Speaking a common language, cultural similarities, a common past (not necessarily a rosy one), even with ethnic or religious differences, are a natural factor in developing special relationships. The most recognizable community in this regard is the English language community. Over two billion people speak English. The core of the Anglosphere are the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, countries with a total population of almost half a billion people. In over a dozen others, including Ireland, the so-called the West Indies countries, English is the primary language of communication. The core of the Anglosphere is not covered by the framework of comprehensive institutional cooperation (political, economic or military), but it cooperates in a fragmentary manner in a very close and intensive way. The USA, Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand form a world-unique intelligence alliance (“Five Eyes”), established during the Second World War, developed during the Cold War and continued successfully after its end.
As a proof of the strength of the anglospheric ties one has mentioned recently the forging of the so-called AUKUS framework in 2021 providing for cooperation between Australia, United Kingdom and US in equipping Australia with nuclear-powered submarines as well as missiles for its navy.
In diplomatic practice, the peculiarly understood principle of “blood is thicker than water” applies within the Commonwealth of Nations. In the very name of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, relations with the Commonwealth are separated from other foreign affairs. Diplomatic representations of Commonwealth members in another Commonwealth country are not called embassies but “high commissions”, and diplomatic representatives are not ambassadors but “high commissioners”. In practice, it is impossible to notice significant differences (even with regard to diplomatic precedence), but the symbolic value is undeniable. In addition, the United Kingdom, as a rule, offers its readiness to represent the interests of Commonwealth members in countries where they do not have their diplomatic and consular representations.
The Commonwealth of Nations was established in its present form in 1949 (the London Declaration) and brings together 54 countries. In only fifteen of them, the Queen of England remains the head of state. Jan Smuts, the South African statesman (and military commander in the rank of field marshal) is considered to be the author of the idea of the Commonwealth. In 1917, he used the term “British commonwealth”, which was quickly picked up as a handy term for the waning British Empire, when empires had become ill-associated in the post-war era and colonial dependencies began to loosen. The Balfour Declaration of 1926 formalized the format of the Commonwealth as an equal union of Great Britain and the Dominions (then Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland and Ireland). Dominions gained thus an autonomous and equal status, placing them above ordinary British colonies. In 1931, the Statute of Westminster was adopted, and the British Commonwealth of Nations became a union of sovereign states (of the Dominions, only Newfoundland, now part of Canada, did not enter there).
With the dissolution of the Empire, most of the former colonies joined the ranks of the Commonwealth member states. But not all of them. In 1949, Ireland left the Commonwealth. Egypt and some Arab states and Myanmar did not ever join it.
The basis of membership is the recognition of the British Queen as the head of the Commonwealth. Members must in principle have a historically constitutional bond with Great Britain. But neither Mozambique nor Rwanda had such a connection when they were admitted to the ranks of the organization. Similarly, with the requirement to use English as a means of communication. Mozambique is eminently lusophone. These are not the only aspects of the lack of coherence.
The criteria for membership in the Commonwealth also refer to the factor of values (Harare Declaration adopted in 1991). Its members are to respect, inter alia, peace, rule of law, human rights, tolerance, non-discrimination. In practice, the enforcement of these principles was not always consistent. Several countries have been suspended from membership for breach of the rules, such as Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe and Fiji. But the Commonwealth sanctions seem to have had secondary impact on the behaviour of states. Some members of the Commonwealth realized this. In 2011, a special group established to develop ideas for the revival of the Commonwealth prepared a long list, including over one hundred recommendations. However, it was difficult to find a consensus for them. The new Commonwealth Charter adopted in 2013 did not contain any major ground-breaking provisions.
The United States, once a British colony, has been always outside the Commonwealth, but if the Anglosphere still has a significant political dimension for the British, it is through a “special relationship” linking Great Britain with the United States. Following Brexit, the revival of this special relationship was seen as the main means of building Britain’s position on the global scene. Despite the fact that Barack Obama tried to make the British people aware that the key to their strong position, also in relations with the USA, is membership in the European Union.
The concept of “special relationship” appeared in circulation mainly thanks to Winston Churchill and against the background of the close cooperation of both countries in the military effort during World War II. Historically, relations between the two countries were difficult, and even initially quite hostile. The American Declaration of Independence of 1776 humiliated the British. Relations have been strained since the beginning. There was another war in 1812 (and the British burned down both the White House and the Capitol in 1814). During the Civil War, London tended initially to support the Confederates. Although Great Britain supported the Monroe doctrine, it was not until World War I that there was significant political rapprochement with the USA.
