It was supposed to be a blog that would not give in to the pressure of commenting on current events. Its purpose was to describe present contexts from the perspective of the history of international relations, the evolution of concepts and doctrines that inspired politicians and diplomats to act. It was supposed to create a distance to the present. The Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022 is an event that may prove very fateful for the entire system of international relations, not only in Europe. It is a war born in a sick mind, dominated by views and ideas from at least a century ago, trying to return the world to the era of imperial, hegemonic and dominant policies, adhering to the Machtpolitik methods and other editions of politics from a position of force, striving to divide Europe into zones of influence. I wrote about these paradigms of force politics with the conviction that they are part of the past world, sometimes even a shameful page in the history of our civilization. And I still think so. The stakes in the Russian-Ukrainian war are significantly high, not only for the future of the Ukrainian state and nation. The West’s behavior towards Russian aggression may determine whether the ideals of modern civilization can triumph over miasms of power and cavern reflexes in international politics.
Many commentators ask themselves how the conflict will affect the future of global competition, and in particular, will China not be tempted to take advantage of the US’s preoccupation with Russia and try to solve the problem of Taiwan by force? That China has supported Putin is no surprise. But whether they will draw risky conclusions for themselves is still an open question. So this entry will be about China and the Chinese version of hegemonism.
Exceptionalism, a belief in one’s own uniqueness combined with a superiority complex, can lead to ethnocentric hegemonism. The modern rise of China’s might has spawned much speculation about a resurgence of Chinese hegemonism, at least on a regional basis.
Indeed, Chinese identity is shaped by a belief in its own uniqueness. Exceptionalism in itself is not uncommon. Many nations build their identity on differences. The United States proclaims uniqueness, as does Russia, or Great Britain. The uniqueness of the USA was derived from its ability to smelt community out of diversity. Russia’s uniqueness is based on its Eurasian character. And Britain’s on its historically global role. Each nation is unique in its own way.
Chinese uniqueness is cultural. For years, it was accompanied by a belief in the superiority of Chinese civilization in comparison with the surrounding world (and with the neighbouring tribes in particular). The Chinese vision of a perfect world was that of a world ruled by the principle of harmony. And the harmony was provided by the arrangement of the world in concentric circles. China was the center of these circles. Hence the term Middle Kingdom, the central land (Zhongguo). Because the most perfect state had to be the center of the universe. And the mission of this state was to spread the principles of the most harmonious civilization to the surrounding world, to project harmony. As late as in 1863, when the technological advancement of the West was already capable of driving the Chinese into complexes, the Emperor of China was referring to “the authority from heaven to rule the universe.” The imperial power in China, moreover, rose beyond a purely political format. There the emperor became a metaphysical figure fairly early on. As steward, he was the emperor of all mankind, the top of the earthly ladder of power. As a son of heavens, he was a mediator between Heaven and Earth. The source of moral order.
The Great Wall of China has never been an expression of isolationist thinking. It was supposed to protect it against a rogue influx of barbarians. Like the Romans Hadrian’s Wall, or the Rhine Limes. Because barbarians have always been lured by the prosperity, wealth and social order of higher civilizations. But China’s mission was to draw culturally aliens into its orbit by the strength of its civilization (not weapons), and to help them submit to Chinese sovereignty.
China’s superiority was manifested in the belief that they could learn nothing from strangers, and that foreign inventions and achievements gave China no use. Initially, the Western inventions did not make any impression on the Chinese. The civilization exchange in Chinese optics was one-sided, non-equivalent in nature. It was China that gave, having nothing to take in return.
The Chinese were not afraid of foreign influences. History has taught them that foreign invaders, even if they took power (such as the Mongols or Manchurians), quickly assimilated. And the collapse of civilization was temporary. Many Chinese today also associate rapid economic growth with closing the chapter of a temporary collapse and returning to the traditional, leadership role of China in civilization development. It is no coincidence that their current foreign policy has begun to embellish slogans for the world to “take advantage of Chinese wisdom” and emerge, copying the Chinese pattern, from the “quagmire of recession” in which it has got into the COVID pandemic.
