Before the Polish elections in 2023, a certain politician frequently called by his opponents as being “out of touch” tried to describe the concept of the international position and the international status of the state. Fighting against European institutions, quarrelling with everyone around his country, and permanent obstruction were, in his opinion, an attempt to obtain the appropriate status of the country.
The position was to be changeable and fleeting, while the status was to be permanent and unchanging.
Contrary to what he said, the so-called status of, for example, a great or middle power is not given once and for all. Because even the seemingly immutable status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council does not have to apply forever.
The Westphalian international order is based on the principle of sovereign equality. The USA and Andorra, China and San Marino, India and Tuvalu mean the same from the point of view of international law. Only permanent members of the Security Council have a globally legalized separate status, which gives them greater rights (veto power in the Security Council) than other states. Unequal rights also occur in other organizations where the so-called shares (World Bank) or population factor (in the so-called double majority within the EU Council) are taken into account when voting.
Since the dawn of history, states have been concerned about two basic goals in their contacts with foreign countries: ensuring security and increasing prosperity. And the guarantee of their implementation was power. If it grew above the surrounding environment, theses states tried to reflect their domination in hegemonic arrangements, either bilateral (e.g. through vassalization of other states) or multilateral (e.g. by building satellite alliances), which gave the superpowers special rights.
The ancient Greeks already made us aware that a place in the hierarchy of states can become a value in itself. The Peloponnesian Wars were nothing more than status wars. From the point of view of the interests of the Greek civilization community, they were completely senseless wars, internally destructive wars. They were primarily about establishing a specific “pecking order”, a hierarchy of power in the Peloponnesian backyard.
Wars in which status and hierarchy were at stake arose organically from the feudal system of relations in the European Middle Ages. In many cases, their goal was not so much the physical conquest and incorporation of the land, but the “tribute” of its ruler. And there was no shortage of similar wars in modern times. It is not without reason that the Crimean War of 1853-1856 is sometimes called the War for the Key to the Bethlehem Manger in textbooks. Of course, Russia’s demands to be granted special rights to protect Christian sites and Christians themselves in the Ottoman Empire were more of a reason than a cause, because Russia saw weakening Turkey as an opportunity for its further territorial expansion.
And it’s hard to think of a better example of a war for hierarchy than the Prussian-Austrian Bruderkrieg of 1866. It wasn’t about control over tiny and irrelevant Holstein, but about leadership in Germany as a whole. Prussia managed to depose Austria-Hungary and then unify Germany on its own terms.
Today, status comes not so much from the sheer size of power, but from the integration of the state into relations with other partners. For example, India has nuclear weapons, is the most populous country in the world, but it still has not managed to become a permanent member of the Security Council and is not treated at a similar level to China although it should. India is a democratic country and the fifth largest economy in the world, but Indians have not been included in the G7 (Japan is there, and Russia was once in the G8). Both China and India want to be seen as great powers, but they do not want to be treated as developed countries (but rather still as developing countries).
One thing is certain, pure power does not guarantee status. At the same time, countries whose potential is growing ambitiously and do not have to seek a foreign security umbrella want their growth to be reflected in their status. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the idea of replacing Russia in the G20 with Poland was taken up in Warsaw. Even though we rank 23rd in the world in terms of economic strength (GDP), it is still higher than Argentina or South Africa, which are in the G20.
Several Western countries have chosen the strategy of building their own status in the international community not so much through military or economic attributes of being a superpower, but rather by creating an image that wins sympathy. Long before the concept of soft power was invented, Canada began to rapidly develop the profile of a country supporting the deployment of peacekeeping forces, facilitating the resolution of disputes, providing economic assistance, and putting forward diplomatic initiatives to improve the functioning of global institutions. Sweden, Finland and Norway have become active in global affairs with a strong association as aid providers. This was not formally reflected in their status. But it made them well known in the world community and improved their electoral chances in applying for membership in key international bodies, including the Security Council.
However, it is clear that the status is still discretionary.
But sometimes also purely formal. The UN Charter contains provisions relating to the so-called enemy states. However, these clauses are considered dead. Germany or Japan do not suffer any damage to their status as a result of these provisions.
When states feel reasonably secure in their internal security and economic interests, they inevitably direct their efforts to secure appropriate rank and status. They satisfy the need for recognition. Foreign policy is beginning to be guided by thymotic aspirations. The state wants to be appreciated, it wants to be treated with respect, it wants to have a sense of usefulness, enjoy full value and relevance. Fukuyama once claimed that thymotic needs would become increasingly important; he saw them as the source of the tendency towards separatism and the driving force behind smaller nations’ pursuit of statehood. In “Emotions, interests, values” I pointed out that he greatly simplified and sometimes even distorted reality.
