European Capitals of Culture. Still, the feeling of deficiency prevails. The European Union is still clumsy in the area of culture. Its agenda for culture is strikingly shallow. There will be no talk of a commissioner with a separate cultural portfolio for a long time. A pity. Without a strong cultural dimension, Europe will not build its “soft power”.

One could continue complaining for a long time. And there are defeatists who believe that the European demos is a utopia. Because Europe is divided by languages, religions, cultures and historical experiences. Because it is so difficult to establish even a common European interpretation of its own history.

From a distant perspective, it seems that only a common external threat can consolidate the European demos. In the political and military sense, Russia is undoubtedly a direct threat in the current situation. But if for Russia’s immediate neighbours it is a direct existential threat, for the western parts of Europe it is sometimes still a distant one.

The migration threat has also been perceived in recent years with varying degrees of acceptance. European solidarity was not at all strong in this respect.

Global competition with China will of course not have a consolidation effect.

Another factor in the solidification of the European demos would be the perception of Europe as an instrument for protecting rights in the event of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the policies of their own state. For millions of Poles under the rule of PiS, Europe has become the only hope of defending the independence of the courts, freedom of the media or “cultural and moral” rights. Poles understood that European citizenship gives them the opportunity to appeal to European tribunals, travel to other countries to get married or perform abortions, which were prohibited in Poland. For these Poles, Europe has become the only guarantee of defending their freedom in the face of an authoritarian state.

It is also a significant phenomenon that supporters of local separatisms (Scotland, Catalonia) have become such zealous believers in the idea of European integration. Jean-Marc Ferry recalled that in the 19th century the sense of Europe manifested itself in awakening nations. Denis de Rougemont called nationalism the romantic disease of Europe. Today, separatism is interested in Europe, because the state nations began to be afraid of Europe. It is no coincidence that Polish populist nationalists see the main threat to the country’s sovereignty not in Moscow, but in Brussels.

Francois Heisbourg, who concluded a few years ago that the European demos does not exist and that the federalization of Europe will not take place because it will be stopped by national resistance, at the same time pronounced that the future of Europe is no more certain than the future of the USSR under Gorbachev. He argued that the creation of Kant’s garden of peaceful coexistence does not require transnational mergers (Canada does not unite with the USA living in a peaceful symbiosis, Scandinavian states do not unite state organisms, despite exemplary relations between them). Thus, a better and the only realistic solution would be a kind of utilitarianism, i.e. a pragmatic search for solutions at the supranational level that give better results than attempts at the national level.

But there is one more integration dimension that could be treated as almost a civilizational and historical mission. Europe has become a testing ground for building a cosmopolitan model of world governance. For if the hypothesis that the nation-state exhausts its possibilities is true, that sooner or later it will become an inefficient or even dysfunctional model, then it is necessary to look for ways to fill the gap after its at least partial implosion. And the European Union is a test of such an alternative.

Francis Cheneval, who tried to describe a cosmopolitan model of world governance based on “free, gradual and dynamic integration between peoples who recognize and implement the principles of liberal democracy and are bound by treaties”, concluded that only European integration follows this cosmopolitan logic and eo ipso remains the only experimental field for the effectiveness of this approach.

So Europeans should demonstrate the success of their integration experiment in the name of universalism, which is, after all, an integral part of their identity. The creation of such cosmopolitan unions on a regional scale would be a way to create a peaceful formula for the whole world.

This is how the global mission of European integration should look like. After all, its aim should not be to think in terms of creating a “European empire” along the lines of Carl Schmitt’s idea.

Jean-Marc Ferry proposed a model of “co-sovereignty” as the future of global governance. And he saw it as an opportunity for Europe to show its leadership role. Because he warned that the leadership of Europe cannot be based on the promise of expanding Europe to the whole world. A cosmopolitan global system will, according to him, be the result of “nimesis de plusiereus systeme cosmopolitiques”.

Jeremy Rifkin saw the political future of the world in a similar way. He saw the need to move from globalization to continentalization. He was a supporter of creating political unions in the regions. The EU was the first continental union to emerge. From continentalization, the world would move towards a new Pangea.

Of course, there are various ideas for a new model of the global order breaking with the existing paradigms of the balance of power and cooperation of nation states.

Some want to move towards a quasi world government by strengthening the UN and existing international organizations of a universal character. This would require a fundamental reform of the UN, equipping it with new prerogatives. This is the so-called pragmatic way. Given today’s UN credibility and its organic limitations, the results may turn out to be unsatisfactory.

Another option, promoted by the “federalists” for decades, is the creation of a new governing institution through an agreement between the governments of nation states, based on a world constitution approved by their citizens. In particular, the new institution would take control of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, would have monopoly on coercion and the use of force, control of trade and economic policies on a national scale. This is undoubtedly the most utopian vision of the future.

Another option is to create a confederation of regional integration unions based on the model of the European Union. We described it above.

And finally, the most democratic option is to create a kind of institutional and functional pluriverse in which networks of cooperation of national states, global institutions, cities, regions, and above all, citizens of the world, their unions, organizations and movements would be organically intertwined.

Daniele Archibugi once presented a vision of “The Global Commonwealth of Citizens”. It would be based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for cultural diversity, self-determination of nations, reversing autocratic tendencies in domestic politics, and participatory management of global problems. It is a captivating vision of a cosmopolitan democracy.

Again, however, as before in the case of European integration, the question arises about the strength of global identity. Its absence destroys the chances of building any new global order based on closer global integration.

It is impossible to think about any new model of world management without crystallizing a strong global identity based on something postulated by prof. Coker, i.e. a common human identity of us as human beings.

For years we have argued that global threats strengthen the cosmopolitan conscience. But the nuclear threat even in the West has stopped taking people to the streets. In China, India or Pakistan, the cosmopolitan conscience will not be aroused by the nuclear issue at all.

The climate warming threat has undoubtedly awakened a noticeable global identity among the young generation in the West. But it exerts too little pressure on the political elites in the “global South” countries.

It would seem that a threat as tangible as pandemics, and especially COVID-19, which has not spared any corner of the globe, will become a catharsis for global identity. But in many “Third World” societies, it served only as a pretext to incite anti-Western sentiment. Because the West with its vaccines as an absolute priority took care of its citizens, forgot about the rest and it did not want even to go for cheap licensing. But China and Russia, with their vaccines, which were often accused of being effective at the placebo level, “cared” for the “Third World”.

Of course, there is always the possibility that a common human identity will be awokened in us by an external threat, like the landing of “Martians”, some kind of aggression by an extraterrestrial civilization. Although in science fiction literature, even such situations do not always have a mobilizing effect on Earthlings. Nevertheless, the prospect of such a turning point is still unlikely in reality.

Francis Cheneval suggested generating global solidarity as a revolt against limiting human rights on a national scale. In his understanding, this global solidarity would not even require being based on a uniform ethical and political order.

In fact, building strong supranational institutions and procedures on a global scale to protect the rights of oppressed people is the strongest moral and political premise for building a new world order. Because the current one, based on the absolutization of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, only legitimizes the omnipotence of the nation-state over the citizen.

Well, and in the longer term, what else could become a catalyst for our identity as human beings? Of course, only the rebellion of machines, the emancipation of artificial intelligence turned against people, the rebellion of robots. But more on that a bit later.

Meanwhile, the voice of civil society in global affairs is still very weak. And in reforming the United Nations, this aspect has not yet been duly taken into account. World politics continues to be conducted without listening to the voice of the citizen.