Polish identity has been plagued by the syndrome of provincialism for centuries. And it is a fact that for centuries we have remained outside the centre of civilization development, although the degree of this distance has varied throughout history. Even though we have adopted Latin culture, we treat ourselves as an integral part of the West, we have made unspeakable sacrifices for the West (Poland as the bulwark of Christianity, Poland as the Christ of nations), we consider ourselves to be stuck on the periphery of development. Even today, when all economic and prosperity indicators show that we are catching up like never before, and that these last years are our golden age of development, progressive commentators pronounce a dark verdict: “Poland is not a modern country.” And on quite a large part of the public scene, the ethos of traditional, heroic, martyrdom Poland, a treasure trove of true values, is being swollen and pushed to the sidelines of politics by Western manipulators who see Poland as a threat and greedy loot at the same time, want the annihilation of the Polish state and the transformation of Poland into a country inhabited by Polish-speaking population, but managed from the outside.
Is parochialism our historical ailment, an inevitable fate?
When the Slavs quietly moved to the lands now called Polish, the civilization system was simple. Rome was in the centre. The borders of its empire in Europe were the limits of the civilization gap. The barbarians did not know writing, had no higher culture, technologically they were behind the Romans. The Celts were the closest in civilization to the Romans. The Germans were a few steps lower behind the Celts, but they were successfully displacing them. And in ancient sources, the Slavs are considered pathetically primitive (today we say: regressive) and poor. The Germans travelled with wagons full of possessions during the migration of peoples, while the Slavs always travelled “light”, without material „stuff”. Leading a simple life and doing without comforts, they were able to endure the greatest inconveniences, they were persistent and unbreakable, which undoubtedly ensured their demographic and geopolitical success. In three centuries, without major wars or major disruptions, they occupied almost half of Europe as we know it today.
So, right from the very beginning, we had a huge distance to make up.
Rome fell, the political centre of Europe moved towards Germanic areas, but in the civilizational sense the centre of progress (cultural, civilizational, economic) remained for many centuries in the northern Italian lands (Milan, Florence, Venice, Turin, Genoa, Pisa). Printing was invented elsewhere, but high culture, banks, mercantilism and proto-capitalism spread to Europe from the Italian city republics. In the seventeenth century, however, the centre of development definitely began to shift north. And the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution secured the leadership of the Germanic tribes (English, German, American, with undoubtedly the major participation of the Romanesque French).
In short, there was then a great change of roles in Europe between the centre and the periphery. England, Gaul and Germania, once peripheral for centuries, became the centre of Europe. Only the Slavs were still backward. Why did they fail?
In the descriptions of the early Slavs, one feature struck me: egalitarianism. They lived in partner communities, in small-size huts, without elite strata and even treated prisoners of war generously. Later, when I read analyses that attributed the causes of Polish backwardness to the nobility’s slavish treatment of the remaining part of society, not only the peasants, but especially them, I wondered when and why this genetic egalitarianism of the Slavs shrunk to the limits of the nobility and was drowned out, even leading to social racism, placing peasants as tribally alien to the nobility in their genealogy. Did it come with Catholicism? With the wars and conquests of the first Piasts? Economists say that the enslavement of the propertyless classes is facilitated by a situation when there is too much land to work, there is a lack of technological resources, and the labour force becomes so valuable that the worker must be tied to the land, deprived of his freedom, and especially the right to move. This happened in Poland, in Muscovite Russia, and more recently in America, which practised legal or actual slavery until the end of the 19th century.
I’m not entirely convinced by this theory. But never mind.
We did not take advantage of the opportunity to break the curse of backwardness. And were there such opportunities? We missed the great plague in the 14th century that devastated Europe, and the salt mines gave the last Piast dynasty a financial boost (from a wooden Poland it became a brick Poland). It was possible to catch up. Only that we were militarily burdened by the need to contain the Teutonic Knights, and then the elite dreamed of expansion to the east. And because our urban civilization (trade, services, manufacturing) was ethnically foreign (German), instead of seeing its development as a chance for a civilizational leap (as in Western Europe), it was treated as a source of easy money, without subjective rights. Because they were strangers and couldn’t say correctly: “soczewicę miele młyn”?
