The gap between the Kantian garden and the Hobbesian jungle is growing. How should the inhabitants of the Kantian garden cope with the threat of the jungle? The most primitive way is to build a high fence, an entrenchment, an impenetrable wall. In history, this method was practiced on a large scale: the Great Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall. However, Europe today will not be able to turn itself into an inaccessible fortress. For many obvious reasons. All it can do is hope to civilize behaviour in the jungle.
Civilizing action consists in stopping acts of violence through international law restrictions, providing support to the victims, punishing the violators with sanctions. Since the late 19th century, the strategy of protecting the weak from violence has been called collective security. Its first incarnation was the League of Nations. To no avail. The United Nations was to avoid its mistakes. It applied the doctrine of collective security twice: in Korea in 1950 and in Iraq in 1991. After the end of the Cold War, there were hopes that the role of the collective security platform would be taken over by the OSCE. Its documents (the Security Code of 1994, the Istanbul Charter of 1999) even included a solidarity clause. It has never been activated, although some of its members have experienced acts of violation of norms and standards and international violence.
In the doctrine of collective security, the key to its credibility is the readiness of states to selflessly intervene in defense of a state that has fallen victim to aggression, the readiness to wage war in the name of someone’s security, which we treat as common security. In other words, for this doctrine to work, an agent is needed. In 1998, the role of such a guarantor of collective security was assumed by NATO, forcing Serbia by force to stop violence in Kosovo. To this day, this case is considered so controversial that it has not been developed any further in NATO’s strategy.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has exposed the inability of the UN and OSCE to ensure the security of its members. The doctrine of collective security looks like a pile of rubble. NATO as an alliance did not for a moment consider the possibility of assuming the role of military guarantor of this doctrine in this particular case. Of course, due to the fear of entering into a direct military conflict with Russia. This would threaten nuclear war. Launching the doctrine of collective security against a nuclear state generally seems unlikely. It could have been used against the DPRK in 1950, but today, when the DPRK has nuclear weapons, UN members would certainly be much less willing to intervene under the UN flag, and some members of the Security Council would not authorize such an operation, arguing that they want to avoid a nuclear conflict.
Two decades ago, it was hoped that the role of the guarantor of the doctrine would be taken over by the US without regard to the UN and bypassing the obstruction of Russia or China. But the role of the global policeman turned out to be too much even for the United States.
The case of Ukraine is not completely deadly for the doctrine of collective security. After all, Western countries, members of the European Union and NATO (with few exceptions) moved to help Ukraine, although not through military action. They handed over weapons, trained soldiers, granted loans, punished the aggressor with sanctions. And despite the fact that legally they had no allied obligations. However, they did not act so selflessly. They finally realized that if Ukraine fell, Russia would move further west, it would threaten them directly. In 2008, when Russian tanks were moving towards Tbilisi, most Western states had not yet seen such a resultant relationship. It was seen by Poland and the Baltic states, the rest was in denial.
The expansion of the Hobbesian jungle brought the European Union down to earth. The Union finally realized that, as stated in the Strategic Compass, it must learn to speak the language of power.
The role of the European Union in global security processes has so far been very limited. It boiled down to attempts at mediation (Iran’s nuclear program, the Serbia-Kosovo conflict), financing post-conflict reconstruction programs (all over the world) and dispatching stabilization forces (already several dozen, but symbolic in their individual size).
Can the European Union afford more? Undoubtedly, the EU won’t matter much globally if (as I’ve argued elsewhere) it fails to become at least relatively self-sufficient in defense, if it doesn’t free itself from the American security protectorate syndrome.
For years, the European Union lived under the illusion of gaining a position in the world as the so-called soft power. Today, the Union is the supplier of more than half of all development aid in the world, and is the largest trading partner for the vast majority of countries in the world. Some still maintain that the European Union builds influence in the world through induction. States, not only in its vicinity, follow the EU policies, standards and even regulations (on food safety, on quality and other). But that didn’t affect its image as a political player noticeably enough. In August 2022, Foreign Affairs published an article by distinguished Indian diplomat Shivshankar Menon entitled “Nobody Wants the Current World Order”. He put forward the thesis that all the world’s major powers, including the US, have become revisionist powers and want a fundamental change in the parameters of the international order. What is very significant is the fact that the author does not notice the European Union as a collective superpower at all, he does not mention it among the players in world politics. Europe is not among the world’s decision makers, according to him.
In short, the “soft power” strategy did not prevent Europe from losing its influence in the “Third World”. Macron’s words spoken at the Munich conference in 2023 sounded dramatic: “I am struck by how we have lost the trust of the global South.”
Because the European Union in many capitals of the world is not yet associated with collective action, and Europe is not associated with assertiveness.
The European Union is surprisingly timid in world politics. This is not completely compensated by the fact that France sometimes presents itself as a spokesperson and representative of Europe (as in 2023 during Macron’s visit to China), even when it is supported by Germany (as in the case of the Normandy format or when mediating between Armenia and Azerbaijan).
Europe is not even able to make a coherent intellectual contribution to the debate on the shape of the future world order. All it could produce was the slogan of “effective multilateralism” and declarations of fidelity to the idea of “rules-based order”. Europe complained about American initiatives to build a camp of democracy in the world, but it itself was unable to propose anything from its side. It does not even aspire to co-create a platform for global dialogue about the future of the world. It supports the initiatives of the Secretary General, supports the plans of institutional reforms, including at WHO, also financially, cooperates constructively with global institutions, but does not propagate its own initiatives.
Someone once said that there is nothing more dangerous than a bureaucrat with a vision. So I do not expect bold visions from the officials of the European Commission. Nor from the officials of the European External Action Service. But the Union’s political leaders could offer something.
