Jerzy Andrzejewski in “Miazga”, brilliant in terms of its literary concept but flat in terms of its final shape, refers in his diary to a fragment of the radio broadcast “Afternoon with Youth” from September 1970 and quotes the statement of a young high school student from Warsaw: “Do I see if there is any progress? No. All is the same as it was, only there are more people.”
Such disbelief in the power of change then, of course, resulted from Gomułka’s stagnation. But I see in this honest statement the manifesto of many today’s opponents of progress. Also in the assessment of the international situation and foreign policies.
I had great respect for the apostles of the realistic school of international relations theory, especially Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz or John Mearsheimer, who was close to them. However, the longer I practised realism in diplomatic activities, i.e. I assessed the behaviour of others through the prism of national interests, marginalized the role of the moral factor, and believed that everything was determined by the power of states, the more I became discouraged from realism. What bothered me most about realism was the belief that international politics had been governed by the same laws for centuries, resulting from the depths of human nature, and that nature itself was unchanging. Realism depressed me with the conclusion that politics and the world of politics were one big “deja vu all over again”, re-enacting the same Greek tragedy full of violence, domination, humiliation and suffering in new decorations. It doesn’t matter that neorealists allowed the world to change, but only in relation to the internal development of states, because, according to them, states will always behave in the same way externally.
I grew up in a small-town atmosphere, steeped in genetic traditionalism. The staffage of the Polish People’s Republic was a decorative shell under which the local population practised Polish classical traditionalism on a daily basis. This traditionalism was patriotic to the core, patriarchal, xenophobic (hostile to all manifestations of otherness), envious and prejudiced, nosy and gossipy, insinuating, demanding, quarrelsome and litigious. It was faithful to rituals and traditions, referring to sacred and sanctified values: family, religious, tribal ones. It treated every change as a threat. When it was unable to prevent it, as in the case of the socialist system in Poland, it tried to limit its effects on the traditional lifestyle as much as possible.
In such conditions, every young and sensible person must mature into a natural rebellion against such a rigid identity, imposed from all sides and every day. In my case it became evident quite early.
Memories of the early years allow me to perfectly understand the phenomenon of populist formations in Europe, which, by appealing to traditionalism, mask it with conservatism. When I saw these outspoken provincial teachers in the highest political positions, these arrogant and unfulfilled former academic teachers, these resourceful small-town mayors and village heads in ministerial and corporate positions, these municipal doctors and the suddenly enriched “mushroom farmers” in parliamentary seats , people no matter how educated they were, and not in the first generation, my memory of small-town Polish conservatism came back to me. I perfectly understood the secret of their electoral success, the direction in which they wanted to lead Poland.
Years ago how much I was afraid that I would become one of them, how I wanted to escape from such a fate!
So I won’t lie that since I was a child I have been captivated by the idea of progress and change. Maybe it grew out of this rebellion against traditionalism. I didn’t want to come to terms with the assumption that everything had to be the same, that if something changed it was in a cycle of repetitions, that if it was better, it would certainly be worse again someday, and it was even more irritating when I heard that the “golden age” is already behind us, that at most we will return to paradise perfection after some sort of final judgment, not necessarily a religious one.
So I joined the Marxists who constantly referred to progress in all cases. But I was put off by their arrogance, that they know perfectly well what the future will look like, so there is nothing to discuss with me at all. When I asked how they knew that the future would look like they said, they referred me to Marx, but I couldn’t find any specific visions in his works. I was annoyed by their conclusion that if the future is known, why wait patiently for it, it is better to hasten its arrival and destroy the old world wherever possible. But a new, better world did not want to emerge. The reality did not want to come close to their vision. And their policies took away more and more personal freedom. I could not accept the idea of progress that required me to give up my own freedom.