Rarely in history has exceptionism driven China towards imperial expeditions. In the eighth century, China tried to intervene in India, in the thirteenth century, during the Yuan dynasty, it rushed to conquer Japan but without success. During the Song Dynasty (10th-13th centuries), China built a powerful fleet that ripped through the seas surrounding Asia and Africa, but by no means was an instrument for colonization or conquest. In the 15th century, Admiral Zheng He even reached the Strait of Hormuz, the corner of Africa, India, and Java. He brought a multitude of gifts from the expedition, but he did not create colonial footholds. His fleet was burnt, and his expeditions were abandoned. And that was for Chinese overseas expeditionism. On land, expansion was more natural. Even Xinjiang (“New Frontiers”) and Tibet have become victims of China over time.
And the formal political and state relations of the Chinese authorities with the outside world were bilateral in nature, based on tributary principles. From Korea to Vietnam and Siam, all foreign kings had to bow their heads to China, do the kowtow or kneel down (and on both knees). The concept of sovereign equality was unknown to China. The sinocentric order has always been hierarchical, hegemonic.
During the Han dynasty, the principle of “loose reins” was introduced, which required the Chinese to be flexible and gentle with partners, as much as they demonstrated their loyalty. To attract them by the power of culture and ideology, manipulate by economic means, but when it is necessary to press politically and militarily to exert control. There are more and more signs today that the centuries-old experience of the “policy of loose reins” has not been forgotten.
Since the Qing Dynasty, the principle of “controlling barbarians with barbarians,” that is, using one partner against another, has been common. The department of dependencies dealt with it.
Until the end of the 19th century, China did not have and did not see the need for a foreign ministry.
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought a deep rift between the myth of China’s superiority and reality, but the Chinese did not destroy the habit of sinocentric perception of the world. China has always looked to the West with superiority, even when it was humiliated (opium wars, boxer uprising).
In communist times, China tried to position itself as the nucleus of an intermediate zone between the imperialist and socialist fronts. From the beginning, they displayed a psychopolitical resistance to accepting the Soviet leadership in the “socialist family.” Moreover, Mao could not forget Stalin’s support to the Kuomintang during World War II. An open split occurred in the late 1950s. The pretext was the proclamation of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence by the CPSU and de-Stalinization. It is true that in 1958 the USSR politically supported China’s military action against Taiwan. It declared that it was ready to go even to a nuclear war in defense of China (however, Khrushchev explained in confidence to the Americans that in fact the position of the USSR was quite different and he would not lift a finger if the US entered into a conflict with China). Soon, the Soviet demand that USSR submarines should have access to naval bases on the eastern and southern coast of China served as a test of the Soviet-Chinese alliance. The demand was rejected resolutely in Beijing. In the Sino-Indian clash in 1962, the USSR already sided with India. The principle of solidarity between the states of the socialist camp ceased to apply to China. And in 1969, an open Soviet-Chinese armed clash took place on the island of Damanski (Zheng beo). This conflict was a deep shock to many international observers. And it contributed to persuade the Nixon administration to establish relations with China.
China decided to go its own way, or as it was called in Beijing, distance itself from both the capitalist imperialists and the hegemonist revisionists. In international politics, they pushed the idea of an in-between world and fiercely fought (verbally) hegemonism.
The mid-seventies vision of this concept evolved to take on the form of the Chinese version of the three world theory as explained by Deng Xiaoping in the mid-1970s. The first world was the USA and the USSR, the second world: their allies in the capitalism and socialism camp, and the third world: the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
China began to aspire to the role of the leader of the so understood “Third World”. They rejected hegemony. They focused on their own geographic priorities. The immediate surroundings have become the most important area: East Asia and Southeast Asia They watched with attention, but also with hope for a gain, the “tiger fight in the valley”, that is, the US confrontation with the USSR. But from the 1970s onwards, they fixed relations with the US, and in the 1980s, also with the USSR. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese addressed the Soviets again as comrades, and did not accuse them of revisionism.
The fall of the communist bloc was a challenge for China. It coincided with the beginning of the growth of their economic power. Towards the 1990s, the priority of national interest and the promotion of the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty as the guiding principles of international politics were dominant in foreign policy there.