The Union hardly even promotes its own integration success as a model for building stability and prosperity in other parts of the world. That is surprising. After all, there are still voices to organize the world on the basis of large continental (or regional) integration conglomerates. But integration initiatives are implemented only in Africa (African Union), Southeast Asia (ASEAN), in the post-Soviet area (Eurasian Union as a form of Russian hegemony) and parts of Latin America. And they cannot match the degree of European integration. The practical effects of their functioning on the stability of the regions are very weak (autocracies and underdevelopment in Africa, crises such as the Myanmar crisis in Asia).
Regional integration can be a good idea for managing the world, but only up to a point. Perhaps it is a good thing that the European Union does not want to be seen as part of the “end of history” in the search for a world order. Its main conceptual merit lies undoubtedly in proving that it is possible to break the ballast of national divisions with good effect, to rise above the limitations resulting from national sovereignty, to destroy the absolute paradigm of the nation state. It merits gratitude without any doubt. But its historical mission should not be to recreate the model of the nation-state and the mechanisms of national policy at a higher level, i.e. at the regional structure. The vision of a United States of Europe may once have been the target vision for European federalists. But today, it can only be a transitional vision.
Undoubtedly, there is a lack of a European voice in favor of building structures of supranational governance of the world. The use of the terms “world state” or even “world government” in this context is, of course, not allowed. Because in this way one can kill even the best idea at its birth. But if not Europe who else can promote it? One cannot count on the United States to promote a supranational approach to world governance for a long time (if ever).
One of the examples. As I wrote more than ten years ago, the European Union could become an advocate for the concept of global justice and the rule of law. The indictment of Putin in connection with war crimes in Ukraine made people aware of the importance of universalizing the Rome Statute and strengthening the role of the International Criminal Court. Not only could the EU become more involved in supporting the ICC, but also promote ideas about other international tribunals.
Years ago, I was asked why the EU could not initiate the process of establishing new ones, such as the World Court of Human Rights (yes, I know, in today’s situation it is impossible to implement it). I was asked why the EU could not promote the idea of creating a global independent election monitoring institution (like the former Office of Free Elections within the CSCE), allowing the UN to focus on electoral assistance. People asked why, being the spokesperson for the fight against corruption, the EU does not seek to establish a global anti-corruption agency (IACCC established at the British initiative has a very limited mandate and narrow membership). The EU abandoned the idea of the World Environment Organization without a serious fight. These institutions could be brought to life by selected, willing, interested governments, open to the inclusion of other, preferably all countries of the world over time, so there is no need to aspire to a full consensus right away.
And undoubtedly, the task of the highest order would be to develop ideas in Brussels to improve the management of global public goods (Internet, world oceans, space, etc.).
Someone once proposed in a discussion in which I participated that the European Parliament should become the spokesman for the establishment of the World Parliament. The European Parliament has indeed extended its support to the idea but a more robust engagement could be envisaged. And the European Congress of Regions should promote the idea of the World Congress of Regions. The European Union would undoubtedly have enough funds to finance the work on establishing these institutions.
Of course, I could always answer that these are very ambitious ideas that do not promise any chance of implementation today. For various reasons. Because even within the EU they would not gain universal support. And the European Union focuses on realistic goals and acts pragmatically.
But, to be honest, I was not so much offended by the lack of these ambitious ideas as by reducing the EU’s contribution to the debate on the future global order to trivial, bureaucratic, gibberish strategies and documents presented on the website of the European External Action Service. When Guterres, in his 2022 report, proposed regular UN debates on future challenges and long-range strategies, I wondered with concern whether the EU would have anything interesting to say in this debate.
My humble suggestion: the European Union could at least give its strong voice in favor of creating a permanent, institutionalized channel at the UN to provide a voice for civil society on global issues.
The EU could provide funding and politically support intellectual debates for a new universalism. If its officers and officials cannot be engaged in them, at least they should support those who want to talk about it.
Merab Mamardashvili, the great Georgian philosopher, when speaking more than 35 years ago about “European responsibility”, said: “European culture is perhaps the first and only correct answer to the question: is change possible in the world?” Europe can become hope that it is possible to lead the world towards a better formula of the global order.
The problem is that European ideas for the world are regarded a priori with suspicion by the other partners from the global South. Often, as I have written many times, they are treated as insidious ideas whose aim is to ensure Western leadership, or even Western control of the world in a situation where the relative weight of the West is decreasing. Suspicion is all the greater when the face of Europe in pushing these ideas is the former colonial powers. Not only France, but also Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands. They have done a lot by accounting for the wrongs done to the colonized peoples, although, as can be seen from the speeches of many leaders of former colonies, they still count on more and sometimes practice “pity politics”.
Sweden, Finland and Denmark have become much more credible as European players on the global arena. Their problem, in turn, is that they are often accused of “ultraliberal” intentions (a priority for women’s and LGBT rights).
European policy would be much more effective if it was actively endorsed by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland. But the horizons of Polish politics ceased to cover the world. Cimoszewicz and Rotfeld were the last foreign ministers who tried to appreciate non-Euroatlantic directions in Polish politics. Political horizons of Polish diplomacy has since shrunk significantly. The the number and size of the Polish diplomatic missions was reduced, and the PiS diplomats massacred our diplomacy to the bone, and the non-European dimension in particular, with a full sense of impunity. The stunted Polish diplomacy is therefore also responsible for the anemic voice of Europe in the discussion about the future of the world.
With its passivity, Europe thus renounces one of its most valuable identity features – universalism. The new universalism.
