The key to ensuring the implementation of raison d’état is having adequate executive capacity. And executive capacity in the traditional paradigm of international relations is related to the notion of power. Power in international relations is always relative. It is measured against the power of other actors on the international scene. Throughout the ages, power has been identified with strength (and force as the ultima ratio). No wonder then that one of the drivers of foreign policy has become the doctrine of taking into account and using the factor of power. The “Realpolitik” doctrine is probably the most famous among the concepts based on power. It is often regarded as a synonym of realistic policy based on sober evaluation of the possibilities of states and making politicians keep both feet on the ground when dealing with the outside world.

The term “Realpolitik” is associated with Bismarck and the policy of Prussia and Germany under his stewardship. The term was reportedly used and described for the first time by Ludwig von Rochau, a German columnist of the 19th century. In his book published in 1853 and entitled “Grundsätze der Realpolitik angewendet auf die staatlichen Zustände Deutschlands” he argued that “Realpolitik” is a diplomacy based on the recognition of the primacy of the principle of power in world politics. In the past, this principle was manifested in the dictate of the stronger (paying often no regard to the law or morality), while the modern effect of this principle has been to base relations between states on the assessment of their power.

For von Rochau, “Realpolitik” was an imperative to give politics the necessary effectiveness. He described in his book the crisis of liberal, Enlightenment thinking after the suppression of the Springtime of the Peoples Revolution. He concluded that it was impossible to transform reality with ideological righteousness. Objectively, the stronger states do not have to be always right. But it is the stronger one who decides what is right and what is wrong. Noble ideas, then, crash into ruthless thinking in terms of force and violence. As von Rochau wrote, a “real politician” knows that in order to tear down “the walls of Jericho”, a simple pickaxe is more useful than even the most powerful trumpet.

The “Realpolitik” doctrine has since then permanently embedded itself in the political discourse of Germany and the Western world. More and more, however, it drifted away from the original meaning. It began to mean a policy of pragmatic assessment of conditions and limitations, striving to achieve the policy goals without ethical hesitations and ideological prejudices, a sober, transactional policy that changes depending on circumstances. In the theoretical dimension, “Realpolitik” has received a solid description in a realistic school of international relations, treating power as the main criterion of effectiveness, and national interests and their conflict as the driving force of international politics.

In this sense, there are many spiritual fathers and patrons of “Realpolitik”, and they are quite eminent. There are among them Sun Tzu and Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, and von Clausewitz. And among the masters of applying it in practice names of Richelieu, Talleyrand, Metternich, Stalin, and Kissinger are quite frequently mentioned.

But as explained above, the doctrine of “Realpolitik” is associated most of all with the figure of Bismarck. It is after him that we repeat every day that politics is the art of what is possible (and the science of what is relative). Bismarck instructed his followers to believe only in one’s own power. He commanded us to reject the political sentimentality expressed in the hope of reciprocity and the altruism of others. The only compass should be the national interest. He recalled that each government is guided by the criteria for evaluating its own actions based only on its own interests. The only sound doctrine of state policy was, in his opinion, egotism (and none there, God forbid, romanticism). Ultimately, all that mattered was arousing fear (and not any sympathy), drawing others to our side under the influence of fear.

Bismarck applied the “Realpolitik” doctrine in pursuing a course for Prussia’s domination in Germany. He skilfully manipulated the Schleswig-Holstein issue to trigger a war with Denmark (1864), and ensured that victory in that war strengthened Prussia’s position. Prussia shared its gains with Austria, but so cleverly as to have an excuse two years later for a conflict with the Habsburgs. Having dealt with Austria (in 1866), Prussia did not humiliate it, demanded neither the Czech nor other parts of its territory (Prussia took over from Austria only sovereignty over Holstein), because Bismarck assumed that it would need its support for a possible reunification of Germany (around Prussia). He provoked France into war in 1870 (appropriately doctored and deliberately leaked Ems Dispatch). And when the reunification of Germany became a fact, he pursued a policy of self-restraint, concealing expansionist intentions, so that Europe would get used to the oversized Germany. It is with Bismarck that we associate to this day the harsh truths of “Realpolitik” that everything that is effective is right and that the goal justifies means.