The European demand for Polish grain, which we associate with Sigismund’s golden age, became our curse instead of a lever of development, as it perpetuated an economic model based on latifundial agriculture and the exploitation of the peasant, the peasant who had effectively freed himself from feudal ties in the West at that time.
At the beginning of the 17th century, we were spared the Thirty Years’ War. So there was again a chance to shorten the distance towards the West. Unfortunately, we were bled to death by the Khmelnytsky uprising, the Swedish Deluge, the Russian Tsar Alexey I aggression, the Lubomirski revolt, and the Turks. Moreover, the Vasas crushed the Reformation sprouts of free thought into dust. Without Polish Protestants, it was difficult to have a Protestant ethic, and without a Protestant ethic, it was difficult to have a native capitalism. We remained in the chains of backwardness.
The Northern War, in turn, devastated the Polish economy, and the Saxons allowed the Polish state to rot lethargically. Would the heroic attempt at reforms associated with the Four-Year Sejm allow Poland to enter the path of development? I doubt it. The elite behind this was too narrow. The vast majority of society followed Targowica at least mentally. And then Polish lands were just a province of great empires. Provincialism became self-reproducing.
Okay, but why Russia, so civilizationally backward, living in fear and complexes of Poland until the end of the 17th century, managed to build such an empire? Even if it is true that it had feet of clay, but in the Soviet version it was an empire that co-ruled the world. During the Cold War, the world had only two centres of power: Washington and Moscow. So why Russia was successful? Because it had its own (Peter I) or imported (Catherine the Great), but visionary leaders that we lacked? We tried different monarchs: Piasts, Jagiellonians, and other foreigners. Nothing worked out. Maybe it was necessary to choose the Hohenzollerns instead of the Vasas in the 16th century? Protestants? No way!?
Descriptions of the First Polish Republic made by visiting foreigners are full of painful observations.
First of all, foreigners complained about the condition of roads and travel infrastructure. And this was going on for centuries. Poland was mud, puddles, unpaved roads despite lots of stones in the fields (Ulryk von Werdum, 17th century). And in cities where the streets were in better condition, there were cobblestones, stones on the sides and mud inside (Giovanni Paolo Mucante, 16th century). “The roads were bad, the villages few” (William Coxe, 18th century). And where the mud was completely impassable, there were only roads made of fir trunks (N. W. Wrexall, 18th century).
Taking breaks during the journey was also bad. Foreign guests complained about the lack of inns and the poor food there (Gaspard de Tende, 17th century).
And provincial poverty was always visible, “barren lands, poor villages” (K. Celtis, 16th century). Poles lived in miserable cottages and lived there with animals (Ph. Desportes, 15th century). People in the countryside lacked “the most basic things”, there was complete poverty, and they even ate “disgusting” bread (N. W. Wrexhall, 18th century).
This poor nation, however, made a good physical impression. “Poles are usually strong, medium-weight, blond, with light skin. The white-headed people are beautiful, and all of them are quite polite and obedient to their governments. They love foreigners. Like other peoples of the North, they like to drink well and eat a lot. They consider excess to be a virtue, and moderation, shown in company, as hidden anger, so their feasts are often accompanied by quarrels and cutting off noses with sabres or karabelas. They value the most and consider the bravest those who have the most scars on their faces”. (F.B., 17th century).
Poles liked exotic spices and fruits. But they sinned with little love of law and order. Interestingly, their children did not cry much.
Fierceness and explosiveness were associated with Poles already during Mieszko’s time. His subjects were “prone to aggression and violence” (Ibrahim ibn Jacob, 10th century). Yes, we have always been brave and proud.
And we have always been prone to pleasure. “Everyone, both laypeople and clergy, likes a cheerful life… They devote the morning to work, eat dinner late, and two hours later have supper. Then they drink a lot, joke and sing until midnight, and sometimes even until dawn. Then they rest in small beds and narrow, in which you can barely turn around” (Giovanni Paolo Mucante, 16th century).