But I agree that thymotic needs are increasingly influencing the behavior of states in the international arena. Most countries want to have “their five minutes” and do not accept the status of a movie extra on the world stage. This is also the result of the process of emancipation of the countries of the global South, about which so much has been written in recent years.
This should also explain why it is so difficult to abandon the formula of rotating chairmanships in the bodies of international institutions. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is chaired in turn by all its members. Also San Marino, Monaco, Liechtenstein, and Andorra. They prepare rich programs for six-month terms, mobilize themselves to organize meetings and events, and propose rich programs of accompanying events, e.g. in the field of culture. Of course, the political weight of smaller countries does not predispose them to aspire to manage large political projects. Behind their backs, key players and the Secretariat do this undisturbed. But the infusion of new energy into the routine work of the Strasbourg Committee, provided by the smaller members, was always visible.
In the European Union, the rotating presidency of the EU Council has often been criticized for weakening continuity, for creating a deficit in the ability to lead in the case of smaller countries, and for allowing states to push particular priorities. And because of these criticisms, the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council have a permanent presidency. But the rotating chairmanship in other Council formats has not been abandoned. Precisely so that every member of the Union has the feeling that it is capable of leading it, that it plays in the first league, and that everyone must take it into account. And the fact that the public relations and cultural framework of the presidency often means more than its political content is ultimately secondary. Because it is not the rotating presidency that determines the direction of decisions within the EU.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the OSCE chairmanship was expected (in Washington and elsewhere) to be strong and proactive. It was intended to prevent bureaucratization and bureaucrats taking over the political management of the OSCE. The Chairman-in-Office, not the Secretary General, was to be the spokesman and the face of the organization. I supported this course with full conviction, even when I worked in the Secretariat.
The chairmanship was to be entrusted (for the entire year) to countries able to bear its burden politically, diplomatically and in terms of resources. So, by definition, not to everyone. On the other hand, it should not be offered to too strong states, i.e. superpowers (such as permanent members of the UN Security Council, but Germany or Italy could already hold it). However, strong Chairmanship irritated the Russians (and some other countries). These countries did everything to hamper its initiative and limit the Chairman’s possibilities of action. And unfortunately, they managed to do it over time. The scope for initiative for the Chairmanship was shrinking. As a consequence, countries like Albania, Serbia, Ireland and North Macedonia, i.e. countries that did not even pretend to be middle powers, felt able to cope with the Chairmanship.
Therefore, I am a supporter of creating functions, even only seemingly prestigious ones, so that countries, especially smaller and medium-sized ones, can be provided with an instrument to satisfy their thymotic needs. Because the worst that can happen is a sense of unrealized ambitions, a growing gap between satisfaction with the successful development of the country and a sense of one’s own undervaluation. Bad emotions that may arise in political behaviour due to lack of fulfilment, especially in international forums, may disturb the climate of cooperation.
The belief that Poland is not treated properly, that Europe is ruled by Germans who do not care about anyone, especially us, was PiS’s obsession already in 2005-2007. In the years 2015-2023, it has already entered the clinical stage. I saw this up close, especially in 2005-2007. Poland engaged in diplomatic wars even on matters irrelevant to Polish interests, all in the name of showing that we are simply a force to be reckoned with. And at the same time, Poland failed to explain to our partners our reasons. As a result, our isolation continued. Even the most friendly countries looked at our actions with embarrassment.
Russia has been suffering from the syndrome of being underrated since at least the mid-1990s. And under Putin’s dictatorship, irritation reached a height that made the world dangerous. From neurotic assertiveness, it turned into belligerent aggressiveness, to reach a state of fierce aggression. Because Russia believes that the West treacherously deprived it of the status enjoyed by the USSR after the fall of the Cold War, which involved accepting that it had its own sphere of influence and acted there freely, and that the West exempted Russia from deciding on the geopolitics of Europe and the world that it relegated Russia from the top league, in which it played on equal terms with the USA, that the West humiliated it by rejecting Russian projects to create a concert of powers for Europe and the P-5 directorate for the world.
Aggression against Ukraine not only did not help Russia regain its desired status, but also pushed it to the opposite pole – the pole of a pariah. Russia is not a full pariah yet, because most countries of the Global South do not want to distance themselves and isolate Russia. It is no wonder that at the G-20 summit in 2023, there was no specific condemnation of Russia in the final document.
The pariah status in international relations informally exists, of course. South Africa experienced it during the years of apartheid. Americans tried to introduce the concept of a “rogue state” and thus justify the construction of a conceptual framework for “black sheep” nations. Later, they were euphemistically referred to as “outlier states”. Today, there are countries that are partially isolated, e.g. the DPRK or Afghanistan.
