In October 2022, Josep Borrell, speaking on the occasion of the launch of the pilot program of the EU Diplomatic Academy in Bruges, likened Europe to a wonderful garden where everything blooms, everything is trimmed and raked nicely, everything works as it should. The rest of the world he called a jungle. The jungle is trying to take over the garden, to break into it. Gardeners have to face it, go out into the jungle, prevent the invasion that destabilizes their ecumene. With his comparison, Borrell provoked a lot of accusations of violating the principles of political correctness, of paternalism, condescension, and even of adhering to the stereotypes of Western civilizational supremacy. Rightly so. But he didn’t say anything revealing. In a scientific form, this dichotomy was described as far back as 2004 by Robert Cooper in his widely studied publication „The Breaking of Nations”.
The European Union indeed has become an unquestionable symbol of the Kantian (peaceful) garden, where disputes are resolved through dialogue and compromise, where the law rules and citizens enjoy prosperity. On the other hand, large swathes of the world have been associated with the Hobbesian jungle, where the law of the stronger applies, the power determines the outcome of the dispute, everyone fights with everyone else, homo homini lupus est.
There is no doubt that the European Union has ensured peaceful coexistence among its constituent nations. The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Union in 2021 is an expression of recognition for the effectiveness of the integration formula in eliminating war as a means of resolving conflicts on the European continent.
The further strategy of the development of the European Union as a peace project suggests itself: let us cultivate and expand the “Kantian garden”.
The enlargement of the European Union is therefore necessary not so much for ensuring the vitality of the Union itself, but for the expansion of the zone of peace and stability, which the Union uses as a peace project. The inclusion of the entire Western Balkans in the EU, its expansion by Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) and even the South Caucasus (at least Georgia and hopefully Armenia) are basically strategically decided. But always the enlargement will have its limits. No reasonable person postulates that the EU’s strategy for ensuring peace in the world should be its boundless expansion.
Cultivating the “Kantian garden” remains a constant task. The Union as an integration project requires constant impulses. It’s like riding a bicycle. Without pedalling, sooner or later we will fall down. And the threat of fall, when looking at the successes of anti-EU populists in Hungary, Poland, Italy, Germany, France and Spain, has increased in recent years. The Recovery Plan (“Hamiltonian moment”) pushed the Union forward, but the slogans of returning to the idea of “Europe of Homelands” are disturbing. Because the Union cannot be rolled up in a controlled manner. It can only be pushed into the tracks of self-destruction. The ambitious Conference on the Future of Europe launched in 2021 has not brought yet any real effects in EU legislation and practice. The European Parliament used its conclusions as a pretext for suggesting deep systemic political reforms in the European Union in 2023. Without a serious follow-up yet. Perhaps Ukraine’s accession will force deeper changes in the EU. They are long overdue.
Cultivating and expanding the “Kantian garden” is one side of the coin, the other is the need to stop the expansion of the “Hobbesian jungle”, clearing it up and taming it. Borrell talked about the need to go out into the jungle, but the problem is more urgent, because it is the “jungle” that goes to the “garden”, it threatens it with direct aggression. It is difficult to interpret the actions of Russia and Belarus in the immediate vicinity of the EU in a different way.
In terms of defence, the Union still lacks a clear strategic vision. In the security sphere, the European integration project is not tied to a precise „finalité”” vision. The central question for „finalité” is whether the Union is to become an institution of collective defence.
There is no uniform answer to this question among the members of the Union, and there will be no one in the near future. The Strategic Compass adopted in 2022 does not provide any precise guidelines. The EU operates with a vague notion of ‘strategic autonomy’. As one can guess, it is about autonomy from NATO, from the United States.
The war in Ukraine has shown that Europe without the United States cannot cope with serious threats from its neighbourhood. The United States took the lead in supporting Ukraine and pulled Europe in the political response to the Russian threat. Also in the military sense, it was the United States that made the strongest move with military assistance to the EU’s flank states and support for Ukraine (only now Europe takes the lead also because of the internal long paralysis on the question of military support to Ukraine in Washington). And the Europeans, even if they wanted to, could not convey then much to the Ukrainians. Because they had the army more for show than for real use.
There were voices in Poland (and in some other countries in the region) that the EU’s common defense policy should be abandoned. It should be abandoned not only as an illusory vision, but also as a harmful vision, because it questions the sense of American guarantees for Europe’s security. And only US guarantees have real value.
An attempt to create the illusion of Europe being able to manage itself without an American protectorate in security matters, the fantasy of European defensive self-sufficiency, such an approach is seen as provocative in many countries, not only in Poland.
Paradoxically, however, Russia’s defeat in Ukraine, its military humiliation, could become a historical opportunity for the Union to achieve a state of defense independence. Because if Ukraine could cope (with the material and financial support of the West) with the Russian threat, why would Europe itself, strengthened by Ukraine’s membership, not feel safe in the face of Russian adventurism? And Russia’s defeat with its political (disintegration) and economic (technological collapse, etc.) consequences would make Russia an incapacitated state. With such a threat (even taking into account the nuclear factor), the European Union could manage without absorbing the United States. And the United States could focus on the main global threat, which is China. A significant part of the American elite would undoubtedly agree to such a scenario. But even in Paris no one has the courage to talk about it today.