The British saw in the Americans not only the descendants of their own migrants, who spoke the same language, but also people who were mentally close, practicing political liberalism, believing in the power of trade and private enterprise, professing a Protestant ethic of life and work.
America’s entry into World War I tipped the scales in favour of the Entente. Soon, however, the Americans retreated to traditional isolationism, left on the shoulders of the British to care for the League of Nations, which they themselves had invented, engaged in military rivalry on the seas, knocking Great Britain off the throne of “the lady of the seas and oceans”. However, when France fell in World War II, and with it the role of the “entente cordiale” diminished as a guarantee of security, US aid acquired an existential significance for Great Britain. There was an integration of the armed effort of both countries (the institution of joint chiefs of staff was established), building a common vision of the post-war world arrangement (Atlantic Charter), strict political coordination (Churchill met with Roosevelt 11 times, exchanged 1700 letters and messages, and Roosevelt was for him as he himself jokingly described after the famous situation of finding him naked after leaving the bath: a person from whom he had nothing to hide, and the only head of state whom he accepted as prime minister in the costume of Adam). It was Churchill who used the formula of “special relationship” for the first time, but only in 1944. He was aware that the waning superpower status of Great Britain would not ensure equality of the partnership. In his post-war speeches, he referred to the US’s special relationship with the British Commonwealth (and the Empire). Thus, as decolonization progressed, the Commonwealth of Nations was an instrument of building a political base for Great Britain, which would make its value as a partner in the special relationship with the USA credible. The Americans left some of their armed forces on the territory of Great Britain, used British bases and infrastructure, and allowed the British to work on nuclear technology.
A cold shower for the British came during the Suez crisis of 1956. The Americans forced Britain and France to abort the military operation, sided with the Soviets in the United Nations until their intervention in Egypt was stopped. The British drew conclusions from the crisis favourable from America’s point of view. They decided to tighten their cooperation with the USA, accepting the status of a junior partner. Kennedy soon abandoned the “grand coalition” format for discussing European security (the Paris summit in this “four powers” format was still held in May 1960, overshadowed by the scandal of shooting down U2, but the Vienna summit in 1961 after the Cuban crisis (but also to discuss the German problem) had an exclusively US-Soviet bilateral character. The British fell out of great Cold War politics.
The Americans decided to quit the Skybolt program without consulting London, despite the fact that the missiles were to be the basis of Britain’s nuclear strike potential. Britain was then offered the Polaris systems, along with the corresponding submarines, which allowed the British to maintain their status as a nuclear power. Secretary of State Acheson then spoke words that would sound very topical today in relation to Brexit. He said that Britain has lost its empire and has yet to find a role for itself. Trying to play the role of a separate power, that is, a role separate from Europe, a role based on a “special relationship” with the United States, a role based on being the leader of a “Commonwealth” that has neither a political structure, nor unity, nor strength, and based on fragile and uncertain economic relations, this role is no longer tenable. This gnomic sentence, however, has not reached the ears of Brexiters nowadays.
Harold Wilson undoubtedly disappointed the Americans by refusing to allocate troops to support the Americans in Vietnam (as Australia and New Zealand did). Soon Great Britain focused on integrating with Europe (initially only in the economic dimension), and Edward Heath called the relationship with America no longer “special” but rather “natural relationship”.
The “special bond” was revived in the days of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. They were close ideologically (anti-communism), shared the conviction about the need for a tough policy towards the USSR and the faith in liberal economic policy. When the British had to recapture the Falklands in 1982, the Americans openly supported them (contrary to Monroe’s doctrine) and were ready to assign them even one of the aircraft carriers (Reagan instructed the Pentagon: “Give Maggie everything she needs to get on with it”).
The next high point of the “special relationship” came with George W. Bush and Tony Blair working together in world politics. Blair fervently supported America in the war on terror and the intervention in Iraq. His critics in Great Britain did not hesitate to sew him the label of an “American poodle” (combined with the famous, but it is not known if true, greeting from Bush: “Yo, Blair”).
Britain has never come close to this level of political intimacy since then. Even when Donald Trump tried to please Boris Johnson with the prospect of a glowing relationship after finalizing Brexit. And even if Britain ever reaches this level again, the “special relationship” will inevitably be of an increasingly asymmetric character.