So I aligned with the liberals. They also believed in progress. And they associated it with the apotheosis of individual freedom. But they recognized that the logic of world development was so all-powerful that progress would happen on its own, maybe faster, maybe slower, but it would happen on its own. There is basically no need to do anything, even when the forces of evil and reaction try to push the world backwards and turn away from the path of development. Just be patient, debate, and don’t get into fights. I couldn’t come to terms with such laziness. I couldn’t accept such passivity. The cringe-mindedness of the liberals, their love for the temperature of “lukewarm tap water”, their inaction in the face of the counter-offensive of the so-called reactionist forces (populists, thugs and dictators) had to lead to my separation from them.
Because, as scientists say, progress is spontaneous. However, counterattacks against it are well-organized, conscious and full of mobilization (see Putin).
I remained a liberal but a mercurial one. This means that for me, personal freedom, dignity and civic subjectivity will always be the primary good. And since I do not actively change the international and diplomatic reality, being retired, my understanding of progress is more and more missionary and calls for bold and courageous actions.
Liberalism, as practised for years, deservedly fell into crisis. In 2023, in the New York Times, Ross Douthat proposed its renewal. Because what would replace liberalism? In America, the choice is poor: either Trumpism or Wokeism. There are certainly more ideological currents in Europe that could be enumerated, but most of them run dry, such as the classically understood socialism, conservatism, nationalism or environmentalism. And they are repulsively epigonic. It is not without reason that someone once called today’s political ideologists “second hand dealers in ideas”. Nowadays, ideological clothes can only be purchased in second-hand shops.
Douthat proposed finding a fraternal idea for liberalism with which it could be married. Because liberalism flourished when it had a chance to act synergistically. In the 19th century, liberalism was combined with nationalism. In the USA, liberalism was creatively combined with Protestantism. In twentieth-century Europe, liberalism had to be infused with ideals of social justice. The point is to find a new version of the “liberalism plus” formula.
The only desirable possibility, at least in my opinion, is to harness liberalism into a new universalism, into a new pangeism, into a new empathetic cosmopolitanism.
Today, it is not easy to say that the world is better, that we have never had it so good and that it will be even better. Because of wars, coups, dictatorships, persecution of people, political prisoners, censorship, migrations, epidemics, growing income disparities, climate change. It would take a long time to list our plagues. There is a lot of fatalism in the West. It’s not new. Let’s remember Spengler. And I also remember what happened in the 1970s. Socialist propaganda delighted in quotes from outstanding studies, reports and statements by Western authorities about the crisis the West was in and how close its end was. After all, the Trilateral Commission in 1975 announced that Western countries would become unable to exist and be managed. This was supposedly due to the disintegration of the civil order, the stupefaction of leaders and the alienation of citizens. Today, these diagnoses can be even darker.
So I also keep books by Johan Norberg and Steven Pinker at hand and reach for them when these cascades of dystopian predictions start to get me down. These books have proven without a doubt that we live in the best possible era in human history. In my opinion, this is still the era of early civilization, it is still a time of darkness, but our era is a quantum leap forward compared to the past years, and also those that happened so recently.
People live longer, are physically fitter, and cope better with diseases, including pandemics. They are smarter, have a higher IQ (Flynn effect). They eat better. There are still those who are dying of malnutrition or hunger, but it is the inefficient local administration that is to blame, not the food shortage. They live better and do not die from cold. They are better educated. 90 percent people in the world can read and write. Women’s emancipation has reached unprecedented heights, although not everywhere. Minorities can count on greater tolerance, people with disabilities on greater empathy. And there is less violence in the world. Interstate violence has been at record lows for decades, although this is undoubtedly no consolation for Ukrainians. Civil wars and violent upheavals still occur, but much less than in the 1990s. The number of criminal offences is decreasing. We have been however slower, as Pinker once showed, in reducing domestic violence. Also in the rich West.
And contrary to the common thesis that moral wisdom is non-cumulative, our ethical standards have increased significantly.
