Polish autarky proponents are, of course, fully aware that today, in times of globalization, isolationism may be merely a desperate attempt to preserve the possibility of unwavering control over society.
Globalization breaks down barriers and borders. States inevitably intensify their contacts with the world. It is more and more difficult to oppose to integrate with the world. Zygmunt Bauman once predicted that new wars of the globalization era would inevitably break out. They will be waged against those who resist globalization. Globalization, however, does not need forceful methods for its expansion. Undoubtedly, its impact on the sovereignty of states raises serious concerns. The emergence of the virtual dimension of interpersonal interactions is undermining the traditionally understood state control over the behaviour of its citizens. For several years now, the tendency of many countries to virtually separate their citizens from the world has been strengthening. China is, of course, a pioneer and the leader in the construction of digital walls. But more and more countries are considering tightening the mechanisms of control over information flows in the virtual world, and especially over data on their own citizens. In reality, however, separating oneself from the world is more and more difficult.
The mild dimension of isolationism still applies in the politics of many countries. It is related to the understanding of the tasks of foreign policy. It manifests itself in the restraint in taking external commitments. Its systematized political or legal form is neutrality or non-alignment. Many smaller countries want to control (and limit) the inflow of foreign investments (not only related to the purchase of land or real estate) for fear of losing economic sovereignty. Isolationism can manifest itself in various forms of protectionism. Light isolationism can be understood and must be respected.
But isolationism, which is no longer benign, but fundamental, makes the cut off from the world an element of oppressive policy towards its own citizens. It is an expression of the will to maintain internal order and ideological cohesion. It concerns totalitarian states. And foreign policy is to be a shell that protects the internal situation against any external interference.
Isolationism as a doctrine of foreign policy, assuming limiting contacts with the outside world and limiting participation in international life, requires certain basic conditions to be met. Relative economic self-sufficiency is essential for its effectiveness. Otherwise, it exposes citizens to sacrifices regarding their standard of living and can even bring starvation. The lack of real threats to security (or the ability to neutralize them on its own) should also be required, which in the case of some countries may even lead to the use of nuclear blackmail as an argument in security policy (DPRK).
In the years 1978-199 isolationism was practised in Albania. After World War II, until the end of the 1950s, Albania was a loyal member of the Soviet bloc (a member of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact). In 1958, however, it backed China in a dispute with the Soviet leadership over the concept of a peaceful coexistence. It had also problems with the USSR accepting then the legitimacy of the Yugoslav path to socialism and with Khrushchev’s course on rebuilding relations with Tito. It took the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation as a blow to its own sense of security.
At the congress of the Romanian Labour Party in 1958, the Albanian delegation was the only one to refuse to support the declaration of the communist parties of the Soviet bloc condemning China. When the USSR began to withdraw its advisers and withhold the promised aid (grain supplies), it accepted Chinese support and from 1960 on, in a political sense, it walked together with China. The Soviets were doctrinally proclaimed as “treacherous revisionists” in Tirana. However, Chinese sponsorship was not able to compensate for being cut off from the USSR’s aid. The country was plunging into poverty. Albania finally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968.
Albania served for years as an easy (and proxy) target of propaganda attacks by socialist states (like Romania) when they wanted to avoid directly criticizing China.
Albania did not cut itself off from the rest of the world and remained in the ranks of the United Nations, and even played the role of China’s spokesman there until the Communist China took over its legimate seat occupied after 1945 by the Taiwanese authorities. However, it refused to participate in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Albania only joined it in 1991.
But the pro-Chinese orientation had to come to an end as well. The break with China actually began in 1976, when Albania criticized the new post-Maoist leadership of China. Tito’s visit to China also made the Albanians angry. In 1978, China stopped providing aid to Albania.
Albania then opted for full autarky. It was duly reflected in the legislation of the country. Albania renounced any financial aid from capitalist and revisionist countries.
Autarky served the purpose of arousing nationalist sentiments. And nationalism was supposed to legitimize socialism. Enver Hoxha proclaimed “building socialism on one’s own.” Which ended with great national relief in 1991. And today, here you are, Albania is even a NATO member. And it will inevitably join the European Union.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has followed consistently (and continues to this day) the isolationist path. There, the doctrine of “Juche” became the ideological basis of isolationism. “Juche” in Korean means a “subject”, that is, the postulate of treating the nation subjectively. “Man, the master of his own destiny” is the starting slogan of the doctrine. But its political conclusion was that the masses needed a “great leader.”
Kim Il-Sung mentioned the Juche term for the first time in 1955, although it was not until 1963 that he formulated its first three canonical principles: independence in politics, economic independence and defence independence.