Ever American ally would like to be seen as endowed with the highest sympathy and special status on the part of the hegemon. In fact, Great Britain enjoys this status and continues to this day. Americans did not talk politically so frankly with anyone, even when Great Britain was a member of the European Union, nor shared information and opinions with anyone so abundantly. In private, I envied British diplomats that when they came to the meetings at the State Department, they walked swiftly through the gates showing their “passes”, while we Poles, also allies, had to wait for the “guest” badges to be issued and the official escorting us to appear.
But the Americans also took the Germans very seriously, considering them to be the main European force since the mid-1950s. Never has Poland experienced such closeness and trust as enjoyed by the British and (to some extent) Germany. Even if during Trump’s presidency Polish leaders thought that Poland would win over America’s feelings by daily submissiveness and servility, and mistook courtesy from Trump for political commitments.
Our involvement in Iraq (and also in Afghanistan) at the beginning of the millennium increased the value of Poland in the eyes of the Bush administration (the same happens today in the context of the Russian aggression on Ukraine but will it be used politically?). At that time in 2003, both France and Germany entered into a polemic with Washington. Following Aznar’s departure, the Spaniards distanced themselves from participating in the operation in Iraq. And Poland took on a difficult role when it agreed to share responsibility for the operation in Iraq (although only the US and the United Kingdom had the formal status of occupation states). I experienced this unprecedentedly serious treatment by the American side in the years 2003-2005, when I was the director of policy planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then the deputy foreign minister. When I went in May 2003 as director for planning consultations to Washington for the first time, our embassy produced more than ten long messages of my conversations. Until the leadership of the ministry had to intervene with our ambassador, that it was too much, that it was an exaggeration to start the day with the need to read three or four reports from the conversations of Director Ĺwitalski in Washington. There was just so much of me that it looked like a showcase. Nevertheless, the dispatches contained messages, whatever to say, with original and interesting content (and that is why they were sent by the Embassy to Warsaw), which was solely the merit of my American interlocutors (and a sign of trust and respect).
In 2004, Adam D. Rotfeld and Richard Armitage inaugurated the Polish-American strategic dialogue. The Americans came to the presidential residence in Hel, where the talks were held, with a solid delegation. In 2005, as a follow-up, I was supposed to continue the strategic dilague as deputy minister in Washington with the then Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns. Minister Rotfeld decided that he should bear witness to the importance we attached to dialogue, and he also went to Washington. He opened the consultation, had a brief meeting with Condoleezza Rice. And left the floor for me.
It was a time when our policy was not so monothematic and it was not limited to the issues of Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus). Our involvement in Iraq kept our horizons open. At that time, we still had active outstanding Arab world experts, excellent sinologists and Oriental diplomats (e.g. specialists in Korea or Iran). The Americans were clearly interested in the opinions of our diplomats. And some of these opinions, for example, were very critical (not to say, from today’s perspective, prophetic ones). The Americans did not mind that most of our diplomats on these oriental affairs were MGIMO graduates. Well, it even increased the value of their expertise. After a dozen or so years, when the personnel policy of some ministers and natural processes did their job, our achievements at that time look as if they had been wasted. A noticeable staffing gap has developed that cannot be replaced even by the most talented graduates of linguistics or ethnography.
During the strategic dialogue in Washington in 2005, the Americans shared several important assessments and signalled their position on some issues, including those important for European cooperation. So I decided to return to Warsaw via Berlin and discuss the conclusions of the consultations with the USA for Polish-German political cooperation. I have always believed that a close and partnership dialogue with Germany is strategically important for our foreign policy. I conveyed to my counterpart in Auswertiges Amt the news of a negative change in the American position on an issue important for Berlin. The reaction of the interlocutor shocked me. There was a resentment in his voice that he was learning this from me, that Americans could talk to Poles so honestly and in partnership. Was it jealousy, envy or regret that they lost (due to the quite irritating actions of President Bush and statements by Chancellor Schroeder) the status of a privileged partner in dialogue with the hegemon, or just an emotional outburst after hearing bad news for Germany? It was not the first time that I noticed that the generation of senior German foreign ministry diplomats at that time had a problem with accepting Poland as a parity (first-league) political partner. Even if their bosses, such as Joschka Fischer, wanted to treat Poland like that.