Those interested in statistics and facts can refer to Pinker and Norberg. They will find that the deeper they immerse themselves in their narrative, the easier it will be to find evidence that things are better, that the world is changing for the better. Malcontents will always say that what does it mean – “for the better”. Because mass depressions in the West, family breakdown, loneliness, and, for example, secularization – all this is progressing. And fewer and fewer people (in proportion to the entire population) believe in God and pray to him. Is that supposed to mean “for the better”? Answering yes is a trap. It turns out that you can make progress without divine support.
In my professional life, the everyday question was: how to measure progress in international relations. There was no shortage of ready-made answers: a decline in violence and threats to use force, an increase in the number of treaties and other international legal instruments regulating the behaviour of states, the growth of international institutions mitigating the state and egoism of states and forcing cooperation, and the increasing international responsibility of states and their leaders for their internal policies. And so on and the like.
Contrary to what orthodox realists say, the world has moved forward, even though the international environment is still structurally anarchic.
For me, the aspect of the substance of the relations was more important than the civilized form that international relations were taking. The key to assessing progress from my point of view is to what extent foreign policy is subject to moral evaluation, how big is the gap between utilitarian morality (“Kali’s principle”), which has always governed the foreign policy of states, and the morality of the Kantian imperative of duty (which dominates in ethics inside every tribe). As you know, in my view of the world, the bearer of the moral factor in international relations is the citizen, the human individual. I therefore measure progress in international relations by its influence on international politics. For me, the vector of progress is an empathetic, just, civic and cosmopolitan community. Oh, it’s still far away, I admit, barely looming on the edge of the horizon.
Bold ideas in international political discussions undoubtedly trigger violent reactions that reveal the emotions of the participants in these discussions. How many times have I, in my modest and ultimately marginal arguments, recalled the descriptions given by Albert Hirschman in his “The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy” about the ways in which progress is hampered by conservative, if not even regressive, reflexes?
The first response is the perversity thesis, i.e. an attempt to prove that a bold idea, instead of solving the problem, will make it worse. Global supranational institutes, instead of strengthening the international community’s ability to act, would introduce an additional bureaucratic factor complicating action and cause new tensions, this time between institutions and nation states. And instead of promoting democracy in the world, it would lead to the establishment of a new level of authoritarian bureaucracy, deprived of a social mandate. It would weaken nation states, which are the only real instruments for ensuring political stability.
The second argument of the reaction is the futility of actions. An attempt to strengthen the transnational dimension in global governance would, according to this logic, end in total failure. There would be a diffusion of responsibility, a leadership deficit. Fake actions would cover up the general stagnation, and nation states would be forced to take rescue measures on their own.
And the third line of contestation against bold ideas is the thesis that the risk is too high if they are implemented. Reactionaries do not question the sense of change, but argue that their implementation would be too expensive, the world is not yet ready for it, and it would raise public expectations that no one would be able to meet. In fact, it could lead to the collapse of the entire international order.
Compare the above with what right-wing politicians say about the ideas for reforming the European Union. Sounds familiar? Now imagine if similar ideas had a global dimension. A country like Poland can exit from the European Union if it does not like the direction of progress the EU is taking, but can it exclude itself from the global community? Just like Russia or China? Unless together with the USA. Then it would be different?
Supporters of progress today limit the horizon of their own imagination. They embed their ideas in the deep rut of existing reforms. They agree to the need for evolutionary, gradual, balanced, responsible, real, verifiable and consensus changes.
Such shackled pragmatism shines through in the grand reports preparing the UN’s “Summit for the Future.” In the Panel document discussed here a few months ago, the chapter on the so-called pre-emptive action focuses only on four issues: climate change, managing biological and health risks, managing new technologies and combating cross-border crime. No references to geopolitical or global-social challenges. The proposed steps include further summits, regulatory agreements, road maps and institutions (including those worthy of support, such as an independent global body for monitoring health challenges). However, you won’t find any new quality here. They are just following the same proven groove.
Until the “black swan” comes and destroys the comfortable groove. Has it come?