There are now claims that the only way for the international community to effectively respond to states violating the norms of international coexistence, human rights and democratic values is to disconnect the state from the cooperation network, to impose on it IT and transport isolation, isolation from financial markets, trade and technological sanctions, etc., i.e. to put it very simply, to take these initiatives that the West has undertaken towards Russia to make it aware of the need to stop the war in Ukraine. Western sanctions had some effects, but they did not influence Russia’s attitude at all. But if they do make an impact over time, Western policy could send an important signal to other criminal regimes. Because a similar approach can and even should be applied not only to Russia (or the DPRK).
It is sometimes said that status is determined by belonging to a selected group of countries. Status is enhanced by membership in a more or less elite club. For years (until the end of the 1990s) the Council of Europe had such a club character. Did Portugal or Spain feel bad that they were not eligible for membership in the Council of Europe under Franco and Salazar? Maybe so, but they could still count on the full political solidarity of the West in the face of the confrontation with the USSR and the communist camp.
The Community of Democracies turned out to be a club devoid of political significance. Did Biden’s decision not to invite the leaders of Hungary and Turkey to the democracy summits in 2021 and 2023 have any impact on the status of these countries? Of course not. It had only an image-related connotation, and a fleeting one at that. Because this step was not followed by any other consequences. The conclusion is one that I have already written about on this blog: participation in the club of democratic countries must provide clear political benefits in order to influence the sense of the state’s status.
The status of the state is undoubtedly influenced by the presence in narrow consultative bodies (informal or even secret). I mentioned on this blog about the functioning of the so-called directorate within the European Union or the so-called quad within NATO. During the PiS government, Poland not only did not get closer to these circles, but at least when it comes to the European Union, it moved significantly away from them. And if the eurozone transforms into a broader leadership circle within the European Union, our absence there will push us out of serious conversations about the future of the Union.
The existence of these circles may cause widespread irritation. And rightly so. That’s why they function so discreetly. But no one will be able to prevent their occurrence and persistence, if they are effective. For Polish politics, one of their current systemic conclusions is: as long as Germany enters these circles and Poland does not (even indirectly, i.e. as an add-on), there will be no real partnership in foreign and European policy between Germany and Poland. After Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the NATO quad should have been irrevocably transformed into a pentalogue. Has it been transformed? The recent quad summit in Berlin followed the old pattern. Pentalogue would skyrocket Poland’s status.
Failure to meet thymotic needs may prove to be a serious obstacle on the way to a new model of managing the world. Of course, the greatest resistance to the new (implicitly cosmopolitan) governance model will come from the great powers, led by the USA. However, it will be more about maintaining control over decision-making processes than about maintaining status. The transfer of rights to supranational institutions always limits the freedom of the great ones to decide. The Brussels experience shows that the largest players, such as France or Germany, can indirectly influence the Commission’s actions, but also have to enter into disputes with it on many issues (such as investment protection). They also lose cases in the Luxembourg court. The USA and China are not yet ready for similar situations globally. Smaller countries, not only in Europe, have long realized that many decisions regarding the functioning of their economies are made elsewhere. And this applies not only to members of the European Union.
They do not mind the remodeling of the world governance system, which would include elements of transnational integration. But they would be scared by solutions that would be interpreted as undermining their sovereign and equal status.
The huge mistake of universalist, pangean and similar movements is that they try to replace national identity with universalism. I have written many times on this blog that this will not work. Universalism must be included in the national political emancipation and revolution of dignity that we are currently experiencing. It is not without reason that one of the former heads of the European Council, visiting even the most forgotten corners of Europe, including those not yet in the EU, used to say that this is where the real heart of Europe beats.
Therefore, I have always proposed to multiply high-level functions in international organizations, which would be entrusted to individual countries on a rotating basis. I also believed that even membership in the Security Council should be subject to the widest possible rotation. Of course, it would have to exclude countries such as the DPRK or Syria, but apart from that anyone could sit there. Tuvalu as well. Poland was replaced by Estonia in the UNSC in 2020. Has anyone noticed a difference? Even so, it was certainly not a difference unfavourable to the effectiveness of the Council. So let’s invent algorithms to avoid unnecessary competition for functions, as well as for prestigious diplomatic, sports and cultural events.
Let’s please everyone. Of course, meeting the basic criteria of decency. No honours, no world events for dictatorships, oppressors, aggressors, etc. None. I know, I know, this is an idealistic assumption. After all, so many countries would not even mind the participation of Russian athletes in the Paris Olympics.