Deng Xiaoping’s political will was assumed to be associated with his so-called twelve- and twenty-four-character messages that for decades has been the matrix for the analysis of Chinese policy.
It was suggested by this testament that China should hide its own abilities, bide its time, keep a low profile and renounce any aspirations for leadership. It warned that the enemy was still lurking at the gates, and China should build its strength, while being vigilant.
The will found expression in the doctrine of “peaceful rise”, which reached its peak around the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. China won the world with a smile, gentleness and success. In international politics, they promoted the idea of a multipolar world (as the antithesis of Pax Americana, which they rejected as tainted by hegemony). They wanted to be a partner one can rely on. They flooded the Third World with aid and investments, without questioning the state of human rights and democracy. They effectively washed away the influence of the West there.
In the years 2002-2005 I was the director of the policy planning department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Its pleasant side was the possibility of carrying out the so-called policy planning consultations with foreign ministries of other countries. These consultations provided an opportunity to meet interesting diplomats with intellectual ambitions and to talk about problems on the global or regional agenda from a different, less bureaucratic perspective, abandoning the straightjacket of official positions. Consultations with Chinese partners (both in Warsaw and Beijing) stood out from other meetings. We could consider each issue from an almost stratospheric height, in almost historiosophical optics, and with the use of an Aesopian style that made impossible for us to fall into polemical narratives. In addition, Chinese partners sat down to the table with a thick book containing positions on all possible questions and issues. If the issue I raised did not find a suitable reference in the Chinese knowledge script, it was not picked up. Everything was accompanied by smiles and nods. This created an overwhelming impression that the consultations were treated by the Chinese as part of the “charm offensive” campaign and that it was not worth wasting too much time on the exegesis of their Aesopian (Confucian-like) language. But the very fact that China was interested in such regular and comprehensive consultations brought for Poland important added value. Because it was done in the “one-on-one” formula, not “seventeen plus one”. After 2006, the policy planning dialogue never reached such intensity, and between 2016 and 2021 there was no policy planning dialogue at all.
The concept of the single belt and the new silk road became the vehicle of Chinese foreign policy in the new millennium. Nothing, however, made the Chinese view of the world more aware of the Chines ambitions than the world’s land and sea routes converging in China. The Belt and Road initiative confirmed the inevitable rebirth of Sinocentrism (even if initially in a mild form).
But the more Janus-like face of a superpower China was also being revealed more and more. Politics took on more nationalistic features. The growing military potential was its important instrument. The era of Xi Jinping is an attempt to create a new concept of Chinese policy, with the rejection of “Deng” self-restraint, assumption of assertiveness, and military expansionism. China began to push its way through the seas in Southeast Asia (building military infrastructure in the Spratly archipelago, etc.), reheated the territorial dispute with Japan, and inflamed the border dispute with India in 2020.
The breakdown of Hong Kong’s autonomy is assessed as a turning point in Chinese policy. China began to act like a hegemon (so far regional) and challenged the West. It’s as if Deng’s Testament is no longer valid.
China has launched an information offensive that had not been practiced before. And they got caught up in hacking and espionage scandals. When I got to the Secretariat of the Council of Europe, I found out that the most hacking attacks on the organization’s servers came from China, although in the Council of Europe no secrets are kept (maybe the reason was that the Secretary General of the Council of Europe was also the chairman of the committee, which awarded in 2010 the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo). And the COVID-19 epidemic has exposed China’s enormous disinformation potential.
At the same time, China, when the Trump administration was unleashing disputes and trade wars, became the main defender of globalization. Which was commendable, but its credibility was flimsy, because in fact China was thinking about the interests of Chinese exports. Even if the internal market is currently treated there as a priority engine for economic growth, entire industries that live on exports still function there.
China’s behaviour has acquired the mark of “wolf diplomacy”. Its essence is blackmailing partners by limiting relations (especially trade ones) if they allow themselves to criticize China. When the European Union introduced sanctions for human rights violations in Xinjiang in 2021, China responded hard with retaliatory sanctions against parliamentarians, European institutions and even researchers and analysts. They gave an unequivocal signal that they would not allow themselves to be challenged by anyone and that they were ready to confront the West.