Visitors to Poland repeatedly emphasized Polish hospitality. “Great lords are noble and wonderful. I knew some who hosted French, Italians and Germans even though they did not know them, and fed them until they found something to do” (Gaspard de Tende, 17th century).
Poles had few books, but they knew foreign languages. Even peasants and children spoke Latin. “The Poles, drawing on Italian sources, brought the splendour of Latin speech to the North and surpassed the Germans and Hungarians” (Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini). In Warsaw it was possible to “get by perfectly well using German, which is common here, as well as French. English is spoken in many homes, and educated ladies also speak Italian” (Johann Erich Biester, 18th century).
Poles always wanted to hear what foreigners thought about them, but they only tolerated opinions that were flattering to them. This tendency to hear compliments about yourself from strangers can still be observed today. “Poles are considered insincere when it comes to speaking favourably about their nation, country, laws and government, because full of self-love they despise what is inconsistent with their customs. To obtain a good reception from them and everything you want, you must praise and flatter them” (F.B., 17th century).
You may agree with these descriptions or not, but even in the most critical ones, we do not see any genetic contraindications to success. Because strangers always notice our endurance, ability to make sacrifices, to endure hardships. Maybe we made up for the lack of organizational habits with improvisation, which was not entirely effective. Perhaps the state and braggarts weakened the ability to act collectively. But no one dared to call Poles lazy and dullards.
The development problem was not the lack of appropriate national characteristics, but the fact that we had never created an efficient state. There was royal power, state institutions (the king, the Sejm, tribunals), there was absolute rule of the nobility on the farm, but there was no state, state spirit, state identity that would organize the community, mobilize it to make investments (such as building bridges, roads and a professional army). A Pole could sacrifice his life for his faith, even for the king, but he did not want to sacrifice himself for the sake of the state. This concept was too abstract. There was no collective state instinct, no collective political imagination. It does not appear to be a birth defect.
Today, no foreigner has the right to complain about Polish roads and infrastructure, Polish houses and narrow beds, Polish food, or the condition of Poles’ wardrobe. Poland looks even better than our prosperity parameters compared to the rich West. But we agree – there is still a long way to modernity in the heads and organization of the state.
It would be an unforgivable mistake to assume, as some progressivists suggest, that it is enough to remove from power nationalist-traditionalist politicians, “Eurasian” political elite, take away their propaganda instruments, silence the church, and the transition to modernity will take place by itself. Wherever you look, you can see a huge gap – in schooling, higher education, scientific research, health care, public administration, courts, prosecutor’s offices, services, police, and spatial planning. And there are so few politicians capable of leading the country towards modernity with imagination and knowledge. And the pressure of circumstances that reduces their talent to small pieces is so enormous.
It is incomparably easier to make up the distance today than ever before. Today the world is flattening. The gap between the centre and the periphery is shrinking. Taking shortcuts is much easier. But of course one need to have adequate elites.
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If Central and Eastern Europe was to suffer from the European provincial syndrome, what to speak of the Balkans? Although Constantinople was a real political centre for several centuries, and it grew on the outskirts of the Balkans. And the Balkans became historically associated with such terms as „Europe’s soft underbelly”, a „powder keg”, a „cauldron”.
I went to Albania in 2014 to take part in a panel discussion about the place of the Western Balkans on the map of Europe and the world. In my speech I chose the greatest possible distance from which I could look at the region – from a civilizational and social perspective. I simply studied the position of the countries in the region in the world rankings prepared by The Economist at that time. I could, of course, refer to the solid UN Human Development Index, but I preferred to choose the criteria myself, which would give me a more insightful picture of the lifestyle of societies. Besides, I have serious reservations about HDI.
The picture that emerged was quite depressing. Well, thirty years after the fall of communism (and the collapse of Yugoslavia), the region was, first of all, still largely dependent on external aid and mired in debt. On the list of countries in the world with the largest amount of aid per head of population, Kosovo was third, Montenegro – 26, Bosnia and Herzegovina – 29, Albania – 34, and Serbia – 42. In terms of foreign debt (in proportion to exports), Serbia was ranked 9, and North Macedonia – 24. Countries of the region ranked even higher in terms of the costs of servicing foreign debt.
