Russia’s defeat in Ukraine, its political, military and economic prostration would create an opportunity for a fundamental reconstruction of geopolitical parameters in the post-Soviet space, including in the South Caucasus. For this to happen, it is necessary not only to establish a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also for Turkey to act responsibly. One of the essential elements of such responsible policy should be bringing about Turkish-Armenian reconciliation.
In Turkish foreign policy, Pavlov’s reflex is to temporarily freeze relations with countries that recognize the Armenian genocide. Sometimes the freeze is deeper, sometimes shallower, sometimes it is only about the tone of the leaders’ statements, as was the case in 2021 after President Joe Biden’s statement honouring the victims of genocide. Biden was sent to take lessons in history, but Turkey could not afford more pouting, because it had managed to spoil its relations with the Americans anyway. Turkey tolerates statements that refer to the tragedy of the Armenians, but the use of the very term “genocide” automatically releases the state of offense in the authorities, lèse-majesté multiplied.
This Turkish dysphoria also affected relations with Poland. In April 2005, the Polish Sejm commemorated the Armenian genocide. Speaker of the Sejm Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz proceeded the resolution suddenly, without discussion and by acclamation. Which, from the Turkish point of view, was the most painless procedure anyway, considering that the declaration could not be stopped. The Turks grew grumpy. They issued a statement, canceled scheduled meetings and visits. We knew that after six months the anger would pass, and it did as predicted. But, because of the importance of the partner, we made conciliatory gestures in the meantime. I accompanied, among others, Minister Rotfeld when he tried to rebuild bridges with Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul during the NATO ministerial session in Vilnius. However, they remembered Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. And when he ran for the post of Secretary General of the Council of Europe in 2009, they used the parliamentary resolution as a pretext not to vote for him. Because the true reasons were different, political.
As the Polish ambassador to the Council of Europe in 2009 I fully devoted myself to Cimoszewicz’s election campaign. It cost me a sea of sweat, a lot of sour frustration, but it gave me an insight into the most inaccessible secrets of doing election campaigns in international organizations.
A representative of the management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed me about the intention to submit a Polish candidacy 48 hours before the deadline. And the official did not want to reveal the name of our possible candidate. It didn’t look like an excess of trust in me, but never mind, because it was primarily a self-attack against the candidate himself. Did someone want him to lose from the beginning? If I had known that this candidate was to be Cimoszewicz, I would categorically advise against it. The Polish candidate could be put forward, but not at the last moment, when the two leading political camps in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, that is socialists and conservatives (EPP), had already identified their favorites. And not a socialist, because the EPP, as the largest parliamentary group, wanted to regain the SG position after 5 years. Our candidate was proposed by the Polish coalition government whose parties were part of the EPP faction. That is, the Polish EPP members were proposing a socialist candidate in opposition to the already internally anointed EPP candidate – Luc van den Brande. When, after the official submission of the candidacy of Cimoszewicz, a certain Polish first-league politician, already retired at that time, asked me about the chances of our candidate, I answered honestly: “5 percent. But if we manage to block Van den Brande in the Committee of Ministers, our chances will increase to 40 percent. ”
Van den Brande did not receive a recommendation from the Committee of Ministers at ambassadorial level (and normally this should eliminate him from the race), but of course he did not want to accept it. He sent the Belgian foreign minister himself to Madrid to the ministerial session in April 2009 on a deathly fight to stop the decision eliminating Van den Brande. And he was doing a mole job under the Polish candidacy, describing Cimoszewicz as a Polish sabotage within the Christian Democrats. And it happened even in a situation when the Polish election priority was to ensure the election of Jerzy Buzek for the position of the president of the European Parliament. Cimoszewicz loyally announced that he would withdraw his candidacy if it could complicate Buzek’s election. Fortunately, it didn’t complicate things. Van den Brande did not resign until the end, he surrendered only on the evening before the final vote in the Parliamentary Assembly in September 2009. However, when he called on his faction to vote for Cimoszewicz, hardly anyone obeyed him, so earlier they were confused by his attacks on Cimoszewicz.
Working with our candidate during the campaign was a pleasure in every respect. We have developed a detailed and blockbuster program. Cimoszewicz’s final counter-candidate – Jagland, after being elected, began to implement this program (including in the budgetary and administrative spheres), because he simply did not have his own ideas. And Cimoszewicz himself performed better from every campaign meeting to another, arousing panic among rivals dying out in gray.