According to Kissinger, Stalin was another master of “Realpolitik”. He had no regard for morality and legalism. For military victories, he only demanded payment in one currency: territorial acquisitions. He could negotiate with the West, but only on a quid-pro-quo basis. It was debated among Western strategists during the “Cold War” at what price he was prepared to make concessions and loosen Soviet control over Central Europe. It was suspected that such a price could be some big and real economic benefits. This is a questionable thesis. Because Stalin firmly believed that time worked for socialism anyway. A consent to the departure of the region from the banners of Soviet communism (in the form of some finlandization or even titoization) would undermine one of the axioms of the theory of the continuous progress of the socialist revolution. The communists claimed after all never give up power once they had gained it.

In Stalin’s diplomacy, the arrangements made at the meetings of world leaders could at best reflect the real relationship of power, but in no way redefine it. Negotiations were not meant to change the world, but to legitimize changes in the real world that had occurred. In that sense, he was undoubtedly a cold-blooded realist. He eagerly met with Roosevelt (or later Truman) and Churchill (or later Attlee) when it was dictated by the needs of World War II and ensuring its victorious end. He could be so warm and jovial so that he even earned the nickname of “Uncle Joe”, as Roosevelt referred to him. But he rejected after World War II the possibility of returning to personal cordial contacts with US or UK leaders. It was not for personal reasons that he rejected it. He saw no point in those meetings, because he would have nothing to negotiate with the Western leaders. Consequently, after Potsdam, he never saw them again.

According to Kissinger, Stalin did not believe in abstract slogans or values. He waited patiently in whatever game he played. He used up the chips he had earned and waited for the West’s next move. He believed in the concept of spheres of influence and politics from a position of strength.

This is all true, but he was an ideologist nonetheless! His ideological convictions made him never believe the West! In keeping with the canons of Leninism, he was convinced that the aim of the West was to suppress the socialist system. And in the nature of capitalism was to deceive. So he did not believe that the capitalists could be trusted in any way. Stalin did not believe in the purposefulness of geopolitical compromises. Because socialism was supposed to win anyway. Stalin did so much to confirm the communist theory (he succeeded, after all, in the creation of the world socialist system) that he became a hostage of this theory after World War II. It tied the hands of the leaders of the USSR for years. His successors had to pursue an expansionist policy in the name of maintaining the credibility of the theory. Stalin was a realist and an ideologist, and there is no antinomy in this.

Kissinger is credited with having formally introduced the Realpolitik doctrine into the White House during Nixon’s presidency. Beyond any doubt, Nixon intuitively identified himself with it. Thanks to Kissinger, American policy rejected prejudices and ideological limitations, the best expression of which was the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China. As he predicted, it allowed to fundamentally change political processes in the world (including US-Russian relations). He was not afraid, in the name of pragmatic goals, of humiliation, going for the unilateral US withdrawal from Vietnam. After the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, he persuaded the Israelis to withdraw partially from Sinai, knowing that he would also be able to permanently wrench Egypt out of Soviet influence.

Kissinger himself admitted that he never used the term “Realpolitik”. He argued that the term had been made shallow and was instrumentalized by academic cirles. True, it seems that Metternich or Talleyrand had much greater influence on Kissinger’s style than Bismarck. Kissinger undoubtedly wanted to think of US foreign policy in terms of a great statesman, rising above diplomatic detail, capable of bold strategic decisions, building the international order on the principles of balance of power and strategic stability.

If “Realpolitik” is to mean a sober assessment of reality and a pragmatic selection of means, then even Zbigniew Brzeziński, advising President Carter, was no worse than the champion of “Realpolitik”. Being himself deeply anti-communist by conviction, in the 1960s he suggested nevertheless calming the ideological emotions in US foreign policy by entering the path of tactical “relaxation”, and looking for opportunities in dialogue. He correctly assessed that communism would decompose from within, and that Western interaction with Moscow’s satellites would gradually emancipate them, while unfreezing economic, educational and cultural contacts would weaken ideological control over society and turn it against the communist authorities.

And although the détente policy of the early 1980s had to crumble, but the ferment of the pressure of Reagan’s tough policies sowed in the 1970s only strengthened over time.