Initially, the Juche doctrine was treated as the national version of Marxism-Leninism. Towards the mid-1970s, the doctrine (already supplemented with the principle of ideological independence) lost all connection with Marxism. It became the catalyst and the binder of ultranationalism. For this reason alone, attempts to export it failed. Only Madagascar showed some form of interest in the 1970s.
In the international arena, the DPRK did not shy away from contacts. It was active in international organizations. It tried to maintain proper relations with all socialist states. It did not take sides in the China-Russia dispute. In 1975 it joined the non-aligned movement. It actively developed military cooperation with selected partners (e.g. in the field of ballistic missiles and nuclear technologies with Pakistan). But its autarky has left society with a progressive cachexia bordering on genocide. Had it not been for aid from China, the North Korean state would have collapsed long ago.
From 1953, Poland was a member of the Supervisory Commission of Neutral States on the Korean Peninsula. And the DPRK’s ambassadors to Poland, especially Kim Pyong Il, the stepbrother of the “beloved leader” and “beloved commander,” Kim Jong Il, the son of the Great Leader, could have played with us by hinting on the possibility of taking advantage of the hospitality of Warsaw, if there were contacts that would normalize relations with the USA. Even when President Trump decided to arrange a meeting with Kim Jong Un.
In 2015, as the director of the Asia-Pacific Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I had the opportunity to hear interesting theses of the DPRK ambassador Ri Geon on the matter of a possible Poland’s role.
Nothing came of the Trump-Kim contacts in the long run and nothing could come out. And North Korean society was plunging into poverty and oppression. The oppressive isolationism of the DPRK has become a moral challenge to the world. Not to help people who are suffering badly is morally difficult, but helping to help the regime last may seem even worse. China has no such reproach. The division of the Peninsula serves their geopolitical interests. And without pressure from China, the regime can go on and on.
Burma (Myanmar) practiced isolationism for almost half a century. In 1962, a military coup took place there, and the generals led by Ne Win dressed the military dictatorship in the costume of socialism. Both the USSR and China backed the coup. The power was exercised by the Burmese Socialist Progress Party, and the goal of politics was the “Burmese road to socialism”. Comprehensive nationalization was carried out, a one-party political system was established, censorship was introduced and contacts with foreign countries were limited (nationals of the country had to apply for exit visas, and visas for foreigners were issued for a maximum stay of 24 hours).
But the socialist rhetoric did not convince Moscow. Although it morally supported independence movement in Burma, and the father of Burmese independence, Aung San, was even in his youth an activist of the communist movement (from which he was removed) and was always influenced by the socialist idea. In the Kremlin, Burma was not included in the group of socialist countries, or even in the group of countries with a socialist orientation. The USSR supported the generals discreetly. Quite a few Burmese students and specialists gained their qualifications in the USSR. And the sinophobia that was felt in Burma over time, ruled out support from China. Even though at the start of independence, China extended to Burma tangible help.
Burmese socialism collapsed in 1988. The dictatorship shed its ideological robes. In 1990, the generals ventured into an election which they lost. However, they did not recognize the results and ruled until the controlled transfer of power in 2011. But they were unable to stay in the shadow of the civilian power for a long time. In early 2021, they carried out another coup.
China and Russia blocked the British draft Security Council resolution condemning the coup. ASEAN turned out to be powerless to exert pressure, although Myanmar joined the organization in 1997.
There will be no return to isolationism in the previous edition, however. But again, there is a moral challenge: how to deal with a regime that ignores signals of condemnation from the world, and is even subject to sanctions, even if only personal, against the leaders of the junta?
In Europe, the challenge in 2020 was even more urgent: the actions of the Lukashenka regime. Over the years, the behaviour of the West was strongly influenced by the thesis that the greater the isolation of Belarus, the more inclined it is to integrate with Russia, even to the point of losing its independence. This dilemma was an easy cover for failure to draw fundamental conclusions from the failure of any attempts to establish dialogue with Lukashenka. After mass protests and unprecedented repressions by the regime in 2020, this dilemma has lost its relevance. There is no way other than the consistent ostracism of Lukashenka. Because Belarusians, in their protest against Lukashenka, became a state nation, with their own identity and self-awareness. By allowing the territory of Belarus to be used to attack Ukraine, Lukashenka put himself totally in the hands of Putin. Any integration movements with Russia, washing away the remnants of Belarus’ political and economic independence, will not, however, reverse the civic identity of the Belorussian society. And it will be irrevocably liberated from the anhedonia imposed on it by Lukashenka.
Politicians advocating isolationism today (usually under the right slogans of defending the sovereignty of the state and the identity of the nation) show fears of the future and may be suspected of even dictatorial intentions. Wake up, young people, before your smartphone is cut off.