The European Union included in its documents (Lisbon Treaty) substitutes of allied commitments. Art. 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union talks about mutual assistance, Art. 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union introduced the so-called solidarity clause. The Strategic Compass confirmed that these commitments of assistance and support by the members of the Union “by all means in their power” are inscribed in the context of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Therefore, they cannot be equated with allied commitments within NATO. In the event of a threat from Russia, it so happens that all the so-called flank (front) countries of the European Union are members of NATO. So in the event of aggression against these countries, NATO will act. Support and assistance under EU treaty provisions will be complementary and will not be subject to existential verification of their credibility.
But how would EU members behave if the aggression concerned a non-NATO member, such as Cyprus or Malta? What if Turkey used military force against Greece in a bilateral dispute? Turkey’s leaders have publicly told EU members to remain neutral in these disputes. In the summer of 2022, some of the Turkish statements were very irritating, and Greece even indicated that the lack of an appropriate response from the EU risked repeating the Ukrainian scenario.
Well, someone will say, why the EU needs defense self-sufficiency, if there is no threat of American isolationism (even with the return of Trump to power in Washington?) and the US will not quickly abandon Europe, if only because of global politics?
The aim of the Union remains to strengthen its own political role in the world. It is impossible to conduct a coherent foreign policy without its security component. Of course, such a truncated policy may be pursued. It can take the form of global neutrality, but certainly no activist foreign policy is possible without the instruments of security policy. Remaining an American security protectorate, Europe cannot claim to be an independent pole in the global system. So if we agree to see Europe as a collective political player, we must develop its defense identity.
So far, actions within the Union have been pragmatic. The seeds of cooperation and common institutions were created without deciding what this would ultimately lead to. Military peacekeeping and stabilization missions in the world were developed, planning staffs were formed, and a framework for technological and industrial cooperation in the field of defense was created. A target of 5,000 troops capable of rapid deployment was announced. International battlegroups were formed. Systemic decisions were made that allow cooperation in a narrower group, such as PESCO. But the real defense cooperation of Europeans took place within NATO. For military commanders and military planners in many EU countries, defense cooperation within the European Union was a secondary, marginal, and sometimes even distracting complement to the primary coordination effort that was conducted within NATO. To make things look good some politicians invented the concept of an organic division of roles between NATO and the EU: NATO focusing on defense while the EU concentrating on expeditionary missions.
So the key question for the European Union’s ability to provide its members with security guarantees within the EU framework boils down to whether it can be imagined without an integrated command, without a common armed force (a European army), without a “Europeanised” nuclear umbrella. It would be fair to say that it is impossible to imagine it without a clear answer to the above questions. NATO may remain a credible guarantor of security without the need to create a common army and a common nuclear umbrella, but this is due to the decisive role of the American military potential. Europe without a common army and the “Europeanization” of the French nuclear deterrent will not be self-sufficient in stopping the Russian threat. Britain’s exit from the EU made the discussion on these matters easier, but the critical mass for a breakthrough in thinking about defending Europe is still nowhere to be seen. Even such seemingly simple ideas as the appointment of a defense commissioner or a Defense Council have yet to break through. Responsibility for the lack of progress rests primarily with France and Germany. It is still easy for them to deflect this accusation by pointing to the obstruction of Danes or Poles, but it is this so-called the “engine” of integration which is to blame for the lack of readiness for a bold comprehensive strategy to transform the Union into a defense alliance. Because, of course, a common army (even a legion) without the determination to use it to defend each member state can only be of an expeditionary nature and to a limited extent, and a common army engaged in defending members without linking it to the full spectrum of deterrence, i.e. also to a nuclear deterrent may be of limited use likewise.
And what about the United States? They should not only tolerate such development of the European Union, but also actively support it. After the end of the Cold War, the US thought at least three times about giving Europeans more responsibility for Europe’s security. Europe has not been able to rise to the occasion. And the European alliance as an autonomous pillar of NATO would undoubtedly serve this purpose. And, one can hope, it would mobilize Europeans to make more financial contributions to their own defence.
For years, it has been argued that the inclusion of the European Union as an alliance in the NATO guarantee system is like squaring the circle. Only people with little political imagination can think like that. Because it is possible to combine both systems of commitments and military integration, even taking into account the specificity of countries that still consider themselves neutral, such as Austria. It is, of course, a challenge to overcome Turkey’s stagnant resistance in NATO to the creation of the so-called European pillar (and the resistance of Cyprus in the EU to the Turkish droit de regard). These are not systemic problems.
Poland should unequivocally stand in favor of an EU alliance based on a common army. There is no doubt that it is the Polish armed forces, together with the Ukrainian ones, that would form the backbone of the European land forces. And that would give it the right, like France’s nuclear status and expeditionary potential, and Germany’s status as Europe’s cash dispenser, to play a special role in managing the European defense alliance.
Being able to achieve relative self-sufficiency in self-defense, Europe would play a much greater role in the projection of security outside, as an agent of collective security both in Europe and in the wider world (at least in the part adjacent to Europe).