But as the saying goes: what will you do if you cannot do anything, what will you do? The fact that the Turks did not want our candidate was not surprising, because he was a genuine threat to countries that were increasingly out of line with the standards of the Council of Europe in the field of the rule of law and democracy. A “dark alliance” was formed, led by Turkey and Russia, to which smaller and larger supporters of a more understanding view of their murderous or mafia policies (the Yanukovich region party, the ruling kleptocrats in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the cacique Balkan leaders) narrowed down to it. And the counter-candidate, Thorbjorn Jagland, did not hide his sympathy for Erdogan and Putin. He was supported by socialists and communists, known for their factional discipline. After all, what kind of socialist and post-communist Cimoszewicz was, if he was proposed by the Christian Democrats?
Additionally, some decision-makers and officials at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided that the election of Cimoszewicz was almost a foregone conclusion, because there were so many declarations of support. And they did not do much in terms of programming and lobbying. As if they did not know that in similar elections, when parliamentarians decide, and not governments, such declarations cost little. So they began to fall into a waggery, and sometimes even levitate. And for me, despite the fact that the Permanent Representation in Strasbourg did most of the substantive and lobbying work, I was accused of defeatism. I actually predicted (even calculated precise numbers) the result of the vote. Cimoszewicz clearly lost. It was not the first time that a better candidate has lost. After more than a decade, it can only be confirmed with even greater conviction that it was a great pity for the Council of Europe.
Until now, Turkey has not normalized relations with Armenia. The 1915 Armenian genocide is a historical fact. Up to one and a half million Armenians died then in pogroms, massacres, deportations, and hunger marches. These facts are well documented. They inspired Rafał Lemkin to develop a convention against genocide. It was from the tragedy of the Armenians that the very term genocide was born.
Turkey’s official circles are still stuck in denial. The current doctrine does not question the death and dislocation of Armenians. It treats it as part of the common sufferings of the inhabitants of Turkey during World War I – diseases, hunger, understates the size, and looks for justification in the disloyalty of the Armenians. Most Western countries have adopted political declarations (and even legal acts) commemorating the Armenian genocide. However, not all of them. For some of them, the current requirements of a proper relationship with Turkey prevail over paying tribute to the victims of history. The case of Israel is interesting in this regard. Several attempts by the Knesset to pass a resolution regarding the Armenian genocide have failed. The Holocaust was undoubtedly a special case, but not the only act of genocide in the contemporary history of the world. Israel’s silence on this matter takes on an ambiguous meaning.
Turkey’s resistance to facing history is not an isolated incident. To this day, the Koreans and the Chinese await apologies from Japan for the crimes committed against these nations. But Turkey is a case of total constipation by the culprit. And the historical blockade is compounded by the complications of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
Turkey recognized Armenia’s independence in 1991 but it did not establish diplomatic relations. In 1993, due to the Karabakh conflict, it closed its land borders with Armenia. It introduced a trade embargo. At the beginning of this millennium, it lifted the restrictions on the entry of Armenian citizens. And there are tens of thousands of them as tolerated economic migrants. Air flights between the two countries were also allowed. Trade is carried out via “double” bills of lading in order to avoid the Turkish embargo.
In October 2009, after two years of intensive negotiations, the so-called the Zurich protocols were agreed upon, which provided for a gradual normalization of relations. However, the Turkish authorities, under the apparent pressure of Azerbaijan, made their entry into force dependent on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Armenia waited, waited, until it declared the protocols invalid in 2018.
The 44-day war in 2020 in Nagorno-Karabakh complicated relations even more. Armenia accused Turkey of direct military involvement on the Azerbaijani side. There were calls for a complete boycott of Turkish goods. However, the Armenian authorities sent a clear signal of readiness to talks with Turkey on the normalization of relations in 2021. Negotiations are progressing. But Turkey makes progress dependent on the Azeri-Armenian peace settlement. At the beginning of October 2022 the first in almost 13 years Armenian-Turkish summit took place.
In Turkey, there are still concerns that the recognition of the Armenian genocide will result in claims for damages, restitution of property (of the Armenian Church), and other reparations. The possibility of changing the boundaries should be ruled out. The Armenian authorities have come to terms with the provisions of the Kars Treaty (of 1921), which left Western Armenia (that is, most of the former ethnic Armenian territory) within the borders of Turkey. Even if some Armenian politicians (not only from the ranks of the Dashnaktsyutsyun Party) may argue that Armenia was not sovereign then, and that the Turks themselves violated the Treaty by blocking Armenia. It is true that Molotov made demands to the Turks to revise the borders in June 1945, demanding the “return” of the Kars, Ardagan and Artwin regions. At the end of the 1960s, the Soviets tried to negotiate with the Turks an equivalent transfer of the border area of Ani (with the ruins of the historic capital of Armenia), but without success.
The European Union has not made Turkey’s recognition of the Armenian genocide a condition in the accession negotiations with Turkey. But it feels like a depository of historical reconciliation in Europe. So it’s a pity. Another example of a lack of European consistency.
Campaign for Cimoszewicz in the premises of the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the Council of Europe