One consequence of Chinese policy was the creation of the so-called Quad, i.e. the format of cooperation between the USA, Japan, Australia and India. India’s joining it is a significant fact, even if they stipulate that their interest in dialogue is now focused on fighting the epidemic and economic issues. The Quad is undoubtedly an attempt to build a regional counterbalance to China’s policy.
Taiwan remains a priority for China. Forcible reunification would be a sign of openly questioning the role of the US in world and regional politics. Its far-reaching consequences are hard to imagine. But reunification of Taiwan would be for Xi the crowning element of his political legacy. Sometimes personal obsessions lead to policy blunders.
China’s behaviour should come as no surprise. For years China has been contesting the dominance of the West in world politics. But so far they have been hiding behind the backs of others. It was Russia that took on the burden of contestation. China remained in the shadows. Russia has a military potential that poses an existential threat to the US and the West. And it has pursued an aggressive policy in recent years (aggression against Georgia, annexation of Crimea, occupation of Donbas, intervention in Syria to rescue Assad). But it is objectively a smaller challenge, because it depends more on the West (to sell raw materials there and import technology). China has, unlike Russia, the economic potential to challenge the West. Their GDP in absolute terms exceeded the level of 70 percent of US GDP, and measured in terms of purchasing power, is already the highest in the world.
The Western policy towards China has proved to be inaccurate and ineffective over the past thirty years. It can be called the “policy of five illusions” (following the example of Chinese systematization habits).
The first illusion was that the West believed that China would become democracy as it grew rich. Meanwhile, they have created one of the most intrusive and oppressive authoritarian regimes.
The second illusion was that Russia would understand that it was played out by China and could be at most a Robin alongside the Chinese Batman. And it will distance itself from China. But Russia remains close to China all the time and treats the West as its greatest threat.
The third illusion was the belief that by ignoring the state of human rights in China (when developing economic relations) it was possible to simultaneously solve human rights problems in Russia or Cuba, and in the world in general. As a result, economic cooperation with China developed smoothly, and no sanctions were involved. And the state of human rights in China has increasingly exposed the duality of Western political standards. At the same time, China’s economic successes encouraged other autocrats to build prosperity on the basis of the so-called socio-political stability, i.e. without democracy.
The fourth illusion was that it was believed that the world could be saved from confrontation (a new global cold war) by focusing on common threats (ecology). For China, however, these issues (despite the declarations that are currently being made) remain of secondary importance. Even such a threat that seems appealing to the imagination today, like global pandemics, when it comes down to it, are played by China in terms of strictly national interests.
And finally, the fifth (very European) illusion was that China was only an American problem, economically and strategically. Europe decided to stand aside in the nineties. It was also believed in Brussels that by treating China as a threat, we would succumb to the logic of a self-fulfilling prophecy. And we would call the wolf out of the forest: China would become a threat because we left them no other option.
The West now, and the Trump administration’s big role in this, has recognized that China is a threat after all. Biden’s team took over this assessment. But it is not easy to mobilize the West for a more assertive policy towards China.
Unlike the situation in the Cold War, this time neither Russia nor China have any intention of exporting their own political model to the West. They only want full legitimacy of their own (oppressive) model of governance. So the West does not live in fear that one day it will wake up under the red banner. Both Russia and China do not mind the West being able to live its own way at all times. On the contrary. They believe that the Western liberal model of society will break down the West from within and make the West unable to aspire to any hegemonic role. All Russia and China are saying is: let’s not interfere in internal affairs. Live for yourself, West, as you like, but also let others live.
The West, and Europe in particular, has now embraced the slogan of solving great general civilizational challenges. The big problem with this thinking is that it is impossible to solve the great challenges of the modern world without making a decisive effort to implement the idea of a one world concept. And it is impossible to create a unified world while both Chinese and Russian authoritarianism persists. While they are waiting for the West to decompose itself from within and perish with the decay of unbridled liberalism.
When Germany and France put forward the initiative of the alliance for multilateralism in 2019, Russia responded in January 2020 with the concept of a concert of five permanent members of the Security Council, strongly backed by China. And the concert of the so-called P5 is nothing but a disguised version of the “five hegemons”. Accepting it would mean the West’s consent that nothing can be done in the world without China and Russia.