The Obama administration wanted to be considered “cold-blooded” in the assessment of American interests and “realpolitical” in the choice of means of action (maintaining presence in Afghanistan and Iraq despite election promises, refusal to participate in the intervention in Libya or Syria), but on the fundamental issue: the relationship between the US and Russia and China, it undoubtedly succumbed to “wishful thinking”. The 2009 reset with Russia had nothing to do with “Realpolitik”. And the belief that China would become America’s trustworthy partner as economic development progressed had little to do with reality either. This was indirectly admitted by Joe Biden, the vice president of Obama who from 2021 has served as president. He recognized China as the main threat to the West, and he firmly ruled out a new reset with Russia.

The practice of “Realpolitik” is attributed to Vladimir Putin. He is believed to trust only in strength, and he firmly thinks that only strength will ensure Russia’s superpower status. The annexation of Crimea and the attempt to detach Donbas from Ukraine, disregarding international law and possible sanctions, are treated as confirmation of this “realistic” view of politics. In relations with the West, Putin tirelessly insists that Russia should be accepted as it is. And over the course of two decades, he managed to convince quite significant number of Western politicians to such an approach. He is also seen as a supporter of transactional diplomacy. Although, as in the case of Stalin, everything with him is a matter of price. His proposal to divide Ukraine, submitted in February 2008 to the Polish Prime Minister, has been leaked to the public opinion. And it did not sound like a joke or a provocation. After all, in “Realpolitik” everything is just a matter of price.

In 1994, as head of department in the CSCE Secretariat, I accompanied the then Secretary General Wilhelm Hoeynck during his visit to Moldova. We also went to Transnistria, where it was planned, inter alia, to meet the commander of the Russian contingent, General Alexander Lebed. Suddenly, during the plenary talks, Lebed stood up and asked the Secretary-General for a face-to-face conversation. Wilhelm Hoynck was slightly confused and said that he would need an interpreter, which was me. This is how I witnessed one of the strangest diplomatic talks in my career. Lebed spoke out by making long, annoying pauses which he filled up with staring deeply into the interlocutor’s eyes. He threw some passports on the table and asked, “What am I supposed to do with these people?” It was hard for us to understand what he might have meant (we guessed that he had granted asylum to these people at his military base). And his message was very simple: no mediation by international organizations would help to protect people; the agreements and declarations of the governments will be worth nothing there. Only him could be the guarantor of peace and security in Transnistria. And there was no price that would be worth withdrawing the 14th Army.

I recalled this conversation when several years later I learned about confidential talks conducted by one of the key Western countries with Russia in order to break the deadlock in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. In the capital of that Western country it was recognized that of all the so-called frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the Transnistrian crisis was relatively the most handy in bringing about some kind of compromise with Russia. And such a compromise could have warmed the overall relationship with Russia and lend credence to the thesis that it is possible to talk constructively with Russia about the security of Europe. The problem was that it was not possible to offer Russia an attractive price that would allow it to be seriously considered. As in the late 1940s, when the West had nothing attractive to offer Stalin with regard to Eastern Europe.

Both Russia and China are demanding that they be accepted as they are. During World War II, the Allies accepted the USSR as it was, in the name of joint struggle against Germany. Today, could the West accept them as they are in the name of fighting global warming (as some Western politicians would like)? After all, The West did not accept Russia as it was for the sake of the fight against terrorism (as Russia counted on after “nine-eleven”), or of solving the problem of Syria, Iran’s nuclear program or other challenges on the current agenda. The price would be too high.

Long years of lack of clear successes in Western politics based on values (and international law) may discourage from sticking up to principles and encourage people to abdicate in favour of “Realpolitik” understood in this way. The hypostasis of this abdication is sometimes called the concept of “principled pragmatism”, which the European Union began to proclaim in its common foreign policy documents. According to it, the Union does not abandon values, but looks at the way of making politics in a pragmatic way, taking into account the real possibilities of its own action.

The as yet insurmountable barrier against the abandonment of values factor is the resistance posed by the sensitivity of Western societies. The emancipation of the individual in the assessment of foreign policy raised a high ethical bar for political choices. Issues such as the poisoning of Navalny can no longer be swept under the carpet for strategic or geopolitical reasons. “Realpolitik” cannot withstand moral pressure.
The values factor in politics has found itself at a critical juncture with the requirements of “Realpolitik”. One must be optimistic that at this critical time, much more difficult than during the confrontation of Western liberalism with the communist world, the outcome will be victorious for the factor of values.