Secondly, the region was severely affected by unemployment and emigration. In terms of unemployment rate, North Macedonia ranked 3rd in the world, B&H – 5th, Serbia – 14th, Albania – 28th, and Croatia – 32nd. If we take the youth unemployment rate (up to 24 life), it was a total disaster: B&H – the world leader, North Macedonia – the runner-up, Serbia – 5th, Montenegro – 9th, Croatia – 9th. The ranking of the world countries most affected by the brain drain placed Serbia in 4th place, B&H in 5th place, and North Macedonia – 10th.
And thirdly, it was then a region of an ageing and dying population. The ranking of the slowest population growth made Serbia the 9th country in the world, Croatia – 11th, Montenegro – 15th. In terms of the lowest female fertility rate, B&H was then the leader in the world. North Macedonia was in 8th place. In the ranking of the lowest so-called raw birth rate, B&H was in 3rd place, Serbia was in 5th place, and Croatia was in 15th place. If we take the average age of the population, Croatia was in 13th place, and B&H was in 30th place. The region was the leader in terms of cigarette consumption (Serbia was the world leader at that time), and alcohol.
What gave a fairly good opinion about the region was the fact that these countries ranked quite high in terms of social equality (the Gini coefficient gave Serbia 7th place in the world), low costs of living (Serbia took 17th place in the world), as well as the strength of family relationships (on the list of countries with the lowest divorce rate, B&H was 6, North Macedonia 12, Serbia and Croatia – 22).
It also turned out, based on these world rankings, that these countries lived quite safely at that time (in terms of crime, their only problem was theft). They coped quite well with corruption (Croatia was at the level of the Czech Republic, Montenegro and North Macedonia at the level of Italy, Serbia was better than Greece or Bulgaria, and Kosovo and Albania, although very low, were ahead of Russia) and bureaucratic burdens. And after all, they didn’t look that technologically backward (if, for example, one measured it by mass access to the Internet).
This is how I imagined measuring the distance between the centre of civilization development and the periphery. I leave it to the readers whether after ten years the distance between the Western Balkans and the peak of civilization has decreased or increased. I bet it has diminished in many ways. But a trip there can still cure us, the Poles, of our complexes.
Of course, it was just fun back then. The problem is the great subjectivity of the choice of criteria and the method of measurement, also in the context of HDI. The criteria are usually selected from the centre’s perspective. That is why the criterion of gender equality is so important to the UN. For Afghanistan, Iran or Yemen, this is no criterion. And the criteria are subject to change. In Denmark, for example, the number of cars per family has long ceased to be a measure of prosperity, but in Laos it still is. And more so than 20 years ago.
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More seriously, I was interested in the provincialism syndrome in relation to the way foreign policy was conducted. Provincialism is, of course, something more systemic than our Polish “Negroness”, which a few years ago sparked a public discussion far beyond restaurant tables.
I have seen various peculiarities among the helmsmen and reviewers of Polish foreign policy. During the times of the Polish People’s Republic, I met people hopelessly affected by the vassalism syndrome, an inferiority complex that was difficult to imagine. During the Third Polish Republic, I met followers of (cynical or ideological) bandwagoning. I met blind “Eurasians”. I met the “kings of the suburbs.” But I also had the opportunity to work with people who knew the world and were not afraid of the world, they looked at Poland from a wide horizon.
However, I agree with the thesis that provincialism is our greatest defect when thinking about foreign policy. Talented youth involuntarily take it out of the education and upbringing system. It grows and perpetuates itself in state institutions and public life. I would not make this thesis if I, as a proud representative of the Polish province, had not obsessively fought my own provincialism from my earliest years.
Polish foreign policy and the activities of Polish diplomacy are not grounded and limited by the lack of material and financial resources, the non-superpower status of our own country, dangerous neighbourhood, dependence on Brussels or Washington, but by this provincialism in thought habits, political imagination and ideas. More about it at another occasion.
